Power Vacuum

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Chapter 1: Power Vacuum

Taking advantage of the power vacuum that comes about when friction arises among various demographics is one of the oldest methods of attaining influence. The United States is known for applying this tactic in multiple countries. And so is Russia. This book will explain that Ukraine can also play this game to good effect if they wanted to and by doing so, they would be able to reclaim all of Ukraine, even the breakaway regions of the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic. The reason this book takes this approach is because if a negotiated settlement was met with widespread condemnation in Kyiv prior to the Bucha massacre, any negotiated settlement afterwards—which doesn't involve the complete removal of Russian troops from Ukraine, as well as the return of the breakaway regions back into the control of Ukraine—would also be met with condemnation and possibly even more hostility that could lead to the ousting of President Zelenskyy, someone who is clearly a man of peace but now compelled to attain justice for the victims of the Bucha Massacre. The book Anthony's Treaty laid out a peace plan that could have led to Ukraine being given back all of its internationally recognized territory. The separatists would have plead guilty to terrorism and been exiled to Russia for 10 years, as well as paid a pension from the Russian government. Russia would have removed its troops from Ukraine and took responsibility for the violation of ceasefires during the 8 year civil war in Donbass. In exchange for allowing water into Crimea, Russia would have allowed Crimea to hold referendums every 10 years for 100 years. Finally, eastern Ukraine would have been given 500 years to transition over to the Ukrainian language. Such a treaty is almost untenable now and in theory could only be implemented if Ukraine gains a significant military advantage over Russia as well as a deterrence mechanism to keeps Russia from encroaching the country ever again. This book explains in detail how such is possible with other forms of warfare, one being taking advantage of the power vacuum, another being the use of both economic terrorism and critical racial theories, both of which don't require resorting to the use of violent terrorism. It must be said, however, that violent terrorism has worked to some effect especially when it came to Chechnya's independence from Russia in 1996 and Algeria independence from France in 1960, but at the same time especially in the case Chechnya's second war with Russia, terrorism worked against them and led to Russian eventually annexing the entire country. The aforementioned non-violent tactics, however, may suit Zelenskyy's liberalism and his inclination to non-

violence, with power vacuum exploitation being the most advantageous.

Russian operatives operating in the United States have possibly pulled off the greatest act of fomenting social unrest and division in the country of a major power, to the point that if Russia decided to invade the United States, at least 40% of those living in there would welcome them with open arms. Not only has Russia successfully carried out this task of helping to sow discord in the United States, they also did the same in eastern Ukraine, offering to aid the separatists if they could provoke unrest throughout the Donbass region and give Russia a justification to intervene and way of getting water and other supplies into Crimea. If we go back to 2016 in the United States, political and racial tensions were brewing throughout the country. Police brutality and the ethnic overtones that it was given gave rise to an ethnocentric movement that alienated other demographics in the country. While Russian operatives did not facilitate the rise of the various divisive movements in the country, they did help accentuate the division by supporting both sides of the social and political unrest. Russian operatives set up multiple fake accounts on social media encouraging support for the Black Lives Matter(BLM) movement. But they also set up accounts encouraging its opposition such as the Trump movement and the alt-right movement. Russian operatives were also involved in organizing protests on behalf of both sides of the discord. This mode of operation ultimately achieved its objective to divide the country and weaken it internally, and it quite possibly emboldened Russia to defy US threats aimed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine since Russia, in observation of the friction in the US, could assume that a large number of demographics in the US would actually support Russia in order to shirk their political opposition. One can say that the political climate in the US and the intensity of the discord there is why the Ukraine war has garnered so much coverage in the west. Because if we look at the war objectively, its not the first time that Russia has launched a full-scale invasion of one of its neighbors. Russia invaded Chechnya in 1994, and Georgia both in 1993 and 2008. And in both cases, there was no where near as much western outrage, coverage, or support on behalf on either Georgia or Chechnya. Hence, we can affirm that there is a politicized aspect applied to what is happening in Ukraine that ultimately drives the attention towards it. We can say that the division in America has worked for in favor of both Ukraine and Russia in some ways.

The western media in recent years has for the most part taken a contrarian stance to GOP politics in America, due to the election of Donald Trump in 2016. In an effort to alleviate embarrassment and

distance themselves from the movement that Trump had surrounding him at that time, the media would often side against any perspective they felt was upheld by the conservative outlook. Likewise, in order to distance themselves from the left-leaning media, many of Trump's supporters would automatically side with Russia presuming that such was standard modus operandi of getting in formation against the opposition. Hence, we see how Russia was able to achieve the effect they wanted. However, there is plenty of evidence that the GOP was not entirely pro-Russian since republican senators like Lindsey Graham and John McCain were instrumental in getting weapons sent to Ukraine in the first place. But, nonetheless, because of Russian influence in the 2016 elections, it was still heavily perceived that the GOP was pro-Russian and it came to be the case that many GOP supporters also had that same outlook and would thus support Russia because of this perception. It was also maintained that Russia only interfered in the 2016 elections in order to have Donald Trump elected, and because of this, despite evidence that Russia supported Trump's extremist opposition movements like BLM and Antifa, many would hastily presume that by distancing themselves from the GOP, while providing a platform for their extremist opposition groups like BLM and Antifa, they were also distancing themselves from Russia. This was not the case because the democrats, in providing a platform for extremists in other demographics outside of the white male republican demographic, were unwittingly also playing to Russia's hands because extremist elements in other demographics were indeed supported by Russian operatives. A number of ethnocentric groups in the United States have ties to the Russian Government. In fact the FBI recently raided a pro-black solidarity socialist group on suspicion of having ties with the Kremlin. Furthermore, another factor that led heightened GOP support for Russia was because Donald Trump, during his tenure, was open about his admiration of Russian President Putin. However, back in 2017 a perplexity arose, when President Trump approved sending lethal military aid to Ukraine in a move that didn't fit the Trump/pro-Russia narrative, western media agencies like Reuters condemned it. They published an article in 2017 disapproving of the decision to arm Ukraine. The commentary by Daniel DePetris was entitled "Why the U.S. shouldn't send arms to Ukraine." There were also many reports among western media that Ukraine had a neo-nazi problem. But after 2019, when the quid-pro-quo scandal occurred with Trump threatening to cut off lethal aid to Ukraine, the media shifted their stance on Ukraine in order to remain contrary to the GOP. Ultimately, the contrarianism would set the left-leaning media against Russia. But it's a huge misconception to believe that Russia was decidedly on the side of the

GOP since there is evidence that Russia was playing both sides of the friction and supporting all extremist movements that could further divide the country. While the democrats presume that by upholding critical theories like Critical Race Theory is a way of distancing themselves from the Trump movement and Russia, in reality that also plays into the hands of Russia's goal of dividing and destabilizing the country. Hence we can presume that Russia's interference in the 2016 election was not in support of any party. It was only in support of what would ignite the most division within the US, evident by the fact that after the election of Donald Trump, Russian operatives still remained active in their support of ethnocentric movements in the US opposed to the Republican party. One can easily surmise that Russian operatives are currently supporting the radical elements in every and any demographic and anyone doing the same to some extent is ultimately aligning themselves with Russia's goals of destabilizing the country whether they know it or not. It is quite possible that Russia has already achieved their goal since the trajectory of the US is leading towards a possible civil war. The power vacuum left from the division in the US leaves the door open for Russia to completely cripple the United States for good, which is something a civil war would do.

Russia was also instrumental in facilitating separatism in Ukraine, leaving a power vacuum that would lead to Russia eventually gaining control over 20% of eastern Ukraine. The power vacuum was such that Kyiv's opposition in eastern Ukraine ultimately begged Russia to come in and invade because in 2014 when Ukraine was on the verge of quickly defeating the separatists in the Donetsk People's Republic(DPR), those defeats suffered by the DPR compelled Igor Girkin, the then leader of separatists, to implore Russia for reinforcements. He argued that the defeat of the DPR would reflect badly on the Russian Federation, since it was President Vladimir Putin that named the republic "New Russia." Russia obliged and now because of that, Russia has gained control over 20% of Ukraine's territory. This book argues that in order to eliminate that power vacuum of Ukrainian speakers versus Russian speakers, Zelenskyy has to get as many people in Ukraine back to the middle and away from the extremes. Not only that, Zelenskyy will have to develop a critical race theory and conduct his own version of clandestine affairs in eastern Ukraine, but instead of fomenting separatism between Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers, he would have to foment friction between those elements in eastern Ukraine who are against joining the Russian Federation and those who are for joining the Russian Federation. And in such a way that those who are on the side of autonomy will lean on the side of Kyiv and away from the Russian

Federation. There are certain things that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is doing to work against the Kremlin and these things can be exploited by Zelenskyy to great effect.

The Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) of the United States has taken advantage of power vacuums in a number of countries throughout the years. Back in the 1950s, after the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran, the US eventually got involved in the political process there when Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected Prime Minister. Back in the 1940s when oil was just getting to be known as a major resource in Iran, the US, UK, and Soviet Union all made attempts to exploit the oil rich nation. The Anglo-Iranian oil company was formed, but many of the royalities were being withheld from Iran while England was reaping most of the profits. Just prior to Mohammad Mosaddegh becoming Iran's Prime Minister in 1952, he helped to create legislation that would allow Iran to nationalize the Anglo-Iranian oil company, and after he became Prime Minister, the international community refused to buy oil from the now nationalized Anglo-Iranian oil company. Many feared that Mohammad Mosaddegh was a communist. Because Iran had been constitutional monarchy since 1944 with the Shah as the head of it, the US took advantage of the power vacuum that arose from the rift between the Shah and the Prime Minister of Iran over the powers concerning both positions. The CIA had been supporting all of Mosaddegh's political opposition, but later engaged the Shah with bribes and persuaded him to orchestrate a coup against Mosaddegh and have him removed from power. This coup was carried out in 1953, which led to General Fazlollah Zahedi being installed to replace him. Later that same decade and into the next, the US used economic warfare in Cuba to turn the people against the Castro government. Fiden Castro had come to power in 1958 after ousting the US backed leader General Fulgencio Batista during the Cuban Revolution. After Fidel came to power and then nationalized a US-Cuban oil company, the US employed numerous tactics to overthrow his government, using assassination plots and preventing Cuba from exporting and importing certain goods. Later on when John F Kennedy became president of the United States, all of Cuba's exports were embargoed and that embargo still holds to this day. Later on in the 1990s in Iraq, the US attempted to persuade the Saddam Hussein's Shia opposition and Kurdish minorities to overthrow his government. This is led to a brutal crackdown by Saddam's government and a refusal of the US to help the Shia and Kurdish militias they encouraged to rebel. The Shia uprising was a complete failure and many of them were slaughtered by Saddam's forces. The Kurds on the other hand were still at least able to establish autonomy for themselves in northern Iraq.

There has been much conjecture about the role that the US played in helping to encourage unrest in Ukraine. While Russia had been trying to bring Ukraine back into its sphere of influence since the early 2000s when Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma had begun to encounter significant disapproval over corruption scandals, the United States had become concerned about Russia's ability to hamper the US's military goals in the middle east, particularly in regards to Syria and Iran, two nations that are staunch allies of the Russian Federation. The US has always been concerned about Iran since the 1979 Iranian revolution when Iran's anti-western mantra of "Death to Israel, Death to the United States" became regularly repeated. The US had such heightened concern about Iran that back in the early 90s, the US made sure to hope that their requests for the overthrow of Saddam in Iraq would only do enough to weaken Iraq to the point where Iraq would no longer be a threat to the US, but still able to keep Iran in check. Iran had been threatening to develop nuclear weapons and because of their policy against the US, the west is concerned about what Iran might do if they are able to develop them. Iran has centrifuge technology that would allow them to enrich Uranium at record speed should they seek to develop a nuclear weapon. In lieu of this prospect, the US would simply invade the country if they could and install a different leadership, but since the US is aware that Russia will almost certainly come to Iran's aid, diplomacy becomes the only option to pursue. Russia is also a major supplier of heavy weapons to Iran, providing to them air defense systems that could provide heavy resistance to a potential US invasion. But this is not only aspect that triggered a US strategy against Iran. Iran, in fact, took advantage of the power vacuum that came about in Iraq after the US invaded Iraq in 2003. The power vacuum that arose came from large segments of the Iraqi Shiite population that did not want foreign troops on their soil, irrespective of whether or not those troops were there to help them. For many Shias in Iraq, it did not matter that the US was there to overthrow the Sunni government and replace it with a Shiite majority. For them, the atrocity was having foreign troops on their soil. This left an opening in Iraq that Iran could exploit. This new demographic of Shias against US occupation was perfectly suited to Iran's geopolitics and hence it would lead to Iran backing the Shiite-faction of the Iraq insurgency against US forces in 2005. With Iran having such close ties to Russia, the US could not simply strike Iran in order to deter them from aiding the insurgency. The next best option was to find ways to distract Russia from what is happening in the middle east, hence the Bush administration announced in 2008 that Ukraine and Georgia could be admitted into NATO. This helped trigger Russia's full scale invasion of Georgia, which didn't last long

enough to keep Russia occupied in eastern Europe as opposed to the middle east. Thus Iran was able to continue supporting its proxies in Iraq in attacking US bases there without worry of the US launching a military intervention inside Iran. Meanwhile starting around the time of the Iraq insurgency, Syria after initially helping the US in the war on terror had begun providing safe passage to Al Qaeda militants seeking to get into Iraq to join the resistance movements. Syria was also allowing the Iran to use its territory to set up bases and ship weapons to its proxies in Yemen, Lebanon, and the Gaza strip. The US later saw an opportunity to overthrow Syria's Assad regime in 2011 during the Arab Spring when protests were often met with lethal force from Assad's police force. This created a power vacuum and gave the US the justification to side with the violent separatists and help foment a civil war in the country. However, this led to Russian intervention in Syria in 2015, which prevented the US from carrying out its goal of removing Assad from power. It is certain that Russia's subversive behavior towards US hegemonic policy in the middle east is what drove the US to send heavy weapons to Ukraine in 2017, figuring that it would force Russia to remain focused on issues in eastern Europe. Now with Russia tied up in Ukraine, Russia was left no option but to withdraw from Syria. This opened the door for the US to assert more influence in the region since the value of the US dollar is tied to the security of its allies in the middle east. However, this book explains that a sudden US abandonment of Ukraine could have geopolitical implications that would affect US standing in the middle east as a trustworthy ally, which would in turn threaten the value of the US dollar. Zelenskyy can in fact take advantage of this to ensure even more supplies to his country. Moreover, when it comes to US helping orchestrate a coup in Ukraine, there some misconception regarding the players involved, and it is widely presumed in conservative circles that the democrats were instrumental, but looking back it was a largely bi-partisan effort that was led by republicans. Back in 2013, US republican Senator John McCain traveled to Ukraine to help support the anti-government protesters in Kyiv, a month after police began to use violence to quell the protests. Once again a power vaccum arose that made it very easy for the US to step into Ukrainian affairs. During that time, McCain expressed his concern that Russia was attempting to stifle freedom and democracy and that Ukraine should distance themselves from Moscow. The unrest created a window of opportunity for the US to side with the anti-government groups in Ukraine, not just to steer them away from Moscow, but also to lean them in favor of the United States. Later it was revealed that Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland, in a phone conversation with US

Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffery Pyatt, had endorsed Arseniy Yatsenyuk as the best candidate to become Prime Minister of Ukraine in the new government, and she had also expressed a desire to keep the EU out of Ukraine's political affairs. Yatsenyuk was part of the opposition that stood against Yanukovych. But because the agreement to allow then Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych to remain president until the next elections did not fall thru—with the outcome instead being Yanukovych getting ousted, some political circles in the west presumed that this was a US backed coup and because it happened during the Obama/Biden Administration, many presumed that it was largely partisan and led by democrats, but its clear that both sides were looking to gain an edge in Ukraine—at that time the democrats politically and the republicans militarily. In fact, back in 2012 during that time it was republican Senator Mitt Romney warning the democrats about the threat Russia posed to the United States. In 2013 and 2015, John McCain was criticizing the democrats about their lack of military support for Ukraine against Russian aggression. In 2017, it was republican President Donald Trump that agreed to send heavy weapons to Ukraine and republican senators Lindsey Graham and John McCain had actually traveled to Ukraine a year before to reassure Ukrainian forces that the US will provide them with the weapons that they needed to defend themselves against Russian aggression. In retrospect, after the ousting of Viktor Yanukovych, Russia would end up accusing the US of orchestrating regime change in Ukraine. Regardless, the heightened division in Ukraine allowed both Russia and the US to take advantage of the power vacuum. Russia subsequently annexed Crimea and instigated a civil war in the Donbass region in 2014 and left Ukraine in a bloody fratricidal 8 year civil war before invading the country in 2022 and carrying out numerous war crimes. This book presents the idea that while both Russia and the United States can play this game of taking advantage of power vacuums in order to steer the politics and military in their favor, President Zelenskyy of Ukraine will have the opportunity to do so as well and possibly bring Ukraine back into Kyiv's sphere of influence.

Chapter 2: Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Russia decided to invade Ukraine on similar false pretenses used by the US as justification to invade Iraq—the prospect of a smaller country attaining high-powered weapons that could be used offensively against the larger country. Just prior to the Russian invasion, Ukraine posed no threat to the Russian Federation, and not only that, there was no precipitating event, such as a major terrorist attack inside of Russia, that would have warranted Russia's full scale invasion of the country. This is why geopolitical policies of Russia and the United States has forced the world to examine both how the laws of war are applied, and also how other countries might have to prepare for a future possible unjustified attack from the great powers of the world such as Russia, the United States or China. Ukraine has put up a valiant fight against the Russian invasion into their country, and is attempting to launch a counteroffensive in the Kherson region before the winter sets in. While many Ukrainian officials are concerned about what the winter will bring as far as how it will impact strategy, Zelenskyy has nonetheless vowed to continue fighting against Russian forces amid fears from Ukrainian officials that during the winter, Russia could target Ukraine's thermal infrastructure and prevent them from being able to provide adequate heat to much of the population. This would lead to emigration and another refugee crisis as more Ukrainians would leave the country seeking adequate winter shelter. Ukraine will look to end its active phase of the war before winter starts, but if Zelenskyy insists on further resistance, another strategy could be applied, one that involves other ways to resist aggression that don't involve firing artillery. Other tactics will have to be explored because the winter brings about many challenges on the battlefield. NATO has warned about this and is lobbying to get more winter uniforms to Ukraine, as well as generators that would provide heat to soldiers and prevent soldiers from dying in freezing conditions. If Ukraine is able to have more winter gear, while Russia encounters a shortage, it could translate to a greater advantage for Ukraine during the winter months. Working around the limitations of the winter will require innovation and oftentimes the smaller country is better at applying resourcefulness in emergency situation. The challenge of winter, as well as the gas shortages in Europe will challenge Europe's continued support for Ukraine, and this is something that Ukraine will have to remain vigilant about. Also, there could be less mobility in the winter, with troops spending even more time holed up in bunkers, taking refuge from artillery strikes, as opposed to conducting high speed advances into enemy territories. Because Ukraine and Russia are no

strangers to cold winters, it is likely that they will both find a way to operate in such conditions. However, the war could end up in a stalemate in the winter since the freezing weather favors the defenders. Areas consolidated by Russian forces will be easy for them to defend. Likewise areas consolidated by Ukrainian forces will be easier for them to hold. It is much easier for a soldier to find shelter in the winter than it is for him to travel and advance or move into enemy territory. Snow and mud ultimately impede the movements of soldiers and vehicles. These factors are why Ukraine has set a goal of recapturing Kherson before the start of winter because if they secure it before that time, they will have an easier time defending it during the winter, which will give them a strategic advantage of possibly reclaiming other territories in the east of Ukraine. On the other hand, the winter factor also works in favor of Russia, allowing them to forecast that Ukraine will not make any more major advances during the winter. This aspect allows Russia to ramp up production of arms, and Russia is already buying arms from North Korea and Iran in an attempt to bolster their supplies in time for the spring and summer of 2023.

The full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, and after Russia advanced into Kyiv in early March of 2022, capturing Bucha, Hostomel, Vorzel, and Irpin, the Ukrainian forces fought back against a Russian assault that had been stalled by logistical problems, morale issues among Russian soldiers (many of whom where defecting to the Ukrainian side), as well as their own underestimation of heavy artillery manned by Ukrainian soldiers. The west, while largely negligent of Ukraine's need for air support, managed to provide the Ukrainian forces with high-tech weapons, which proved vital during the Ukrainian assault to repel the Russian military. Tactical blunders, as well as inadequacy in urban combat, would compel Russian forces to indiscriminately shell Ukrainian cities. Ukraine, however, began to push back against the Russian advance on March 25th, 2022 and was able to recapture various parts of eastern and western Kyiv. By the end of the month, Russian forces began to retreat, but would leave mass destruction in their wake, particularly in the town of Bucha, where close to 1000 civilians were found mutilated and tortured by Russian soldiers. By April 1st, the Ukrainian army reclaimed all of Kyiv. In retrospect, Russia was not prepared for urban warfare, which is why they used Chechen fighters in Bucha, hoping that their experience in fighting against Russia in the 1990s in urban combat scenarios would prove applicable against Ukraine in Kyiv. However, many of those skilled Chechen fighters traveled to Ukraine to help the Ukrainians defend their territory. The Chechens are known for their brutal tactics and in the mid-90s were

able to retain their independence after Russia invaded Chechnya in 1994. The Chechens combined terrorism with highly skilled urban and guerrilla warfare to establish de facto independence from Russia in 1996. As we see in many cases, the only winning strategy that a smaller number of militants can apply against an incoming larger military force is to resort to surprise attacks and ambushes by hiding in places where they would least be expected. Unfortunately, the only way to achieve such is by hiding behind soft targets i.e. schools, hospitals, libraries, and then launching ambush attacks from those positions, which only compromises the safety of civilians in the area, but is often times the only means of self-defense against an enemy that one does not know in advance would be beyond using unscrupulous tactics and terrorist actions. It certainly worked for Chechnya back in the mid-90s. Fast forward to 2022, we see that Ukraine had no way of knowing if the incoming Russian force was indeed attempting to carry out a genocide, which in that case would warrant Ukrainian soldiers getting in place in civilian areas for the sake of protecting civilians who would be in imminent danger. However, the Geneva Convention forces both sides of the conflict to assume that the invading force is not intending to carry out civilian executions and because of that, if one ascribes to the Geneva Convention, the defending nation has to not only allow the invader to enter unopposed but also trust that the invader will have goodwill towards the non-combatants while the defending nation's military leaves the civilian areas unprotected as they go and set up out in the fields far from residential areas. The non-conbatants have to also avoid engaging in hostilities in order to retain their civilian status. So basically, in order to be protected by the Geneva Convention, civilians are prohibited from engaging in self-defense. If they do, they immediately become combatants and are fair game for enemy soldiers. Armies without question take advantage of this loophole, which is a reason why the laws of war have to be reexamined, because at the moment, it favors the more powerful aggressor nation. If we look at some of the old human rights reports, there are plenty of occasions in which military forces would fire artillery into residential areas of which there was no military personnel or military equipment in the area. This is why it becomes imperative for human rights organizations to review how the laws of war are applied. There is so much nuance that has to be addressed and a review of all these factors require a large degree of delineation. Zelenskyy, because he could only presume the worst—that Russia was indeed going to Kyiv to carry out a genocide against Ukrainians, he decided to make it legal for all Ukrainian citizens to take up arms and hostilities against the Russian forces.

After the atrocities they carried out in Bucha, Russia would meanwhile stage a second assault in other regions of Ukraine, particularly in the east and the south, where Russian forces were already gaining ground against the Ukrainian resistance, thanks largely to Russia gaining access to a map of the mine fields, possibly delivered to them by a traitor within Ukraine's ranks. This is heavily owed to how quickly the Russian were able to seize Kherson in just a matter of hours. They then completely surrounded Mariupol by March 18th before entering the city center on March 24th. Much of the water and food supply had been cut off and those civilians who remained stuck there had to wait on negotiations for implementing civilian evacuation corridors, which were often impeded by Russian shelling along evacuation routes. Russia also upscaled their attacks on Odessa, Mykolaiv, and the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in early April. Russia's early gains can be traced back to their seizure of Kherson which made it easy for them to make gains in those other areas. The Russian forces continued to fight in Kharkiv, shelling Ukrainian positions. Kharkiv is less than 22 miles from the Russian border. When Russian forces mobilized reinforcements to enter the towns of Izium, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk, Ukraine ordered that Ukrainian-speakers living near eastern Ukraine evacuate towards the western parts of the country. Much of this was owed to a delay in arms shipments to the eastern parts of Ukraine, shipments which had been promised to Ukraine by the west. Proximity to supply lines of arms shipments was also a factor in the delay. At the beginning of the war, Ukraine's close proximity to supply lines at the Polish border played a critical role in Ukraine being able to resist the initial Russian advance into Kviv, but in the east, Ukrainian forces were further away from those lines, which made it harder to access incoming weapons provided by the west. Thus naturally Russia would have an advantage in the east, considering the fact that Russian forces in that part of the country are in closer proximity to their supply lines of weapons and aid coming from the Russian Federation. Russia was aware of this and subsequently consolidated all of its military personnel in southeastern Ukraine under the single command of Aleksandr Dvomikov.

In Bucha, after the Russian troops fled Kyiv, it had been discovered that war crimes had taken place there. Photo evidence showed scores of dead Ukrainian civilians that had been lined up and shot in the back of the head, execution style. This set the tone for the active phase of the war, during which Ukraine would later retaliate often with vicious tactics. It was reported by Ukrainian newspaper, The Kyiv Independent, that Russian troops killed a number of civilians in Bucha, and human rights organizations confirmed this.

The victims included people simply transporting food, or families trying to escape the fighting. On March 5th, Russian troops fired upon 2 vehicles, one of which included a mother and her two children. Bucha Mayor, Anatoliy Fedoruk, reported to various journalists covering the war that war crimes had occurred in Bucha prior to the Russian retreat. He told the Associated Press that during the fighting the volunteers could not even gather the dead for burial because of the endless shelling by Russian forces. Not to mention, dogs were feeding on the human cadavers that laid in the streets. Many in the international community, in solidarity with Mayor Fedoruk, stated emphatically that Russia was guilty of war crimes. The mayor would also compare the massacres in Bucha to the atrocities committed by the Nazis during WWII. Ironic, considering the fact that Russian troops were telling residents in Bucha that they were there to save them from Nazis. Furthermore, evidence of the tragedy came in the form of videos posted on social media, and the mayor had also noted that among the dead in Bucha, were a number of Russian soldiers—hundreds in fact. Ukrainian soldiers reported finding mutilated bodies comprising of men, women, and children in a basement at a summer camp that was used by the Russian forces as a torture chamber. Some of the acts of torture against Ukrainian civilians involved slicing off ears and pulling out teeth. The Ukrainian newspaper, The Kyiv Independent, posted a photo of a man and three naked women under a blanket whom Russian troops attempted to incinerate before retreating from Bucha. It was confirmed by Ukrainian officials that the women were raped and killed, while the men who were murdered in Bucha were killed execution style as many of the dead Ukrainian men were found with their hands tied behind their backs. A large portion of these victims were going about their day—there were many shopping bags alongside the bodies. In one photo, a man was lifeless next to what appeared to be his bike. It was often the case that many of the dead bodies had civilian clothing, making it all the more likely that civilians in Bucha were targeted for execution. Various news outlets like CNN and BBC aired footage of the scores of dead bodies that lay in the streets, many of which were bounded with legs and arms tied. Some had been shot at point blank range and others were crushed via being run over by tanks. Charred corpses were seen by a playground with evidence of being executed prior to being burned. The style of execution varied from torture to be-headings, to mutilation and incineration. A number of the bodies had also been booby trapped. Many of the residents of Bucha described how drunken Russian soldiers were conducting grave acts of terror and sadism against Ukrainian civilians. When forensics arrived in Bucha, they began the process of excavating those dead

bodies buried in mass graves—one of those graves was near the St. Andrew the Apostle church. Meanwhile, Ukraine was advised to corroborate with the International Criminal Court and gather evidence that would implicate the Russian state of war crimes. Subsequently, it had been discovered that the Russian army was using flechette rounds to maim Ukrainian civilians. Such a mode of offense was considered a violation of humanitarian law. Many residents, who had taken refuge in basements in fear of the Russian presence, confirmed that the dead civilians in Bucha had been murdered by Russian troops. The residents who sought refuge inside their homes were without basic amenities like electricity and had to make use of candles in order to generate heat for boiling water and for cooking meals. They finally appeared in public when Russian troops had evacuated the town, and some first-hand accounts of the massacre cited by news outlets revealed that Russian troops had been taking nearby civilians and using them as basically cannon fodder against the Ukrainian soldiers. One person who was part of a group of Ukrainians executed by Russian soldiers survived by playing dead after being grazed by the executioner's bullet. His group had been caught at a checkpoint and taken captive by Russian troops. They were all tortured, but he was the only one to survive the execution. He later arose and sought refuge at a nearby residence. Many of the Bucha residents describing how the Russian occupation panned out explained to Human Rights Watch that Russian soldiers were going door to door, interrogating residents, and taking from the them, their clothing, jewelry, and other items that they would find useful. The Russian soldiers were also commanding residents to return to their homes, even as resources such as water and food were becoming scarce. The Russia troops continued their assault on the infrastructure of the town. Russian armored vehicles were also firing indiscriminately at buildings, while denying first aid to survivors of the shelling. The residents also explained how Russian troops began digging mass graves for victims of the conflict and for those executed by Russian soldiers. Summary executions were confirmed to have taken place by the Human Rights Watch organization. The New York Times called the massacre at Bucha a "campaign of terror", and noted that Russian soldiers were killing unsuspecting civilians in cold blood, and raping women—some of whom were held captive in a basement and later impregnated as a result of repeated sexual abuse. One resident in Kyiv who witnessed the Bucha occupation by Russian troops and who was present at the headquarters for the Ukrainian defense force when it was raided by Russian military personnel said that the Russians scoured through documents looking for the names of people who participated in the war in Donbass, before targeting

them for execution. He then explained how Russian soldiers specifically sought and executed people who were donning tattoos symbolic of far right and Neo-nazi groups, as well as people who had tattoos that were officially associated with Ukraine. He also told journalists that Chechen fighters were killing people indiscriminately. Later, it had come to the attention of the media that Russian soldiers were seizing cell phones of Ukrainian residents and observing content to see if they held anti-Russian views. When this turned out to be the case, Russian soldiers would either arrest the person or execute them. According to many of the eyewitness accounts, the massacres could be summed up as indiscriminate killings by Russian soldiers against non-combatant Ukrainian civilians, killings that had no justification. One Russian soldier was overheard bragging of his marksmanship, boasting about how he shot two Ukrainians inside their apartment by firing through the windows. When it came to rapes, there were roughly 25 girls and women who were raped by Russian soldiers, according to Lyudmyla Denisova, Ukraine's human rights commissioner. As the Russian state denied the allegations of war crimes and insisted that the massacres were staged by Ukrainian forces, satellite imagery showed—before the Russian retreat from Bucha—what appeared to be humans dead in the same places that the Ukrainian forces reported seeing them after they reclaimed the town in early April. It was confirmed that the killings took place when the Russians occupied Bucha. Both the New York Times and the BBC agreed with the assessment. The images also showed on March 10th what appeared to be mass graves dug out near a church. Many of the satellite images were verified by drone and video footage that showed Russian troops shooting a civilian walking with a bike. The person turned out to be the same person, shown in another video, laying dead with civilian clothing near a bike. More video evidence gathered showed Russian paratroopers forcing civilians to lay on the ground, while drone footage later showed dead bodies in the exact same spot. These videos were released by the New York Times on May 19th. Mayor Fedoruk confirmed that most of the executions by Russian forces against Ukrainian civilians took place in the Bucha areas of Yablonska, Sklozavodska and Lisova, and that 280 people from Bucha had to be interred in mass graves. The surviving residents of the city were left having to bury 57 other dead Ukrainian civilians, while coroners gathered 100 more dead bodies. Because there was no electricity, the morgue could not accommodate the dead and preserve the bodies via refrigeration, which left the coroners having to pay landscape workers to dig out a mass grave for the victims. The mayor estimated that the number of people killed in the massacre were somewhere in the range of 300, while the deputy mayor, Taras

Shapravskyi, estimated that roughly 50 of those 300 were killed execution style. As of April 12, the number killed in the Bucha massacre was said to be around 400. The BBC news later raised the death toll to 500, and then to more than 1000 by May 16th, estimating that 650 of the +1000 were killed directly by Russian soldiers. The 64th Seperate Motorized Rifle Brigade was identified as the primary occupiers of Bucha during the Russian invasion. They are an infantry brigade connected to the Eastern Military District's 35th Army. Also identified as part of the Russian occupation of Bucha were Chechen Units from the Special Rapid Response Force and the OMON. These military personnel present in Bucha during the massacres were identified by Ukrainian intel. Subsequently, the name of the Russian soldiers were released by Ukrainian media, which was something considered a top priority by those parties seeking to indict the perpetrators of the massacres for war crimes. In addition, German Intel sources were able to intercept radio transmissions of Russian soldiers, and found that the Wagner Group participated in the orchestration of the massacres. It was clear from the evidence that the Russian soldiers considered the operation of mass killings there business as usual or standard modus operandi. Meanwhile, the National Police of Ukraine convened an investigation into the atrocities that occurred in Bucha, and approached the situation much like a typical crime scene. This ran concurrent with requests from the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine to have the International Criminal Court and other international organizations investigate what happened in Bucha and other parts of Kyiv. Russia, on the other hand, sought to initiate a special conference of the UN Security Council to allege that the gruesome aftermath of the Russian withdrawal from Bucha was staged by Ukrainian radicals for the sake of provocation. Russia ordered their own investigation, suspecting Ukraine of pushing false information. But Amnesty International, a highly impartial human rights organization, confirmed that Russia committed war crimes in Bucha. Ukrainian Foreign Minister, Dmytro Kuleba, compared Russia to ISIS, stating that Russia even was worse than the Islamic terrorist group. He also proposed that G7 nations implement harsh financial restrictions on Russia. Kyiv Mayor, Vitali Klitschko, called the massacre a genocide of the Ukrainian people with Vladimir Putin directly responsible. President Zelenskyy arrived in Bucha on April 4th and spoke at the UN Security Council the next day, calling for Russia to be removed from the Council if they refuse to face consequences. He stated that Russia found pleasure in the deliberate killing of civilians, and he also urged the international community to hold Russia accountable for what transpired in Bucha. The Bucha massacre would have a major impact on President Zelesnkyy and his

worldview of Russia and Russians in general. The atrocities were also condemned by the EU Council. Its president, Charles Michel, promised Ukraine that the EU would do everything in their power to implicate Russia for the crimes committed. NATO and the UN were, as well, appalled upon hearing about what happened in Bucha. Antonio Guterres, Secretary General of the UN, spoke on behalf of the UN, calling for an investigation that would certainly lead to those responsible having to face a war crimes tribunal. The US called for Russia to be suspended from the Human Rights Council, which led to an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly. There, it was voted that Russia be removed from the Council. However, 24 nations voted against the proposal, while 58 abstained. Libya in 2011 was the only other nation to be removed from the Council. Other European organizations like the European Commission condemned the massacres in Bucha and formally allowed Ukraine to begin an expedited process of joining the European Union(EU). Estonia condemned Russia, and compared the Bucha massacre to the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis and the Soviet Union, and encouraged investigations and criminal proceeding against the orchestraters of the atrocity. The Prime Minister of Slovakia said that what occurred in Bucha was reminiscent of what happened during the Yugoslavia war. What occurred in Bucha set the tone for the rest of the war, and it was clear from Ukrainian resistance in the west that Russia will not have the capability of conquering all of Ukraine. In fact it is clear that the territories west of the Dnieper river pose logistical issues for the Russian military and because of this, Russia will ultimately pull out of many of the territories it seized in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine's arsenal of HIMARS rocket systems creates a very strategic problem for Russia's ability to consolidate more territory towards the west of Ukraine beyond the Dnieper river. There is also another factor. The dynamics that shaped the war in Ukraine has similarities to the Russian war in Georgia in 2008 and because of this, reports of Russia possibly using a nuclear weapon in order to appear strong may be blown out of proportion. Remember, back in 2008, Russia launched a full scale invasion of Georgia, backing the separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, shortly thereafter, Russia withdrew their troops from areas of Georgia seized during the invasion, while keeping its troops stationed in the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In retrospect, tensions in Georgia began after Georgia claimed its independence after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, Russia wanted to keep Georgia within its sphere of influence and decided to support separatist movements in the Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in order to subvert Georgian independence. After the civil war in the early 90s,

the separatist regions in Georgia remained autonomous amid a long stalemate and there were many attempts by the Georgian government throughout the later 90s and early 2000s to reintegrate them back into the Georgian control; Georgia even installed its own pro-Georgian leadership in South Ossetia. However, it was never recognized by Russia and was also heavily resisted by the separatists. Ironically, though, Russia remained restrained in recognizing the independence of those breakaway regions, despite repeated supplications from the separatists. At one point the EU and Russia came to a consensus on a peace plan, which the separatists themselves rejected. Tensions would take a turn for the worst when NATO announced its intentions to admit Georgia into the military bloc in 2008. Russian officials knew this would only compel the Kremlin to take aggressive action and recognize the independence of the breakaway regions in Georgia and ultimately use military force there in order to cement it. Hence in August of 2008, Russia launched a full scale invasion of Georgia, clearing ethnic Georgians out of separatist controlled areas. Here we see that Russia did not conquer all of Georgia, but seized a number of territories in Georgia that were adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia separatist-controlled areas, and later withdrew their forces from those adjacent regions. Russia subsequently recognized the independence of the separatist regions in Georgia in order to justify a continued Russian troop presence specifically in those areas. On account of this, when it comes to the 2022 Ukraine/Russia war, we can expect that within 2 years, Russia will withdraw its troops from many of the regions of eastern Ukraine adjacent to the separatist territories of the Donetsk People's Republic(DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic(LPR), while retaining troop presence in the DPR and LPR. We can also surmise that Russia's main goal in Ukraine was not necessarily to conquer all of Ukraine, but to ethnically cleanse the breakaway regions of whatever remained of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians in majority Russian areas of eastern Ukraine. Because of this dynamic that played out during the Russo-Georgian war, Ukraine will face a similar outcome. However, there is a power vacuum that would remain in the breakaway regions, one of which no one seems to recognize and one that Ukraine could easily exploit.

Chapter 3: Zelenskyy and the Far Right

While a platform of peace is what brought Vlodymyr Zelensky to power in Ukraine in 2019, a platform of continued resistance against the Russian invasion of Ukraine is what will keep him in power after 2022. When Zelenskyy first became president of Ukraine in 2019, his attempts to make peace with Russia and end the conflict in eastern Ukraine by allowing the DPR and LPR to hold elections was met with widespread condemnation in Kyiv. Protesters took to the streets demanding that there be no capitulation to Moscow and now following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Zelenskyy is left with no choice but to end the war through victory, not a negotiated settlement. However, it could still be advantageous for him to remain open to re-uniting Russian and Ukrainian speakers in Ukraine. The challenge he faces is overcoming the impact of the Bucha massacre and how that will alter his view of the Russian element in Ukraine. Not to mention, most Ukrainians will view the Bucha Massacre in line with the Holodomor, another major atrocity carried out by Russia against Ukraine back in the 1930s. Ukrainian will expect to have the deaths of innocent in Bucha avenged in some form or fashion. However, in light of what has transpired, this does not change the fact that Zelenskyy is without question the one of the best examples of liberalism in modern history, whose tolerance has had a far reaching effect. On one hand, as a native Russian speaker, he can evoke the support of far right Ukrainian extremists and on the other, he can advocate for far left inclusiveness. When we first entered office, he had the support of both Russian and Ukrainian speakers because of his inclination to non-violence. This is the correct perception of Vlodymyr Zelenskyy and is a testament to his broad appeal. In fact, this factor of tolerance often exhibited by Zelenskyy can lead to Ukraine being able to reclaim the Donetsk and Luhansk region without the Ukrainian military firing a single shot. I'll will explain. The key to Zelenskyy's success in being able to exploit the power vacuum in eastern Ukraine will be his ability to learn from the mistakes Victor Yanukoych and Barack Obama. Both of these men were elected to the presidency in their respective country in which their ethnic backdrop represented a minority of the overall population. Viktor Yanukovych was president of Ukraine as an ethnic Russian-speaking Ukrainian and Barack Obama was president of the United States as an African American, a demographic that only comprises 12% of the US population. However, the mistake that each made was that they both played the race/ethnicity card toward the end of their respective administrations, which ultimately fragmented their countries. Yanukovych leaned Ukraine in the direction of what

represented his ethnic Russian backdrop, while Barack Obama openly supported a movement that represented his ethnic backdrop. Zelenskyy is in a similar situation, but has not leaned towards what represents his ethnic Jewish backdrop, and for this, he can still evoke some unity between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers, which could allow him to take advantage of the power vacuum that will exist in eastern Ukraine. Zelenskyy has the privilege of natural neutrality, not to mention even the radical right group, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) espouses that any non-Ukrainian is capable of inclusion only if they are in the best interest on Ukrainians. Zelenskyy, as head of state, has proven that the Banderist ideology can permit one to rise to leadership in Ukraine of they are in fact in the best interest of Ukrainians. And simply because Zelenskyy has leaned towards the Ukrainian element, in no way can he be considered ethnocentric from the vantage point of the Russian element because he is at the same time a native Russian speaker, and also not ethnic Russian or ethnic Ukrainian. So one can look at the nuance and see that there is a measure of neutrality in Zelenskyy that will only aid Ukraine's ability to regain the separatist controlled Russian occupied areas. Keep in mind, Zelenskyy was going to seek justice for victims of the Odessa fire of 2014 and even after the Russian invasion in 2022, Zelenskyy has condemned some of the actions taken by Ukrainian soldiers during the war, particularly when it comes to torture.

After Amnesty International released a report that criticized Ukraine's tactics of using civilian areas during combat operations, Amnesty was met with widespread criticism from Ukraine and many of its western supporters. Amnesty International, because the report largely pointed out Ukraine's humanitarian violations, ended up being castigated as siding with the aggressor and blaming the victim. Amnesty international traveled to the Donbass region, Kharkiv, and Mykolaiv and found evidence that Ukraine was setting up military bases in hospitals and schools, which is a violation of international human rights law. Amnesty also interviewed residents in those areas who stated that they were very uncomfortable with Ukrainian forces setting up artillery near their homes. It was also discovered that there was enough wooded areas that the Ukrainian army could have used to set up their bases against the Russian forces. Ukraine, since February 24, 2022, was forced to defend against a brutal Russian invasion, which saw Russian forces carry out summary executions and war crimes in multiple areas of Ukraine, most ominously in Bucha, where a massacre took place that involved the indiscriminate killing of Ukrainian men, women, and children. The upside to the Amnesty report condemning Ukraine is that it becomes impossible to deny that

the Russian military did indeed carry out the Bucha massacre, which Amnesty has documented in detail. International Human Rights law holds both sides of a conflict accountable to laws regarding the protection of civilian areas, and this led many to subsequently consider if the defending nation should be allowed some freedom to use any means at its disposal to resist an oncoming invasion from a larger aggressor that is employing unscrupulous methods to occupy territory. In light of this, one has to realize that other defensive entities would be entitled to those same rights, and it has come to be the case that weaker forces around the world are being allotted some leeway in terms of how aggressive actions are perceived by the international community. Yet it can be explained in many cases that tactics which do endanger civilian areas are, in an objective sense, actually imperative and also effective in defending a nation. The first Chechen war is a clear example. But I also try to present to the reader that there are other ways to establish deterrence that do not involve endangering civilians or engaging in direct hostilities with the occupying force and may actually have a greater intended effect of deterrence and could ultimately help Ukraine win back the breakaway territories in the east without firing a single shot at the occupiers.

When the full-scale Russian invasion began of February 24, 2022, Zelenskyy made numerous appeals to the Russian population for the first few months, displaying a patience amid incidences of Russian artillery that would maim and obliterate numerous Ukrainian soldiers as well as civilians. This strategy of appealing to Russian people was a good strategy on Zelesnkyy's part because victory for Ukraine will be contingent on who they can work with inside Russian occupied areas of Ukraine. And at the beginning of the Russian invasion, there were demonstrations that broke out in Russia on behalf of the Ukrainian people. However, as the war dragged on towards the sixth month, Zelenskyy's rhetoric towards the Russian element has changed considerably, and this may be an unwise strategy because Zelenskyy's success or probability of reclaiming lost territories in the east of Ukraine will be contingent on his ability to recruit inside of a population that largely identifies as Russian, which is why his liberalism could be the secret weapon that makes Ukrainian victory possible, not to mention his fluency in Russian is a huge weapon for Ukraine right now, making it all the more imperative for Ukraine to make some room for the Russian language. To put it bluntly, clandestine operations aimed at trying to get the breakaway regions back into Ukraine's sphere of influence will require fluency in Russian. On that note, one can explain how reclaiming lost territory without resorting to tactics that were largely effective for Chechnya, could be possible if Ukraine plays its cards right. Chechnya used

tactics like terrorism and hostage taking which had the intended effect of wearing down Russian forces during the first Chechen war, but as will be explained, Ukraine may not have to resort to such tactics, and this may ironically work against Russia's goals in Ukraine. This writing makes reference to ISIS and Hamas's airstrike evasion tactics which experts agree are top notch, and explains how Ukraine will have to build up its underground infrastructure in similar fashion if they want to remain impervious to foreign aggression and keep civilians safe from Russian artillery for years to come. Furthermore, while some in the west seeks a negotiated end to the war—myself included, such an outcome if Ukraine is left without its own internationally recognized borders will likely put the executive office in Ukraine in political hot water with the extremists, considering how peace can often be conflated as capitulation and betrayal by the most nationalistic elements of the country. Just look what happened in the 1980s to the Egyptian president and the Israeli president after they both sought to establish peace with their country's longstanding enemies. Anwar Sadat, Egypt's president, was assassinated by Arab extremists at a military parade, not long after he signed the Camp David accords which normalized Egypt's relations with Israel and officially ceded the Sinai Peninsula to Israeli control. Yitskah Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, was assassinated by a Jewish extremist while holding a rally for the Oslo II accords which were aimed at making peace with the Palestinians and agreeing to withdraw some Israeli settlements from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as give the Palestinians some political control and autonomy in those areas. The Oslo II accords were largely opposed by Jewish extremists who insisted on Israel's claim on all of Palestine and who at the same time did not believe that the Palestinians would cease hostilities. As we see in those cases, the extremists lobbying for a continued war to see its final end is not about advocating for the rights of the living, but is about advocating for the rights of those who have already died for the cause. This is why the far right in Ukraine were unhappy with the Minsk accords, because the Minsk accords essentially disregarded the efforts of those who died trying to reclaim Donetsk and Luhansk from violent separatists. Unfortunately, this is the stage that the Ukrainian/Russian conflict has reached—peace essentially being a form capitulation for the Ukrainian army. Russia has also taken measures to stifle speech that does not support continued Russian aggression. This dynamic is also why the militants in Gaza continue to resist Israeli influence, and also why ISIS remains in operation in Iraq and Syria. I was watching a video online and it involved guy walking around the Palestinian areas and asking random people if they wanted peace. Well, many of those who were

asked this question responded with a resounding "yes", but when asked specifically if they wanted peace with Israel, the majority of those asked this question emphatically stated "no." From that small sample, even the women there were insistent of avoiding peace with Israel. Only some of the men who were asked gave an answer that took into the account the benefits of peace with Israel, benefits such as more freedom. Other men in the video stated that their only concern about Israel were the extremists—those Israelis who want the entire land of Palestine to go under Israeli occupation. As it stands today, many in the west support the continued efforts of some of these groups seeking to resist capitulation, but at the same time many in the west are unable to see how capitulation is why some places in the west are not currently at war. What if the confederates in the southern United States started ruminating on the vices of capitulation? It would be bad for the country. What if native American groups started doing the same thing? Or what if Mexico started pondering on the vices of capitulation concerning the state of Texas which originally belonged to Mexico? These are disconcerting prospects, but very possible if social pressure becomes aligned with such goals. Russian operatives have been using this dynamic of separatism to weaken the US internally, and to great effect. There were many Russian elements back in 2016 that were linked to social media pages promoting entities like the "alternative right" and "black lives matter", both of which ultimately ended up fragmenting the country due to the extremist elements within those movements. Such actions on the part of Russian operatives set the country on a trajectory toward a major political overhaul. In fact the US and Russia, have used clandestine means to weaken each other. Academia is well-versed on NATO expansion. To this day, Russia continues to foment division in the US. The FBI recently raided a socialist pro-African group linked to the Russian government, and this turned out to be another example of how Russia can use critical theories circulating in the US to encourage separatism—the end result being what we are seeing in Ukraine—violent conflict. But now, Ukraine may have its turn to foment separatism in a way that will benefit Ukraine. Separatism has a way of shaming people into the cause and putting the entire geography at significant risk of a human rights catastrophe. Hence, the pro-Russian separatists ultimately have to take responsibility for the entire conflict. In no way, this justifies Ukraine shelling separatist areas and hurting civilians there since 2014, but it does highlight how separatism is a scourge to be avoided because of the predicted outcome—mass aggression and war. But beware, Ukraine can apply these divisive tactics as well, and to great

effect that would lead to an unpredictable and seemingly impossible outcome that benefits Ukraine, one that no one could predict.

We can see that in an ongoing war, when capitulation or surrender becomes a vice, the war itself becomes endless. However, in the case of Ukraine, the only median outlook a pacifist can have in this unfortunate circumstance of peace becoming capitulation, if not betrayal, is one that can articulate strategy of cleverness, where total victory could be attained by flattery or non-war-crime related activity. Otherwise, in disregarding those other non-violent methods, anyone supporting victory for Ukraine must accept the reality that such an outcome could only be expected to occur with the use of the some of the same guerrilla and brutal tactics used by organizations that are largely castigated by much of the western world. This writing tries to show that while these brutal tactics have been used with effect by countries like Chechnya during the first Chechen war, there are other ways to win a war which go beyond the use of arms or engaging in direct hostilities.

At the moment, there is a strong channel of money and arms supply to Ukrainian forces, but it should be made clear that as this conflict drags on, Ukrainian forces may feel compelled to use tactics akin to the ones used by those who share similar goals of avoiding airstrikes and reclaiming lost territories. It is very likely that the Ukrainian strategy could find itself strongly aligned with these strategies used by Mideast insurgent groups like ISIS and Hamas, whose backdrop involves contention with a military force much larger than their own. Much of ISIS's leadership is comprised of Saddam loyalists who refuse to accept the overthrow of their longstanding leader. Furthermore, as far as the Ukrainian counteroffensive goes, there is seemingly no way to stop what has been set in motion by the Russian invasion—the prospect that Russians and Ukrainians are now enemies to the very core. Hence why Ukraine could end up under some form of far right ideology, even if its interwoven with some measure of western democracy after the war end. The topic of national socialism is a major controversy for Ukraine. The book Anthony's Treaty tries to lay the foundation that national socialism espoused in some parts of Ukraine has a different context due to the historical backdrop of Germany being a liberator to a nation of people that were almost entirely wiped out by Soviet dictator, Josef Stalin. Immediately after the Germans in World War II had taken over Ukraine, the leader of the OUN(Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), Stephan Bandera and other officials had declared Ukraine's independence. The OUN was largely against Poles and Russians, both of whom represented to Ukraine a longstanding oppression of their unique language and culture. Stephen Bandera

even wrote a letter in 1941 to Hitler explaining his case for Ukrainian sovereignty. However, upon hearing the declaration of independence for Ukraine in 1941, the German forces immediately arrested those who made the declaration and sent them to prison camps, where they would stay for the most of the war. Among those arrested was Stephan Bandera. His followers, however, remained active in Ukraine, collaborating with German forces against Poles and Jews and the Soviet Union. Bandera was later released from the prison camp late in the war in the hopes that he could help Germany defend against the Soviet counter-offensive. After the war, Bandera traveled to the American zone of West Germany and he eventually became an asset for UK and US intelligence services, having knowledge of the inner workings of the Soviet Union. UK intelligence began sponsoring the OUN, and the US would protect Bandera by blocking his extradition to the Soviet Union, whom had declared all Ukrainians to be Soviet citizens. Bandera, however, would later be tracked down and killed by KGB agents. In 2018, Ukraine designated Bandera's birthday on January 1st to be a national holiday. Ukraine has tried to clean up his image, but Bandera remains a polarizing figure of which many eastern and southern Ukrainians consider to be a Nazi collaborator and thus hard to identify with. The Nazis themselves, however, wrote that the OUN were indifferent to Jews and would either help or harm them depending on where they stood on Ukraine. It seems like one of the founding tenets of the OUN lean along those same lines of only accommodating non-Ukrainians if they stand behind the Ukrainian cause. This may be the only way to explain the juxtaposition of Vlodymyr Zelenskyy as Ukraine's president and the presence of this element in the Ukrainian government—that being Zelenskyy fully backing the Ukrainian people and language and thus gaining the support and respect of the far right in Ukraine. This also explains how native Russian speakers Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovych were still able to garner enough support in Ukraine to hold office, since, despite being native Russian speakers, they were initially considered in the early part of their tenures to be in the best interest of Ukrainians. It is also important to distinguish the controversial Azov battalion's Nazi origins from the overarching framework of Ukrainian culture, by way of acknowledging the fact that much of the Azov battalion's original neo-Nazi membership was comprised of native Russian-speakers from eastern Ukraine. They were not products of Ukrainian culture in the western parts of Ukraine, where the majority of native Ukrainian speakers reside. Another thing to take into account is that in Ukraine, the propagation of both Soviet-era nostalgia and leaders like Joseph Stalin, who was the main perpetrator of the Holodomor(murder and starvation of

millions of Ukrainians), can give rise to counter-extremism such as Nazism. Because Azov was part and parcel of a largely de-centralized Ukrainian resistance to the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine during the 8 year civil war (there were many private militias fighting the separatists), the Ukrainian government basically annexed the paramilitary group, as well as other private militias, into the Ukrainian army...all for the sake of a more organized resistance to separatist and Russian forces in the Donbass region. At the same time, the Ukrainian army did not assume their ideology. It was the other way around. The private militias were indoctrinated and consigned into true Ukrainian nationalism. It was true that the Azov were instrumental in helping Ukraine, and are at the same time, highly skilled, tactical and pose a real danger if they continue to uphold their Nazi ideology and resist full integration into the Ukrainian army. But such is unlikely since neither President Zelenskyy, nor much of the native Ukrainian-speaking populations of Ukraine would tolerate it. Meanwhile, the Azov had begun to disavow many of its Nazi perspectives.

Now that Ukrainians and Russians have become adapted to the idea of warfare and death and conflict with each other, many will have no qualms about pursuing this reality for years to come. It is no different than Hamas or ISIS, as both of these entities have settled on the reality of war and death and insist on maintaining this for an indefinite period of time, at least until their goals of reclaiming lost territory is finally reached. The insurgent strategies were employed by the Chechens during the first Chechen war and to great success and is perhaps the most relevant example of how a smaller eastern European country could resist the onslaught of a larger Russian force advancing into their country. The sugar-coated view is easier to read about. The realistic perspective, however, forces one to accept the realities that we live in in terms of how nations are formed and defended. The militants in Chechnya applied warfare strategies of which insurgents in the Middle East are using today, strategies that involve guerrilla tactics and subterranean warfare. In hindsight, if one believes that Chechnya was right in defending themselves against Russian imperialism during the first Chechen war, then one is automatically forced to maintain that the tactics they used to make that happen were right as well. While it is explained how these tactics worked for Chechnya, it is also explained how those tactics would theoretically apply to Ukraine, along with the possibility of Ukraine being able to avoid resorting to those extremes, while still retaining a high probability of regaining lost territory, if Ukrainian intelligence apparatus could simply apply some old tricks used by their US and Russian counterparts.

Chapter 4: The Value of Subterranean Warfare

There is one thing that the Ukrainian insurgency will provide to the world. Further advances and knowledge in subterranean warfare and anti-missile defense, which will be a likely strategy that Ukrainian insurgents may apply against the Russian occupation, seeing that the only method of warfare used by major powers to stop insurgency, in most cases to no avail, has been airstrikes. This has been the case throughout modern history. Ukraine demonstrated the effectiveness of secret underground tunnels when they put up a fierce intransigence amid the Russian assault on Mariupol during the Ukraine/Russia war of 2022. In mid-April of that year at the steel factory called Azovstal Iron and Steel Works located in Mariupol, Ukrainian defense forces took refuge there and conducted an extraordinary resistance to Russian forces. The factory was fortified with steel and underground tunnels, making it hard for Russian airstrikes to accurately locate and destroy Ukrainian forces. When Russian troops made their way further into Mariupol and surrounded the factory, Ukrainian forces, because of the fortification that the underground shelter provided, remained adamant to fight till the last man. Back in February at the start of the invasion of Ukraine, Russia launched an amphibious assault on Mariupol and shelled it relentlessly, killing 10 Greek civilians and a 6 year old girl. Back in 2015, a series of Russian airstrikes had killed 29 civilians in Mariupol. By the end of February/early March, Mariupol, though still under Ukrainian control, was completely surrounded by Russian forces whose shelling of the city cut off access to water, internet, and electricity. This stoppage of vital resources was the only means of stopping the Ukrainian resistance. Many who were killed in Mariupol were not sheltered in subterranean bunkers. On March 2nd, as the Russians were preventing civilians from evacuating the city, hundreds of civilians were killed after a residential area was shelled relentlessly by Russian forces. The next day, the shelling continued as the DPR urged Ukrainian fighters to surrender or face guided artillery strikes. The Russian Ministry of Defense reported that the Russian troops seized more areas nearby. Meanwhile, the supplies in Mariupol were gradually running low, and calls were made for reinforcements and the evacuation of civilians as the Russian forces were shelling critical lifelines such as hospitals. Had the underground fortifications at the Azovstal factory contained a secret tunnel long enough to reach Ukrainian controlled areas, a supply line could have been established that would have allowed civilians to escape and also provided Ukrainian troops hunkered down in the bunker with vital reinforcements to continue resisting the Russian onslaught. A

ceasefire had been subsequently enacted so that the 200,000 civilians trapped in Mariupol could evacuate, but this was because the Red Cross got involved as a facilitator and promised to ensure the establishment of ceasefire agreements which would enable civilians to exit the city. An extensive secret underground network capable of reaching multiple areas of Ukraine would have allowed civilians to escape regardless of Russia's operations. Anyhow, when the negotiated ceasefire was finally in place, civilians were only briefly allowed to vacate Mariupol and seek refuge in the city of Zaporizhzhia. Reason being, is because the Russian forces commenced shelling the city which forced civilians to turn back and stay put. Russia's understanding of the ceasefire was that civilians would be allowed to leave, but through a corridor towards Russia, not towards Zaporizhzhia. Ukraine, however, feared that Russia would send Ukrainian civilians held captive to secret concentration camps either in Russia or separatist held areas. This first attempt on March 5th at establishing humanitarian corridors only resulted in 17 people evacuating. The second try the next day was once again subverted by Russian artillery strikes which destroyed the city's fuel pipeline and access to heat in much of the city, resulting in 700,000 people ending up without heat and subsequently in danger of freezing to death in temperatures that had gone below zero. The last remaining communication line, a cellular tower, was damaged by Russian shelling. The Red Cross said that the new ceasefire was in principle only and that much of the other circumstances surrounding how civilians would evacuate remained vague. One of the roads that was going to be used to evacuate civilians was mined. And on March 8th, Russian forces shelled one of the evacuation routes as civilians were being evacuated. Large numbers of civilians were killed in Mariupol and many were buried in mass graves. Even as this was taking place, Russia managed to shell the gravesites where many victims were being buried. An attempt at another ceasefire was stifled on March 9th, when Russian forces began shooting at construction workers and checkpoints established for evacuation. This was followed by an airstrike on a maternity ward and hospital where three civilians were killed and 17 wounded. Three days later, as Russian troops captured the eastern parts of Mariupol, roughly 82 ethnic Greeks were able to get out of Mariupol through one of the corridors established. This was followed by more artillery bombardments of Mariupol by Russian forces. Vadym Boychenko, the mayor of Mariupol, said that on March 13th, the Russian military unleashed hundreds of bombs in a 24 hour period as food and water had become extremely scarce. The Ukrainian forces were, nonetheless, able to provide some resistance and destroy a number of Russian military vehicles as well as kill 150

Russian troops fighting in the city. Meanwhile, ethnic Turks were on standby waiting to be rescued and evacuated by the Turkish government. On March 14th, a convoy of evacuees were allowed to evacuate Mariupol, and the Russian Defense Ministry confirmed that aid was being supplied to the city. The next day on March 15th, even more civilians were able to leave, roughly 20,000. On March 16th, however, a theater in Mariupol where hundreds of civilians had taken refuge was hit by a Russian airstrike. It was reported that 600 people were killed as a result. This number turned to be an exaggeration. But moreover, the underground basement at the theater allowed scores of people to survive the airstrike there. This gives credence to the effectiveness of underground structures providing the highest level of effectiveness in evading airstrikes. After the attack, over 100 of the people inside hiding in the basement survived and emerged from the theater debris on March 17th. In fact, Ukrainian officials initially reported that there was no one killed during the strike.

The assault continued when 2 days later the DPR forces seized the Mariupol airport, driving out the Ukrainian forces. When the DPR advanced, shortly thereafter, into the center of Mariupol, clashes between them and the Ukrainian forces took place at the Azovstal Steel plant. During this time, allegations that Russia was deporting civilians to camps and remote areas of Russia began circulating. After Russia denied that such allegation were true, another school was bombed in Mariupol, a school that was being used by 400 civilians to shelter themselves from the shelling taking place in the city. In the meantime, the Russian forces continued to demand that Ukraine surrender. However Ukrainian forces continued to refuse. On March 21st, Russia responded with a barrage of airstrikes which led the mayor and other city officials to flee shortly after. The Russians at this point were going around the center of Mariupol declaring victory as Russian troops advanced deeper into the city. On March 27th, the mayor called for an immediate evacuation of the remaining residents in Mariupol as food and water had been totally depleted to the point that even Ukrainian soldiers had nothing to consume. Despite such deprivation, Ukrainian soldiers insisted on fighting to the last man, leaving neither civilian nor soldier behind. The next day, the mayor admitted that Mariupol was under Russian control and that 5000 people had perished during the siege. Ukraine reported that 20000-30000 had been captured by Russian forces and sent to camps located in Russia. That same day, the Russians occupied the military headquarters, administrative building, as well as the headquarters of the Azov regiment. The Russians, throughout the conflict, had altogether shot down 90% of the rescue helicopters sent by Ukrainian President Zelenskyy to conduct evacuations as well as resupply the

Azov soldiers taking cover at the Azovstal Steel plant. The Ukrainian military had no choice but to eventually splinter into multiple cells after the Russians captured 267 marines from the 503rd Battalion of the Ukrainian Naval Forces on April 4th. This caused a rift among Ukrainian fighters from the Azov regiment and the 36th Separate Marine Brigade, whose lines of communication had been broken by the surrender of the 267 marines of the 503rd Battalion of Ukraine's Naval forces. Ukraine, in response, attempted to resupply the Azov fighters stationed in the Azovstal steel factory, but the deliveries could not be made due to Russian fighters shooting down the MI-8s used for the mission. After the Russians captured the bridge leading to the Azovstal steel factory, they were able to take control of the fishing port and cut the line of access between the Ukrainian soldiers at the fishing port and those at the steel factory. Had there been an underground route to the Ukrainian forces at the fishing port, things would have been different. Russia cutting off access by destroying the bridge was a major blow that coincided with a severe shortage of ammo that limited the amount of resistance that the Ukrainian troops holding out at the factory could apply against incoming Russian soldiers. At this juncture, it was easy to forecast that Mariupol would, within a short time, fall into the hands of the DPR and Russian forces. A number of Ukrainian troops from the pocket of Ukrainian soldiers from the 36th Separate Marine Brigade held up at the llich steel plant were taken captive on April 11th. Some of them managed to escape and join with the Azov regiment at the Azovstal steel plant, while others were killed en route. The leader, Baranyuk, was captured by Russian forces as he tried to flee the city rather than link up with the Azov. The remaining 1,026 Ukrainian fighters at the llich steel plant surrendered the next day, which left Mariupol to be defended by two small pockets of Ukrainian soldiers. Unsurprisingly, the Azov leadership was disappointed with Baranyuk because he did not relay the plan to escape the llich steel plant with other military personnel, nor try to link up with the Azov regiment as others who escaped the plant would try to do. Instead, he, as llia Samoilenko would express, tried to flee "taking with him people, tanks and ammunition." Subsequently, Ukrainian fighters surrounded by Russian forces at the Azovstal plant requested reinforcement and more supplies, informing the Ukrainian command that the situation was dire, but that fighting was still possible.. The steel plant was a strong fortification and there were many underground tunnels that allowed people there to take cover and remain safe from air strikes by Russian forces. It also provided stealth to Ukrainian troops which made it even harder for enemy forces to locate them. However, without a supply line, there was no way for Ukrainian forces to fend off continuous Russian

strikes because ammunition, food, and water would eventually run out and leave those sheltered there with no choice but to either surrender or die from destitution.

After a port was captured near Mariupol's beach, some of the Azov fighters from the Azovstal plant rescued and evacuated the 500 Ukrainian troops and police surrounded at the port. According to an officer of the Ukrainian Marines, the Azov breached the port and provided cover fire for the Ukrainian troops stuck at the port, allowing them to escape. This left those Azov regiment and other Ukrainian fighters at the Azovstal steel plant as the last remaining pocket of Ukrainian soldiers resisting the Russian advance. Yet, they refused to surrender amid Russia's threats to annihilate them. The remaining number of Ukrainian fighters were estimated to be around 2900, according to Russian officials. Even in light of the Russian control over the city, the Russian troops had not yet been ordered to raid the Azovstal plant. It was believed by the Kremlin that Ukrainian forces would surrender once they ran out of critical supplies. But Ukrainian officials took it to mean that Russia was admitting that they had no ability to infiltrate the complex infrastructure of the plant. The subterranean aspects of the steel plant was akin to the methods used by ISIS and Hamas to successfully evade airstrikes in the middle east. However, Russia's main goal in Mariupol was connecting the city to Crimea so that water and other supplies could flow there. Once this goal was reached, Russia felt no rush to take control of the steel plant, figuring that an all-out assault there would needlessly waste military personnel and be extremely costly.

On April 22nd, Russian troops began expanding their presence outside the Azovstal steel plant very close to the positions of Ukrainian soldiers in Azovstal. It was confirmed that day that the only remaining Ukrainian forces in Mariupol were those hiding out in the steel plant. Subsequently, Russia began pulling some of its troops out of Mariupol and reassigning them to other parts of eastern Ukraine. This was followed by a barrage of airstrikes on the Azovstal facility by Russian forces, one of them striking a military field hospital, wounding hundreds more. Just after this on April 30th, a humanitarian corridor was established which was brokered by Antonio Guterres when he visited Moscow the week before. Gradually at the start of May, civilians hiding in the Azovstal facility were being allowed to leave. 100 left Mariupol on May 2nd, while Russia pulled many of its forces out of the city and redeployed them elsewhere in the Donbass region. This was confirmed by the US Department of Defense. Following the pull-out, Russia's offensive in Mariupol had become strictly airstrikes. The following day on May 3rd, however, the Russians attempted to breach the plant through the tunnel system

after they had been tipped off on the location of the underground network by an electrician in what was an act of treachery on his part. Two days later, more civilians had been evacuated from the Azovstal facility through a humanitarian corridor designated to operate between 8am and 6pm.

The Russians in a final ploy to get Ukrainian troops at the Azovstal facility to surrender, used thermobaric bombs on Ukrainian soldiers. After a long standoff by the Azov regiment and other Ukrainian fighters, President Zelenskyy would give the order for Ukrainian forces in Mariupol to surrender. This comes after he vowed not to cede any territory to Russian forces. Subsequently, the remaining civilians would be completely evacuated by May 7th. The remaining soldiers who came out to negotiate surrender were taken captive by Russian soldiers who would evacuate them from the plant, treat those who were wounded, and detain them along with the remaining Ukrainian soldiers at an area controlled by the DPR forces. The Ukrainian command confirmed that the battle was over and Mariupol was now in the hands of the DPR and Russian forces. The last remaining Ukrainian soldiers surrendered to the Russians on May 20th. The Russian President Vladimir Putin promised to treat the prisoners of war according to international standards. However, some in the Russian government were against allowing members of the Azov regiment to be released in the case of future prisoner swaps. Ukrainian resistance using the underground fortifications at the Azovstal plant was a good example of just how effective tunnels are at combating airstrikes.

Throughout the history of warfare, subterranean structures have been used against enemy forces with great success. Back during the Arab invasions in the 7th century, monks found that they could successfully evade Arab forces by hiding underground. Back in WWII, the Japanese were effective in building underground fortification against US air power, and so were the Chinese, who built underground fortifications against Japanese air power. The Vietnamese during the Vietnam war was possibly the best example of how effective underground fortifications are against a superior air force. Many of the larger military powers, have had no formidable answer for this type of defense, even against small pockets of militants. The current conflict in the Middle East(2001-2022 as of now) is marred by the continued survival of these insurgent militant groups. Major military powers like Russia and the United States have carried out a number of aerial attacks against them in recent years, but only with enough success to weaken the threat, not totally eliminate it. In recent years, Israel has faced numerous problems with the underground operations of Hamas, the militant group that

controls the Gaza strip. Not only for smuggling resources into Gaza, the tunnels used by Hamas has allowed them to, at one point, ambush and kidnap an Israei soldier from Israeli territory. Hamas is also able to conceal rocket fire locations with the use of the tunnels, making it more difficult for Israel to locate and destroy them. This underground methodology is also how ISIS, the Al Qaeda offshoot terror organization comprised of Saddam loyalists, continues to launch ambush attacks against Syrian regime soldiers, even after years of being bombarded by both US and Russian airstrikes. The operations of Hamas and ISIS and their continued survival in small numbers is setting the stage for a new type of warfare: Subterranean warfare. This will be further pursued in Ukraine as insurgents there look to resist the Russian occupation by evading airstrikes. It has become obvious that the larger powers have no real answer on how to battle effectively against underground forces, other then planting explosives at the entry or exit points or using aerial bombers to drop deep penetrating missiles into tunnel locations. This, however, is largely ineffective since many underground structures have detours that lead to multiple entry and exit points, making the destruction of them more complicated. It also doesn't help that the sections which have been demolished by explosives are easily repairable. Another issue surrounding the search and destroy aspect of combating this underground system is that soldiers are often unable to determine whether or not the tunnels are booby trapped. The use of vacuum bombs in Syria, which can devastate anyone hiding in tunnels, has still not eliminated the ISIS threat since a major issue with attacking tunnel locations is finding them in the first place.

This type of warfare has been effective for centuries; what ISIS and Hamas is doing is bringing notice to it. And now Ukrainian insurgents will likely follow suit. Most nations in the Middle East and around the world for that matter already have these underground structures in place and will only be emboldened against stronger nations the longer a small number of militants—relatively speaking—are able to survive by simply building underground fortifications. Israel and the US are working on technology that will allow them to detect underground tunnels, and if they are successful, we may see an end to the prolonged conflict in the Middle East and in Eastern Europe since such technology would also allow Russia to put a final end to Ukrainian insurgency. But if this is not the case, then we can expect that everyone there will attempt to pursue self determination without regard for another country's superior air power. The technology used to detect underground tunnels involve the use of seismic or gravity detectors. Seismic detectors are able to measure the vibrations as they pass objects beneath the surface of the earth,

and if able to find a common anomaly that would identify the existence of a tunnel, those detectors could be effective. However, there would still need to be intelligence that pinpoints the general area of where a tunnel may exist. Gravity detectors like gravimeters are able to detect changes in the Earth's gravitational field based on the density beneath the surface. The presence of a void underground would reduce the gravitation force and would thus show up accordingly on the gravimeter. Another method is measuring the voltage of an electrical current, which would move at a lower voltage inside a void. Ground Penetrating radar(GPR) is another device used. to detect tunnels. GPR uses pulses of radio frequency energy to see underground. The distances detected underground however is limited, since it maxes around a depth of 50 ft. Tunnels have been dug by drug smugglers and militants as far as 100 ft beneath the surface. The use of bunker busters(aerial bombers employed by the US against ISIS) which can penetrate hundreds of feet of both earth and concrete, is still challenged by the possible extensiveness of the tunnels. Some tunnels have multiple detours that allow for escape and reconstruction of damaged sections. Drug smugglers now present a much higher risk in terms national security, since a tunnel system is both a defensive and offensive weapon—-irrespective of its use in drag smuggling activities. The arrest of two Houthi militants at the US/ Mexican border in 2021 raises the question of vulnerability, since one can posit that infiltration of Latin America by radical militants puts the US at risk of not only the implication of undetected drugs coming into the country, but also the implication surrounding the likelihood of a militant attack or ambush initiated from an underground tunnel originating from Mexico. The tunnel entries built by Hamas and ISIS are about 1 meter wide and go as deep as 100 ft beneath the surface. Pneumatic jackhammers are often used to dig out the tunnels and workers cover about two to three meters a day using them. Militants usually employ skilled workers to do the job. These workers normally have some knowledge of the engineering and geological aspects that go into constructing a tunnel. The tunnels are often dug from the inside of a shelter or home, which provides operatives with more stealth. ISIS militants who have escaped enemy fire, often seek refuge in nearby villages and pay residents there to help them construct tunnels. There are some hazards associated with the initial constructing process, such as cave-ins and collapses. It's common for workers to perish during the excavation process, and collapses usually result from not waiting long enough after a torrential rainstorm to resume tunnel construction. As a result, soil erosion, which often compromises the landscape, puts workers underground at risk of being trapped after the collapse. Casualties have ironically

allowed Hamas and ISIS to improvise on the underground construction process and gain a greater understanding of it altogether. Hamas has in turn managed to equip their tunnel system with electricity, concrete walls and ceiling, and is able to conduct communications using landlines, making it all the more difficult to detect their position. Ukrainian militias had success using landlines during the war in Donbass, keeping Russian drones from detecting their positions. This type of technical knowledge developed by mid-east insurgencies could be of advantage to Ukrainian insurgents and it is predictable that they may establish a channel of communication with militants in the middle east in order to gain more technical expertise on tunnel construction. Hamas has been able to smuggle concrete into Gaza and has used it to fortify their tunnel system. Hamas has stated that keeping the width of the tunnels thin(roughly 3ft), while digging out the tunnels so that the ceiling is arched reduces the chances of collapse. After excavation, the tunnels are stabilized with with 12-18 inch wide concrete arches, spanning roughly 3ft wide, and laid to sit atop 2 roughly 5ft high rectangular concrete slabs—one concrete slab holds up one end of the arch, while the other concrete slab holds up the other end of the arch. The tunnel diggers likely set each concrete arch and slabs as they go digging out the tunnel, making sure to remain under the arch as they continue digging, in order to mitigate the chances of being caught directly under soil and rock in the event of a potential collapse. The cement arch would provide stability and safety while excavating. The slabs on the side could protect against cave-ins. From videos showing Hamas tunnels, the part of the arch that sits atop the slabs is engineered and cut in such a way that the slabs on the walls of the tunnel are stabilized by the arch, preventing the chances of a cave in. Cave-ins are usually a very common accident on sand beaches during the vertical excavation process by beach-goers. The way to reduce this risk on sandy beaches is by applying wooden boards and other supports to the walls of the vertical excavation. Moreover, Hamas has developed rocket-making factories underground and they also have a deep-sea diving team that collects old shell fragments which are then made into warheads. Ukraine is said to have a secret underground factory where they build long-range rockets called grim missiles that can strike a target at distance over 200 kilometers.

ISIS, on the other hand, has a less featured system, but has learned over the years how to survive direct air assaults by hiding underground. It's likely that ISIS will build their tunnels based on the proximity of gas fieid locations. Many of the recent ambush attacks by ISIS against Syria have occurred near oil and gas fields. Oil and gas are both important elements of warfare, as they allow militants to

maintain electrical, logistical, and communication channels. Much like Hamas has developed underground tunnels into Egypt for the purpose of smuggling. Ukrainian insurgents make seek to develop a similar underground network into Poland for the same reason. In fact all of Ukraine needs to be fortified with an extensive underground system. Much of the new technologies in this regard should be heavily geared towards Ukraine's development of underground tunnel systems. It is proven that areas which are fortified with subterranean infrastructure are much harder for occupying forces to control. Hence, Ukraine could be a real force as a small country, seeing that with a massive underground infrastructure, they could exert an inordinate amount of geopolitical influence that would not require much eastern or western backing. This is the route to true Ukrainian independence, but will require time and effort and secrecy.

The biggest threat to any underground structure is heavy rain. In most tunnel collapses, heavy rain is often the main cause. Geologically speaking, rain effects on underground tunnels are often deterred by things such as concrete, asphalt or mulch which shields the soil from the effects of heavy rain or wind. In tunnel collapses, after the rain water hits the soil, it eventually infiltrates its way to the tunnels surrounding rock, weakening it though erosion. Water gets into cracks and joints, eventually causing the rocks to break open and split apart. At the moment. one can presume that precipitation is perhaps the greatest threat to underground tunnels. This in itself is a form of intelligence since it's likely that, because of this, militants do not shelter or construct underground during days of heavy rain. They may also, as a way to improvise, start constructing tunnel paths directly underneath surface paths formed with concrete or asphalt, i. e. city streets. This would lessen the effect of heavy rain on tunnel stability. However, the lack of arable land and prevalence of prolonged droughts in the middle east still allows for uninterrupted construction of sustainable tunnels there. This allows us to comprehend the notion that underground structures would be more operational or populated during seasons of drought as opposed to seasons of precipitation. It's likely that militants in the middle east have already planned in advance for climate factors. It is also said that constructing tunnels with an arch ceiling adds a bit more stability than constructing the tunnels with a flat ceiling.

Ukraine should not only be able to construct the most elaborate tunnels, but also develop technology to detect them. This would help prepare Ukraine for future incidences of seperatism. But the approach to this field of conflict should be applied with some discrimination since factors like 'What the tunnels are being used for' need to be taken into consideration. Smuggling purposes would not

warrant a counter~terrorism search and destroy operation since civilians are often employed and in many cases forced into transporting cargo to and from. If the tunnels are used for both, then it's all the more difficult to discriminate accordingly. Ideas have been presented which propose that soldiers infiltrate on foot into the actual tunnels and conduct operations from there. The challenges to this idea is that signals are often weaker or disabled below the surface, making it difficult to maintain good communications. Another issue is the question of soldiers having the necessary oxygen to carry out prolonged. subterranean missions. Beneath the surface, oxygen levels are usually lower, which puts soldiers at risk and endangers the mission. There is also the potential of carbon monoxide poisoning should soldiers be exposed to heavy smoke. Gas mask and other oxygen-storing equipment would be ineffective in protecting personnel against a carbon monoxide build-up within such an enclosed space. Ideally being able to detect and display tunnels on above surface radar makes for a more astute counter tunnel strategy since personnel would be less required to enter the underground fortification. They can simply wait for operatives to exit the underground structure before apprehending the situation. This makes it easier to discriminate exactly who goes into and out of the tunnels.

The above surface structures provide some protection to underground tunnels. Concrete and asphalt reduce the effects of heavy rain on the soil and averts the possibility of rock erosion beneath the surface, which is normally a factor that causes many underground structures to collapse. This makes concrete the number one area of interest in developing an underground tunnel. If the workers are apprehending the effects of precipitation, then it's likely that they have improvised by routing tunnels to follow an alignment with the above surface concrete. If that is not the case, then they would have improvised to only construct or inhabit tunnels during dry seasons, and reduce operations there during wet seasons. Gaza militants fortify their tunnels with concrete surroundings, however due to creep (which happens to concrete under sustained load), concrete can easily collapse underground. Heavy soil and rain infiltration into underground rocks cause rocks to break, losing their ability to support the surrounding soil. The wet heavier soil then places more pressure on the underground tunnels, eventually causing them to collapse. There is a technique called rock bolting, which helps stabilize a tunnel system and is commonly used in tunnel construction. Rock bolts are simply long anchor bolts that are drilled into the ceiling of a tunnel in order to keep stability and prevent collapse from sustained load. Rock bolts are usually used in tandem

with wire mesh to further reduce the risk of collapse. Compared to other places, the Middle East presents less risk of tunnel collapse, due to the prevalence of droughts. Underground tunneling would be much more hazardous in tropical climates where it rains regularly, making the construction of underground tunnels aligned to the above ground concrete much more imperative. Paved roadways in urban areas provide a security aspect for tunnelers and a security risk for cities, should militants apply this type of warfare.

Mitigating the chances of being in the tunnel during a collapse would come with keeping a close eye on climate factors like precipitation, which is a primary cause of tunnel collapses. Making it a point to avoid tunnel excursion during times of heavy rainfall increases the likelihood of survival and reduces the risk of collapse while being present in the tunnel. Another issue is the possibility of carbon monoxide poisoning should a fire break out in the tunnel. The protective masks don"t usually protect against smoke. Ethanol vapor inhalation, however, could provide some protection against carbon monoxide exposure. In a study involving rats, ethanol intoxication was found to have a protective effect against carbon monoxide poisoning. This idea can be applied underground if the ethanol, which is a flammable agent, is sealed safely away from any possible contact with incendiary materials or ignition factors. Flammable materials are recommended to be stored in areas where there is strong ventilation. Underground structures, however, usually lack in this regard. The only workaround is for operatives to enter underground tunnels with alcohol in their system. The drawback of this is that the alcohol would contribute to reductions in judgment and reaction time in the event of a serious emergency. This is not the ideal state for anyone to be in during a risky mission, but it's the only way to safely make use of alcohol's protective effect against carbon monoxide poisoning in a poorly ventilated enclosed space. This also offers the idea that a trade off may be necessary, giving up some reaction time and judgment in exchange for extended time in the tunnels. Since alcohol correlates with a higher serum potassium, one can hypothesize that the higher serum potassium level in the body is what is exerting the protective effect against carbon monoxide poisoning. I would go as far as hypothesizing that higher levels of potassium in the body reduces the body's need for oxygen, that infact the higher the potassium concentration in someone's system may cause oxygen itself to become more toxic. If this is true, this could be a breakthrough allowing people to survive longer in tunnels. In any regard, certainly during the breaching process, ethanol vapors could be applied to breathing apparatuses. The importance of a workaround is mediated by the fact that personnel would be able to stay underground mach

longer. This would also help soldiers defending against an occupation remain hidden from enemy forces for much longer periods of time.

In the present day, the Middle East is perhaps the greatest example of how effective tunnels are against urban defenses. Beginning in late 2013, ISIS, using subterranean warfare, was able to lay siege and occupy large swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria before eventual US intervention in Iraq in 2014 and Russian intervention in Syria in 2015. Even after encountering numerous aerial bombardments by US and Russian Air Forces in Iraq and Syria respectively, ISIS has still managed to survive with the use of tunnels, even launching successful ambushes against Syrian regime forces, a midst their dwindling numbers, thus prolonging the conflict and effectuating an urgency for greater battlefield discipline. Back in 2016, during an Iraqi offensive to reclaim Mosul, ISIS was able to maintain a foothold on the city by developing a large network of tunnels there. The stealth that the tunnels provided allowed ISIS to hide from enemy forces. They were also able to identify the location of Iraqi and Kurdish forces with the use of drones. While hiding underground, ISIS was essentially able to use the drones to locate enemy positions, and then launch surprise attacks on them. Many of the armed forces around the world have recognized the threat and began making concessions to deal with the problem. Israel faces the greatest challenge of dealing with the threat of underground operations by enemy forces. Hezbollah and Hamas have both made use of tunnel warfare and at numerous junctures, successfully infiltrated Israeli territory. Israel has bolstered their defense in response and used technology over the years to locate a number of cross border tunnels. The dangers of kidnappings, planting explosives, hostage taking, and all-out sieges are posed by effective use of underground tunnels, all of which will likely occur in Ukraine as insurgents attempt to reclaim territories from Russian invaders. In the West, many underground structures have been built, but mostly for drug smuggling and immigration purposes. There is at least an example of a tunnel being built for a bank robbery, which ended up failing due the collapse as a result of heavy rainfall. Part of the tunnel likely aligned with surface terrain comprised of dirt. When it rained, the water likely penetrated the soil and eroded the surrounding rock of the tunnel, causing it to collapse. It's probable in the future that attack tunnels will be built to align with surface concrete areas to reduce the risk of collapse from heavy rainfall.

Chapter 5: Material Support

Airstrikes and rocket launches are the number one cause of civilian casualties during military conflict. Major powers like the US, Russia, and Israel have extensive anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems to keep their populations safe. Russia's system is called the s-400. The US has what is called the Patriot missile system. And Israel has the famous Iron Dome system that has been a proven resource in shooting down thousands of rockets fired from Gaza and thus saving thousands of Israeli civilian lives. Ukraine, due to Russia's assault on the country with numerous airstrikes and rocket launches, will be forced to come up with a plan to develop its own missile defense system if they plan to recapture territories seized by Russia and the separatists in eastern and southern Ukraine. Ukraine will likely pursue a strategy that will harness the power of anti-aircraft and anti-missile, as well as evasive tactics such as subterranean warfare. If the United States plans to arm the Ukrainian military for an indefinite period of time without getting involved militarily in the conflict, they will have to become instrumental in facilitating the development of an underground weapons smuggling network, at least until Ukrainian air defense are adequate enough to shoot down Russian rockets and keep them from destroying the depots that store western weapons. Much in the way that Hamas is able to smuggle weapons underground via Egypt, Ukraine will likely need a similar underground apparatus to smuggle in western weapons via Poland.

Today's anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems use a tracking radar to intercept targets and are launched from missile batteries stationed on the ground. There are basically five components to the battery. The first is the actual missile. Then there is the launcher which holds the missile, aims it at the target and launches it. Also included is a radar antenna which detects incoming rockets, aircraft or missiles. All of this is controlled via a control center, usually situated inside of an equipment truck. There, the computers with the radar interface and consoles are manned by operators. Another component of the system is a power plant truck containing at least 2 150-kw generators responsible for providing power to the control center's radar and computer equipment. The anti-aircraft and anti-missile system differs from portable shoulder-fired missile launchers, in that the anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems use ground based radar to track the incoming missile and aircraft targets. The portable shoulder-fired missile launchers use infrared homing to track its targets. However, this method is easily evaded by aircraft that drop flares, which cause the infrared seeker to go off course and instead track the heat from the flares as opposed to the aircraft exhaust.

When it comes to ground based radar missile systems, the radar can lock onto an incoming missile 50 miles away, before it's ever visible to the human eye from the ground. Anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems have been upgraded over the years to detect other forms of aerial threats like ballistic missiles. They have also been developed with onboard radar systems that increase the ability of the missile to track its target. Because radar can be jammed with radio frequency signals, missiles with an onboard battery-powered radar can be programmed to switch to infrared homing in the event of its radar being jammed. Modern missile can fly at supersonic speeds. Equipped with frag warhead that explodes on impact, the 17 ft long missiles also carry a large fragmentation bomb with a proximity fuse that is set to detonate when in a certain range of the target aircraft or missile. The fragmentation bomb is the main component of Israel's Iron Dome system, allowing the IDF to stop Gaza missile in flight by firing missiles that explode in close proximity to the Gaza rockets, causing them to be destroyed in flight or knocked off their course. The new onboard radar transmitters and guidance systems built into the missiles allow them to make contact with the target before exploding, which destroys the target completely. The missile launchers, which are mounted on a truck for transport, can hold somewhere between 4 and 16 missiles. For example, a launcher in the US Patriot missile system has 4 launch canisters that hold 4 missiles each. The launcher is usually powered by the electric power plant vehicle that carries 2 150 kw generators. Israel's Iron Dome system has about 3 to 4 launchers, with each able to hold 20 Tamir interceptor missiles. Russia's s-400 system launcher has 4 canisters, with each able to hold 3 short range missiles. Typically around 90 soldiers are required to operate a missile defense battery, and operators must be present in the truck housing the radar interface and computer systems that controls and guides the missile system. The operators have access to every target picked up by the radar and sensors, and can choose to operate the system manually or let it run automatically. They are also responsible for communicating with the regional command center. The radar that is used to detect incoming targets can also gauge its trajectory, height, and speed. Once the radar, after scanning the skies, identifies the target as hostile and illuminates it, the missiles launched can then track the target, and the operators can properly aim the missile at the incoming aircraft or missile by calculating the intercept point, which is usually calculated based on the target's previous flight path indicated on the radar. The missile usually has an antenna on the nose which can provide further information on the incoming missile while in flight heading in the direction of the incoming missile. The information received by the antenna is then

transmitted back to the command booth, where operators then use the information to recalculate the intercept point, adjust the guidance and send the guidance commands back to the missile which will then adjust the course of the missile and bring it closer to the target. Other interceptor missiles have its own radar and computer systems built within it, allowing the missile to perform all the necessary calculations and guidance on its own. The speed of these missiles leave little margin for error. Also, the radar's software has to be optimized for detecting certain aerial objects, whether they be ballistic missiles, rockets/mortars, or aircraft/fighter jets. Algorithms are also applied to radar systems, which allows them to detect whether or not an aerial object is friendly or unfriendly. As of August 1st 2022, Russia has encountered a fierce Ukrainian counteroffensive powered by US HIMARS rockets. A number of these rockets have been able to evade Russia's air defense systems and some experts believe that Russia doesn't have the software to distinguish HIMARS rockets from grad rockets on its radar. This leaves Russia with a dilemma. Thus Ukraine, along with HIMARS rockets, can simply fire grad rockets from time to time and force Russia to fire more of their expensive air to air missiles that they would rather use against the HIMARS rockets. This will eventually drain Russia's supplies as they try to develop software for the radar that would allow it to distinguish HIMARS rockets from grad rockets.

A new development in anti-missile systems will involve the same technology that backs and powers self-driving cars. Whereas cameras/radars/sensors built into self-driving vehicles are used to help the car sense and navigate around people and other objects, those same cameras/radars/sensors built onto missiles will help missiles more easily ram into and strike incoming hostile aerial targets. Autonomous vehicles, also known as self-driving cars, uses cameras, sensors, and radars to track its own movements as well as the position and movements of surrounding objects and people so that the self-driving car can properly navigate without ramming into nearby people or objects. The major components of these autonomous vehicles are liDar, radar, and motion/object detection cameras. The radar used in self-driving vehicles comprises 2 types: Impulse and Frequency Modulated Continuous Wave(FMCW). The development of autonomous vehicles has been fostered by a great deal of ingenuity among some of the best technicians in the world, allowing the auto industry to evolve from human-controlled vehicles into an automated self-controlled ones. There is a huge race within the automobile industry to bring about the most efficient system of self-driving cars to the market. This task involves extensive research in sensor technology, motion detection, coding, AI, and radar

systems. Self-driving cars rely on radar, lIdar, and ultrasonic. These sensors allow the vehicle to operate without the guidance of a human and gives the vehicle the ability to identify and avoid colliding with impediments, objects and pedestrians in the immediate environment. This same technology used in rockets could be used for the exact opposite purpose—colliding with and destroying any objects or impediments considered a hostile target. The technology behind self driving cars used in missile development will heighten the accuracy of missile strikes and anti-missile defense since object detection technology would have programs that would let the rocket maneuver towards the target without the need for the probability calculations used on current missile systems. Hypothetically, the bounding box used to identify a target object could be set to locate the angle point between the two missiles, allowing the interceptor missile to head straight for the angle point to meet and destroy the target missile or aircraft. This prospect would require advances in motion forecasting from liDar technology. Much of today's missile systems rely on calculating and predicting the trajectory of the target and locating the intercept point, but sometimes the prediction is wrong. Self-driving technology used in missile development greatly increases the likelihood that a missile will find its target. However, there also the possibility that hostile missiles with self-driving technology could be built to detect and evade incoming fire much in the way self-driving cars are made to evade people and things in the environment. Furthermore, the use of cameras as well as object and motion detection on missile systems will require quantum computing due to the hyper-sonic speeds at which missiles travel, making it to where detection and automated maneuvers will only have milliseconds to execute.

Missiles are maneuvered using an exhaust nozzle that can be swiveled from side to side. When the nozzle remains steady in the middle, the thrust remains along the center line of the missile, keeping the rocket on a straight path. When the nozzle is swiveled to the left the thrust line becomes inclined to the center line of the missile, creating an angle called the gimbal angle. Since the trust is no longer passing thru the center line of the missile in this case, a torque is generated and causes the nose of the rocket to turn left. This is also what happens analogously when the nozzle is swiveled to the right, causing the nose of the missile to turn right. With self driving technology applied to missile systems, the nozzle can be automated to keep the missile in the position which keeps the onboard camera's object detection indicator fixated on the target. In self driving technology, the sensors are able to identify an object via a Raspberry Pi board attached with a pi camera module as well as an ultrasonic

sensor responsible for data collection. A python program is then run on the Raspberry Pi, capturing the images from the pi camera and detecting the objects in it such as traffic signals(red or green light) and driving lanes. The ultrasonic sensors detect other obstacles in the path of the car. All the frames are cropped and modified into a numpy array. The images become properly labeled and the data is then put into a npz file before being generated onto an xml file, which would be loaded from the Raspberry pi once the car is started into self-driving mode, allowing the car to detect objects based on the trained data. Thus when the car is put in motion, essentially the onboard camera begins capturing frames from the streaming video and then transmits them to the Raspberry Pi controller where the algorithm is able to identify the object and respond accordingly. For traffic light detection, the algorithm can detect whether the color is red or green and initialize the vehicle to stop at the light if its red and begin driving once the light turns green. Much of this technology in terms of simple code is readily available for numerous devices. Webcams on laptops can be turned into motion and object detection devices with simple html code, giving an intermediate user basic insight into the algorithms for motion and object detection. It is likely that missile detection would be developed using the Haar feature-based cascade classifier methodology that was explained in a paper written by Paul Voila and Michael Jones in 2001. This methodology is a form of machine learning in which a cascade function, or classifier, is developed by extracting features from positive and negative images. For instance, for face detection, it takes both a decent number of positive images which contain actual faces and a decent number of negative images which are images that would not have faces, in order to develop an algorithm for being able to detect faces. For better accuracy, it often takes hundreds to thousands of positive and negative images as well as strong computing power. The next step is extracting features from the images, and this is done with cascading windows called haar filters which contain both black and white rectangles placed over different parts of the image. The features extracted are calculated by subtracting the sum of the pixels under the white portion of the haar filter from the sum of the pixels under the black portion of the haar filter. This process identifies aspects of the image in relation to other parts of the image, i.e. for example if the region of the eyes is normally darker than the nose and cheek areas. Or if the eye region is darker than the bridge of the nose. This data helps the algorithm distinguish between and classify faces and non-faces. This process is what is called training the images and once complete, the vector data is generated onto an xml file. This training process can be done with any objects, including rockets and aircraft.

And much in the way self driving cars use all these features to make itself run, likewise, on a missile, a Raspberry Pi board could be attached with a pi camera module and an ultrasonic sensor for collecting input data. Positive images of any target missile, along with negatives images that don't contain the target missile can be trained, with the data containing the extracted features generated onto an xml file. An example would be Ukraine taking hundreds of images of the Russian kh-22 missile that struck the Kredmash factory and adjacent Amstor mall back in June and training both the positive and negative images so that a kh-22 missile could be detected by the onboard camera of the interceptor missile. Whenever a kh-22 missile would be fired, the anti-missile system radar would detect the incoming missile and fire its own missile to intercept the target. The interceptor missile could theoretically have onboard a raspberry Pi controller with the xml file pretrained to classify the target missile—a kh-22 missile in this case. In flight, the algorithm would be able to identify the kh-22 missile, while the lIdar and radar system built into the missile would determine the range. The cameras on the missile would locate the kh-22 and track it with the bounding box, with the missile nozzle automatically programmed to swivel accordingly in a manner that directs its path towards the target, possibly by being set to maneuver in a way that keeps the bounding box set in a static position. Another possibility is technology where an algorithm would enable the onboard camera to detect the angle point between the interceptor missile and the trajectory of the target missile, allowing the interceptor missile to meet the target at that point and destroy it. This will require advances in liDar technology and its motion forecasting abilities. Open CV is a popular cross-platform library that allows programmers to train their own classifiers for any object. Ukrainian researchers have likely already developed pre-trained classifiers generated as xml files to detect Russian missiles.

Typical of operations throughout the war in Ukraine is the methodology of sending out UAVs to locate enemy positions and then firing artillery based on that information. Daily Russian shelling is double the amount of Ukrainian shelling, and when it comes to targeting fixed positions, Russia has proven to be very effective in that regard. In fact, it has been able to offset Russia's poor ground performance. Russia's weakness in ground performance is one area that Ukraine will try to exploit, which is what they attempted to do in Sievierodonetsk. But in order to trap Russian forces into an urban or ground war, it will require being able to neutralize Russia's vast artillery. Repeated bombardments from Russian artillery has displaced Ukrainian forces, and forced them to abandon their positions, which has kept them from mobilizing enough troops to

conduct a counterattack. This was the advantage that Russia had in the east, as compared to the west in places like Kyiv where Russia's artillery units had been stationed behind friendlies operating further east. This disadvantage is why Ukrainian forces had more success against Russian troops in western Ukraine than they had or would have in eastern Ukraine. As stated before, proximity to supply lines is key, but advancing artillery units to new consolidation points is easier said than done. For Ukraine it is even more difficult because of Russia's long range missile systems which can strike weapons depots from hundreds of kilometers away. Still and all, with Ukraine putting up a fierce resistance with the new HIMARS rocket systems, Russia has yet to employ its upgraded arsenal of weapons which are more technological advanced than their older systems. The problem is the technical expertise needed to operate them. Russia has technology in which fire control would be mediated through a communications systems called ISTAR that would allow artillery tactical groups to receive in real-time the positions of enemy targets, to which then artillery units could direct the gunfire of multiple artillery stations and also provide support to other units on the battlefield. There is also a shorter response time to incoming fires. However, this type of communications system requires expertise that Russia currently has a shortage of. Also, these communication systems require high levels of encryption, another shortage that Russia is facing as far as having the equipment that can keep communications secure. Many of the senior leaders in Russia's tactical Battalion groups have been communicating with unencrypted communication devices like cellphones. Notwithstanding, Russia has been able to overcome this hurdle by deploying more and more artillery and munitions to the battlefield. The shortage of ISTAR equipment operators and the resulting shorter response time to Ukrainian artillery fires has allowed Ukrainian tactical units to evade Russia's artillery response. Ukraine has also at times been able to implement successful artillery fires with ISTAR coordination with the use of UAVs.

There are still large stockpiles of artillery from the Soviet era that Russia can draw from, not to mention the capability to mass production to go along with it. Between the 1980s and 2014, Ukraine's factories were providing Russia with 2000000 152-mm howitzers annually. Hence why Russia is firing these shells at roughly three times the amount that Ukraine is on a daily basis during the war. Russia also has a larger arsenal of guided-missile systems. Aside from the HIMARS rockets, the vast majority of Ukraine's missile systems are unguided. However, this disparity is somewhat offset by the fact that Russia has a shortage of operators trained to direct their guided missile system, which is why Ukraine has seen Russia launch laser

guided missiles without aiming the laser at the target. Russia normally positions their artillery units behind the front line personnel based on the range of the artillery. Those systems with higher range tend to be situated further back than those artillery systems that fire at a more medium range. There is some improvisation allowed in which artillery would be moved forward in cases of getting a target within reach. Batteries, which are all the components of a missile system—the vehicle its mounted to, the men operating it, as well as the computer booth and the containers from which the missiles are fired, are stationed in an area that spans 100 by 300 meters, with roughly 40 meters of space between each gun. The Multiple Launch Rocket Systems(MLRS) are positioned along a line with each MLRS being 150 meters apart. Some of the missile batteries have fragmented into separate units that would support Battalion Tactical Groups(BTGs) whose mobility and information on enemy targets is being supplied via UAV reconnaissance. This improvisation by Russia's forces has been effective in firing upon Ukrainian positions with greater accuracy. Russia has also employed decoys made up of damaged artillery and maybe one working artillery piece to give off the impression of being operable. Thus Ukraine would fire upon the dummy artillery, allowing Russia to locate their position and launch return fire. Ultimately the MLRS are used to deter Ukrainian forces from advancing into certain areas. The howitzers, on the other hand, are aimed for the purpose of striking a target.

When it comes to countering Ukrainian artillery, the artillery units with longer range missiles, such as the Tochka-U missiles, which are further behind the front lines usually carry out the task. After UAV(drones) reconnaissance locates the target, Russian artillery crews are able to strike it within 3 to 5 minutes of receiving that information. Other reconnaissance tools are nowhere near as effective. There are Electronic Warfare (EW) systems, recon tools that rely on sound, as well as radar from the artillery. None of these are as effective as UAV. When using those other tools, it takes half an hour before the target is accurately struck. With UAVs, it takes on average 3 to 5 minutes. To counter this, Ukraine has deployed specialized teams called MANPADS that use shoulder launched precision guided surface to air missiles that track and destroy UAVs and other reconnaissance tools. If UAVs maintain surveillance over its target even as the target is moving, Russian artillery units can then concurrently adjust their aim.

The use of cell phones during the Russia/Ukraine war had led to numerous casualties. In many cases, entire platoons have been wiped out because one person turned on their cell phone, which gave away

his location. The presence of cell phone towers in Ukraine has allowed Ukraine to detect the location of Russian military personnel who are using cell phones to communicate. Cell phones are often used when other communication equipment breaks down and we see in Ukraine an example of how the use of cell phones works against battlefield operations. Ukraine has been able to kill a number of Russian generals by locating their cell phone signal from the Ukrainian cellular network. Russia, on the other hand, is able to locate cell phone signals of Ukrainian soldiers with a Leer-3 electronic warfare system that is comprised of two drones that have IMSI catchers, along with a command truck operating below. Russia's EW system can track roughly 2,000 phones inside of a 3.7-mile range. IMSI catchers are fake cell phone towers that can detect cell phone locations within a certain radius. With IMSI, the exact location of the phone of interest can be pinpointed via triangulating signal strengths from nearby cell towers. Keep in mind that when a cell phone is turned on, it sends out a roaming signal, which is picked up by a cellular network, either the IMSI or Ukraine's cellular network. When Ukraine's cellular network detects a signal from the cell phone of a Russian soldier, Ukrainian operators can find that soldier's position by triangulating using the three closest cell towers. In triangulating using the mobile cellular network and cell towers, the signal strength between the phone and the tower can determine how far away from the cell tower the phone is. Using three cell towers to determine distance of the phone from each tower allows one to pinpoint the location. From this methodology, Ukrainian forces can get the ID of the phone, the roaming number, as well as the exact location. When Russian soldiers stole the I-phones of Ukrainian soldiers, the Russian soldiers were able to be tracked with the Find My I-phone app. One person using the app demonstrated on Instagram the app tracking the movements of retreating Russian soldiers from Kyiv to Belarus to Belgorod. It is also possible to ping the GPS system of a device in order to get its location. Nearly all modern cell phones have a GPS receiver built into them. The reason the Russians don't target and destroy the cell towers is because much of their equipment, even the IMSI catchers, rely on high speed 4G and 5G wifi. While GPS is effective at locating enemy targets, there are ways to obstruct their ability to do so. The methods that can be used to obstruct the location-finding abilities of drones using IMSI catchers, involve using radio emitters to jam the GPS signal of the drone and prevent it from receiving any GPS signal. There is also a technique called GPS spoofing which uses a radio transmitter to disrupt the drone's ability to verify its accurate location. There are, however, workarounds to these spoofing and jamming systems, and some GPS validation

systems have already been deployed during the war in Ukraine. The US military also has its own anti-jamming, anti-spoofing GPS validation system called M-Code, which if supplied to Ukraine would have a profound effect on Ukraine's capability to fight against Russia. Another method of tracking the location of cell phones is through the delivery of spyware. Hamas has tried this against Israeli soldiers. They would pose as beautiful women on social media for the purpose of luring soldiers into downloading malicious software which can track the exact location of the device.

There are a number of things that can be extrapolated from cell phone location. It gives clues into supply routes, bases, and troop movements, as well as strategy. Russia has used its UAVs with IMSI catchers to spy on NATO countries in years past, attempting to see if the number of troops at NATO bases was the actual number that NATO stated they would have present there. When it comes to mitigating the danger that arises with having a cell phone on the battlefield, the only major consensus regarding it advises banning the use of them altogether. But even still, there are cases of generals seizing the cell phones of their own troops who don't want to conform to the safety protocol. Some platoons have a policy in which they require that personnel using their cell phones have to do it over 1000 ft away from their platoon location. Taliban leaders would evade being targeted for assassination by swapping out sim cards with other people at different locations. Another evasive tactic is the use of Faraday cases which blocks wireless signals to electronic devices. With a Faraday case, a person can head in the wrong direction purposely in order to fool the trackers and then simply put his phone in the Faraday case, blocking its signal, and then head back in the right direction, thereby faking out the operator trying to locate his position.

When it comes to counter-battery fire, Multiple Launch Rocket Systems(MLRS) can simply be relocated to evade the strike. Howitzers, however, cannot. In the event of counter artillery fire, those soldiers operating the howitzers have to take cover and leave the howitzers in place. In some cases, the howitzers can be repaired. After counter artillery fire, the MLRS is usually not moved back to its original spot, but is relocated to a different position within the same vicinity of the former one. Also, the battery that is being targeted by artillery fire is usually not the one that launches counter artillery. This process is facilitated by what is called the AKATSIA fire-control architecture, which assigns counter fire procedures to batteries not being targeted. Tochka-U missiles are typically used for these operations. Their long range capabilities allows Russia to target Electronic Warfare systems and command posts that are at the rear

and far behind the front lines of enemy forces. These aspects of Russia's arsenal have it made it difficult for Ukraine to launch a successful counter offensive. However, when it comes to logistics, Russia is at a huge disadvantage, moreso now that Ukraine has precision guided HIMARS rockets that can destroy Russian supply routes and keep Russia from building upon and consolidating positions further west. The obstacles that come with transportation as a result of this could work in Ukraine's favor.

At the beginning of the war, Russia face difficulty is making use of rail lines to bring ammunition to the front lines. In order to circumvent this problem, they begin transporting ammo from the rail heads to the rear and then to ammunition depots stationed behind their operating artillery units. From there, the munitions are then transported to the artillery units via civilian vehicles which cannot travel in off-road conditions. They have to remain on roads. This process of moving ammunition is very predictable and in some cases impossible to defend. But Ukraine's lack of highly advanced long range artillery keeps them from being able to exploit this weakness of Russia's logistics. This is one of the handicaps that Ukraine has to deal with—Russia has the capability to strike Ukraine's rear area operations, but Ukraine lacks the capacity to fire upon Russia's rear area. However, Ukraine seems to have been able to employ saboteurs within Russia's army to do the job. A number of Russian ammunition depots were blown up just before Ukraine's Kherson counteroffensive in late August. Still and all, Ukraine has managed to receive MLRS systems from Germany and the UK in early August, which have the capacity of striking targets at at 186 miles away. These systems should effectively reduce the scale of continuous Russian artillery bombardments and help Ukraine further advance into eastern territories. In combination with more 152mm howitzers, Ukraine will also be able to increase their ability to provide support to its mobile units. NATO however has expressed concern with their ability to keep manufacturing up to par with Ukraine's equipment losses in the battlefield. Furthermore, another issue when it comes to the supply of howitzers from different western nations, is that each type of howitzer has a different operational standard and require different training and expertise. The shells compatible with one type of howitzer is incompatible with another type. This presents a logistical problem for Ukraine, and makes it imperative for them to be supplied abundantly with one type of howitzer so that maintenance of those systems can be more adequately sustained.

Ukraine's success, as far as military is concerned, will depend on their ability to attack the rear of the Russian forces, as well as the logistical aspects of their ammunition transport. This would require

the efficient use of UAVs, Electronic Warfare systems, and long range precision missile systems. However, Russia's Electronic Warfare Systems have been able to determine that Ukraine's ability to locate and strike the position of Russia's forces with the combined use of UAV(drones) and other artillery and communications equipment is reliant on signals received via US operated space based GPS satellites. In order to obstruct this ability, Russia employed their Pole-21 jamming system, as well as their automatic jamming system called the R330Zh. They also have a UAV called the Orlan-10 which is part of their EW system that can jam cell towers and suppress mobile communications. The US, however, has an anti-jamming, anti-spoofing GPS validation system called M-Code, which they could supply to Ukraine to help them evade Russia's GPS jamming systems. The only country outside the US that received M-CODE is Germany. However, there is somewhat of a catch-22 when it comes to jamming systems, and Russia has to temporarily turn off their jamming systems in order to make use of their own GPS-based positioning and targeting of Ukrainian forces. Russia also relies on landlines to communicate. These are cables laid on the ground and are much safer for communicating without giving away one's position. Ukrainian forces also made effective use of these during the war in Donbass prior to February 24 2022. Moreover, when it comes to the use of jamming and spoofing systems, a great deal of fuel is required, and this why devices like the Pole-21 and R330Zh are not always used. Russia also has another jamming and spoofing system that is mounted on a truck. It's called the Shipovnik-Aero and can detect UAVs by analyzing the UAV's control frequency, as well as obstruct various communications networks. After confirming the control frequency, the Shipovnik-Aero can then jam the command frequency. It also spoofs the UAVs navigational system, disrupting its ability to accurately verify its location, to the point that the person operating the UAV may think he is directing it back to the base, but in reality the drone is actually going to a location designated by the Shipovnik-Arso spoofing system. The Shipovnik-Areo's jamming system has restricted Ukraine's ability to monitor certain areas, but if Ukraine is able to locate and destroy it, it would be of strategic significance to Ukraine. Because of the time it takes to set up the Shipovnik-Aero, it becomes increasingly vulnerable to being struck by Ukrainian artillery. Still and all, when it comes to Russia's capabilities, where jamming and spoofing isn't used to target Ukainian UAVs, other forms of attacks have been able to neutralize the threat. Russia has fired its howitzers, MLRS and Tochka-U at UAV operators. Altogether, in lieu of the various systems designed to defend against UAVs, the Ukrainian UAVs usually lasts on average roughly seven days. Ukraine has

considered only sending UAVs out on a pre-set flight plan to lower the risk of losing the UAV, at the expense of being able to more quickly locate, target, and destroy enemy targets. It was found that setting UAVs on a pre-set flight path helped it avoid serious obstruction from EW systems, while UAVs set to fly with via an operator faced more interference from Electronic Warfare systems.

Its been noted that Russian forces rarely disembark from areas they can obscure from Ukraine's reconnaissance equipment and missile capabilities. If Ukraine had the US military's anti-jamming and anti-spoofing M-Code system, they could gain a greater capability to strike those Russian positions. While the Starlink satellite has helped Ukraine maintain GPS surveillance on the battlefield, Russia every now and then is able to able to disrupt satellite networks. Russia's ground based EW systems are extensive and have multiple capabilities like jamming, spoofing, and locating. The TORN-MDM, another ground based EW system, can use triangulation to locate of troops communicating with a radius of 70 kilometers. They can also simultaneously decrypt the communications of the Motorola radios used by Ukrainian forces. (Harris radios are said to be more secure and impervious to EW systems.) Ukrainian forces managed to capture a TORN-MDM system early during the war.

When it comes to ground based warfare, Russia has been at a disadvantage. Despite facing issues on this front in prior wars and also improvising in those same wars, Russian managed to repeat similar mistakes at the outset of their invasion of Ukraine. Russia organizes their infantry into BTGs or Battalion Tactical Groups. However once again, it took massive casualties for them to realize that the most effective methodology of conducting ground assaults is with the use of storm teams as well as ground infantry moving alongside of armored vehicles in order to prevent ambushes. Ukraine on the other hand is prevented from taking advantage of any weakness in Russia's ground based troops because repeated bombardments by Russian artillery often keeps Ukrainian forces from forming into anything greater than a company comprised of 200 soldiers, and the sheer volume of Russian artillery gives them an advantage when it comes to fighting over a broader area. At the start of the Kherson counter offensive in late August of 2022, soldiers wounded in the battle reported the scale of Russian artillery in comparison to theirs and estimated that Ukrainian troops were being killed at a ratio of 5:1. For every five Ukrainian troops killed, there was only one Russian troop killed. Despite the disadvantage, Ukrainian forces made gains, recapturing villages along several axes in Kherson. They also captured territories across the Siverskyi Donets River in Donetsk Oblast. The initial feint operation that the Kherson

counteroffensive was designated to be, had the intended effect of putting Ukraine in position to attack Russia's logistical capabilities, as well getting Russian forces to commit more troops towards Kherson. Russia began to shift more of its forces from Kharkiv and eastern Ukraine to Ukraine's south in the Kherson region. This was done to reinforce Russian positions there since Kherson is of paramount strategic importance for Russia's hold on Crimea. However, it left an opening for Ukraine to advance into Kharkiv, which they did successfully on September 6th 2022, capturing Verbivka and chasing the Russian forces back to the left bank of the Severskyi Donets and Serednya Balakliika rivers. Subsequently, Russia would destroying a number of bridges in Balakliya to prevent Ukraine from going further east.

One of the main advantages Russia has is its ability to strike deep inside Ukrainian territory with long range ballistic missiles. This is why some feel that the f35 of f16s will not be enough for Ukraine to counter this particular Russian advantage. This capability of the Russian military prevents Ukraine from embarking upon sustained manufacturing of defense equipment, and Russia can resort to using ballistic missiles whenever they see fit. Continuous strikes as far as Kyiv would demoralize the population and stifle attempts at recovery. The most devastating long range missile that Russia has is the Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missile which can evade air defense systems with its ability to maneuver in flight. While in flight heading towards the target, the Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missile can disperse emitters that confuses radar systems as to the trajectory of the missile, making it all the more harder for anti-missile defense systems to track and destroy it. The emitters are small objects the size of a coca-cola can, but when they are dispensed by the missile, they can help distort the trajectory of the missile and thus alter the radar readings and subsequent trajectory calculations. Russia usually saves these for a potential conflict with NATO forces in the event of a full scale Russia/NATO war.

In Ukraine, Russia has used cruise missiles to strike targets, missiles such as the 9M727, Kh-101, Kh-59, and 3M-54. The 9M727 can be fired using the Iskander launcher. The Kh-101 is normally fired from Russian bombers. He Kh-59 are usually launched from the ground, while the 3M-54 is launched from vessels in the Black Sea. The 9M727 and Kalibr missiles are subsonic and travel low in order to avoid being detected by radar from anti-missile systems. Russia also uses E95M air targets to train its anti-aircraft crews. Many of Russia's missiles are evasive with high maneuverability, such that its very difficult to predict their trajectory since the missile can change direction while in flight. It has been recommended that Ukraine

should set up it air raid alert equipment over a vast areas in order to account for the maneuverability of Russia's missiles. It is often the case in Ukraine that aid raid sirens are so often, that in many cases they simply are ignored by the general population.

Russia's missile have guidance systems built into them. The missiles use built-in sensors to help direct their flight. Russia's missiles have imaging technology that allows the missile to compare footage from real time imaging with pre-loaded mapping. Other missiles have built-in radar and components for receiving satellite signals. If these signals are jammed, the missile has other components that would allow its position to be detected. For this, Russian missiles have an inertial navigation system(INS) comprised of accelerometers which measure translation and gyroscopes that measure rotation, both of which allows for the position of the missile to be determined. Essentially, after the initial orientation is provided by the GPS, the INS—if the GPS signal from the missile is later jammed—can help operators calculate the position of the missile from information provided by the onboard gyrometers, accelerometers and other motion sensors. That information is combined with the initial orientation in order to calculate the missile's current position. This method is jam proof. However, even in light of the prospect of jamming, Russia's ballistic missiles rely on GPS for satellite navigation since it is believed that other countries will always allow GPS signals on their territory. When it comes to Russian missiles that fly low and at subsonic speeds, Ukrainian forces are able to alert gunner units when a missile has just flew by, preparing them in advance to shoot down the missile. This has proven effective for Ukrainian forces, who have been able to shoot down a number of Russian missiles with their own air-defense systems. Furthermore, for Ukraine to make serious advances militarily, it will require for them to be supplied with long range missile systems like the Army Tactical Missile Systems(ATACMS) which can reach as far as 300 kilometers. Such a weapon would allow Ukraine to strike far behind Russia's front lines and destroy Russian ammunition depots and ammo transport equipment. Another factor that would work in Ukraine's favor if they received the ATACMS is that it could raise the likelihood of being able to recapture separatist held territory. One of the reasons that the separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk were able to hold on to those territories for as long as they have is because in 2014 they were successful in driving Ukrainian forces off of their post at the Izvaryne border connecting Luhansk and Russia. Consequently, Russia was able to bring in weapons and reinforcements into the separatist territories via the Izvaryne border crossing to aid the separatists against the Ukrainian government forces. Without

recapturing or launching strikes at the Izvaryne border crossing and repelling incoming artillery from the Russian Federation, Ukraine will have no means of neutralizing the separatist threat in Luhansk and Donetsk and no way of securing the region back into Ukrainian control. This is why long range missile systems would make a significant difference in Ukraine's ability to keep morale and faith among its own troops very high because troops would have more confidence in their mission to recapture all of Ukraine.

The other game-changer would be if Ukraine's military could get its hands on the US military's M-CODE anti-jamming and anti-spoofing system. This combined with ATACMS would give Ukraine the capability to conduct more reconnaissance and locate enemy targets at long range. Ukrainian UAVs would be able to maintain its command link with operators without the elevated risk of jamming and interference from Russia's EW systems.

The US has also sent radar hunting missiles called (HARM) which gives Ukraine the capability to take out Russia's radar sites. The HARM missiles can be fired from Ukraine's MIG-29 fighter jets and would give Ukrainian forces a great advantage in their counteroffensive. The US has used HARM missiles in the past in wars against Iraq. The missiles work by detecting radar emissions.

Chapter 6: Lessons from the Russia/Chechnya War

The wave of nationalistic sentiment, feeling as though one is justified is not always a formula for military success. It can help garner support, as we see in the case of Ukraine, but in most cases, it has no bearing on the outcome of conflict. Like Ukraine, both Chechnya and Georgia, following the breakup of the Soviet Union, felt it was their right to extract itself from Russia's sphere of influence, but in both cases, Russia bulldozed its way though such sentiments of justification and resistance of Russian influence and ultimately carved out Russian territory in both countries. Chechnya is now part of the Russian federation. On account of that, its one thing to be confident about victory for Ukraine, its another to see it from a realistic perspective. Russia is facing a situation in Ukraine that heavily mirrors what occurred in Georgia and Chechnya prior to Russian intervention—oppression and hostile treatment of ethnic Russians. Such was Russia's justification to intervene militarily in both of those countries, and was also Russia's justification to intervene in Ukraine. Historically, Ukraine has only existed as a truly neutral state in 1990s under the presidency of Kuchma after the fall of the Soviet Union. In years prior, Ukraine was either under the protection of Russia as it was the case when Bohdan Khemlynitsky, Ukraine's founder, made Ukraine a protectorate of the Russian empire in the 1600s—And—when the Soviet Union took control of Ukraine following the Bolshevik Revolution. When Ukraine was not under Russian control, it was usually occupied by German forces both during World War I and World War II. Hence, why Ukraine has to make its goals clear—do they want to be under the influence of Germany or the influence of Russia. Or do they want to be neutral? If they make themselves a protectorate of the west, then Ukraine will have to concede to western notions regarding the western view of democracy and also western insistence on civic nationalism, not ethnic nationalism, a prospect that would be a huge blow to Ukrainian nationalism. But as a neutral state, even with just 80% of its territory, Ukrainian nationalism would thrive like no other. If Ukraine places itself under western jurisdiction, then Ukraine must see that such an investment pays off—a payoff that would ensure the return of all Russian occupied areas of the country, but this would require Ukraine eventually allowing foreign forces to operate on its soil and essentially control the political paradigm there. At the moment, the west is only providing weapons to Ukraine, and such may not be enough for Ukraine to reclaim territory from Russia. One way for Ukraine to reclaim territories from Russian occupation would be for regime change to occur in Russia, and not just a smooth transition of

regime change. It would have to be the type of regime change that is marked by major upheaval akin to the Bolshevik revolution and the fall of the Soviet Union. In both cases, the economic situation was a major catalyst behind the revolutions and independence movements. But following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, worldwide sanctions against Russia failed to trigger a cathartic situation in Russia that would provoke unrest. In fact, it has done the opposite. Russia's economy and currency actually remained stable. The Ruble, after a brief decline, rose in value shortly thereafter and had become one of the strongest currencies of the year in 2022. Because of this positive outcome for Russia, if Ukraine is trying to trigger regime change in Russia, they will have to devise a new strategy. If we look back at fall of the Russian empire and the fall of the Soviet Union, there are some intricacies that run concurrent with the similarity pertaining to the economic fallback that helped trigger the collapse of both regimes. Obviously, the fall of the Russian empire was largely due to economic inequalities where the common folks were living in dire poverty, while high-ranking officials lived in luxury. This is the same dynamic that led to the French Revolution in the 18th century. Fast forward to the fall of Soviet Union in 1991, not only was the economy in dire straights—likely due to excessive subsidization of industries by the Soviet government, a far left General Secretary in Mikhail Gorbachev come to power in the Soviet Union and upended all the main tenets of Soviet politics which kept it going, such as restriction of speech, vote for one party, etc. Mikhail Gorbachev did away with such restrictions and the people of the Soviet Union didn't respond with gratitude, thinking it was a conciliatory gesture in order to elicit a positive view of the Soviet Union, the Soviet states took it literally as a license to go independent. So in looking back at the fall of both regimes—Russian empire collapse and Soviet Union collapse, how does one conjure up what would have to occur in Russia to trigger total Russian collapse, allowing Ukraine to quickly seize its former territories.

On August 9th, 2022, the Ukrainian army may have struck a Russian airbase in Crimea apparently with its own long range missiles capable of reaching targets over 200km away. However, there was still some speculation over where Ukraine got the missiles. Did they in fact produce them or were they secretly supplied by the United States or the United Kingdom? Anyhow, the result garnered Ukraine some affirmation on their continued insistence that they have the capability to drive out Russian forces from Ukrainian territories. Driving home the point that such is a likely scenario aids the Ukrainian war machine, the continued supply of foreign weapons, and the prospect of weakening and depleting Russia's military

infrastructure. Proving the viability of a Ukrainian military operation, not just to western allies, but also to Russian officials could foster urgency among Russian officials to negotiate a peace treaty that gives some concessions to terms laid forth by Ukraine. On August 9th, nine Russian warplanes were completely destroyed at the Saky Airbase in Crimea in what would mark a major turning point in the current trajectory of the war, a trajectory of which Russia would comfortably occupy much of the east and south of Ukraine. The strike at Saky Airbase was the first major Ukrainian attack on a Russian base near the Black Sea, and also on territory that Russia considers to belong to Russia. Russian annexed Crimea in 2014 after a referendum. Moreover, the reports of the explosions perplexed some of those following the war, considering that one would presume that Russia would have some sort of anti-missile shield protecting the airbase. While much was presumed that Ukraine did indeed carry out the attack, the president of Ukraine, Vlodymyr Zelenskyy, did not outright claim responsibility for the attack, only pointing out the damage that occurred at the Russian airbase. Shortly before, though, Zelenskyy pointed out to western media the dangers of revealing vital Ukrainian strategic maneuvers. Hence, why it is likely that Ukraine may become more discreet regarding their tactical achievements. Russia denied that Ukraine carried out the attack, saying that negligence caused the explosions. Furthermore, when the topic of HIMARS was brought up as a potential weapon used by the Ukrainians to attack the base, experts noted that HIMARS rockets only have a max range of 120km. The Saky Airbase is around 225km from the front lines. The US supplied HIMARS rockets could not reach that far. In other strategic maneuvers, Ukraine is also blowing up the bridges over the Dnieper river, leaving Russia possibly having to rely on ferries in order to get supplies to troops stationed just west of the Dnieper. However, that may be unfeasible for Russia and will thus leave those Russian troops trapped in some areas just west of the Dnieper at the mercy of Ukrainian artillery. There are also apparently pro-Ukrainian Russian sympathizers conducting sabotage operations, blowing up Russian ammunition depots on behalf of Ukraine. Some Ukrainian sources reported to the New York Times that some Ukrainian sympathizers operating in the Russian military orchestrated the attack. No one is sure of the origin of these infiltrators, whether or not if they are in fact sympathizers or trained by a foreign intelligence service. Zelenskyy has been very discreet about the recent attacks on Russian territories in Crimea, choosing to avoid saying outright that Ukraine carried out the attack or confirm that some infiltrators launched the operation from behind enemy lines. This is very wise since admitting infiltration into Russian

territory could allow Russia to orchestrate a pretext to justify further escalating the conflict. Still and all, recent Ukrainian successes will further aid Zelenskyy's ability to persuade western nations for more supplies and aid. Russia will likely conduct provocations in Latin America in order to get the US to focus its foreign policy there. Such provocations could include Russian sending warships to Nicaragua or supplying Latin countries with long range missile systems, all of which would provoke the US, but force them to shift their focus closer to home—a prospect that would be huge loss for Ukraine on the supply front.

A major concern for the international community has the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power planet that currently under the control of the Russian army. The dilemma that surrounds the plant is how the nature of the conflict requires Russian military personnel to remain present near the plant. At the same time, it turns the nuclear plant into a target that Ukraine can fire missiles at. If Russia agrees to a demilitarization of the planet, Ukrainian forces can advance and reclaim it since it is still internationally recognized as Ukrainian territory. The IAEA had gone to the site of plant to conduct an inspection but has not singled out any one side as far as endangering it. If the something were to occur, a missile strike that hits the building that holds the reactors would lead to a radiation leak. Much of the concern is about the water systems used to cool the spent fuel pools and the reactors. If those are damaged, heat would build up and radiation would be released into the air. Because of the location of the power plant, all of Europe would be affected by the radiation leak if the power plant were to be significantly damaged from the shelling

Ukraine has a lot of confidence that it can overcome the largest military force in eastern Europe. A recent example in eastern Europe of how a smaller nation can attain its objective against the aggression of a larger force can be seem from how the first Chechen war played out, leading to Russia withdrawing troops from the country after a 2 year battle between 1994 and 1996. Chechnya was led by Dzhokhar Dudayev, and during his tenure, there was much unrest stemming from his treatment of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians living there, as well as his administrative policy, which led to opposition and separatist entities that would be supported by Russia. Many Chechens disapproved of Dudayev's policies and initially welcomed Russian intervention and their support of Dudayev opposition factions. Hence why when opposition forces and Russian troops advanced into Grozny, they expected nothing more than having to display a show of force in order to get Dudayev's forces to surrender, considering that it did not take long for Russia to wipe out Chechnya's air force. Dudayev's forces were largely unequipped to confront the Russian

army, but their knowledge of the terrain and use of the infrastructure would shortly thereafter create massive problems for the Russian army as Chechen forces would launch a guerrilla operation that would confuse the Russian occupiers. They made use of basements and underground tunnels to hide their movements from Russian surveillance equipment, and Chechens were also reinforced with the aid of more soldiers and equipment coming from Moscow to help them, often sneaking into Chechnya from Ingusheta. Russia's unpreparedness was attributed to the lack of experience by ground troops who were ordered to maintain military protocols that were often hard to adhere to in the heat of battle—protocols such as not to shoot unless shot at first. Many of the Russian troops were said to be untrained for urban warfare, having been use to the old Soviet style of fighting when Red Army troops fought in battles in which urban areas were left open for the sake of keeping the infrastructure in tact. Historically, much of Russia's wars are heavily defined by an initial learning phase resulting in large casualties followed by an adaptation that leads to a successful counter offensive. This was the case in World War II, as Russia struggled to claim east Poland, Finland, and later its own territory from German occupation. This also looks to be the case in Ukraine when shortly after their move into Kiev, Russia was met with an unexpected and powerful Ukrainian resistance. All of this is very similar to the Russian advance into Grozny in 1994, where Chechen guerrilla units, often made up of small teams dispersed throughout a city, with units comprised of men carrying shoulder launched RPGs, assault weapons, and sniper rifles. For the Russian army, there was a slight mishap that would lead to Russia having to concede on the battlefield to Chechen forces. Much of the initial military personnel that had been deployed during the adaptation and improvisation process during the first year of the Chechen war, having knowledge of what went wrong and what needed to be corrected, did not pass that knowledge to incoming personnel sent to Grozny after the initial military personnel were eventually relieved from duty after serving their term and sent home. The training applied for the incoming inexperienced soldiers was not sufficient enough for application in real time in urban combat situations. Hence why Islamic forces in Chechnya became instrumental in carrying out attacks that would wipe out over a thousand Russian troops later on in the war—Chechen forces became split between secularists and jihadists. In looking back, in this case of the first Chechen war, we see how Russian troops initially encountered significant losses amid Chechen guerrilla and subterranean warfare tactics, but later adapted to the urban warfare and stifled the Chechen resistance. This process in itself was the training exercise for Russia because shortly

thereafter, Russia then began improvising and making use of unmanned remote controlled armored vehicles. They also began letting experienced Russian troops initiate ground advances, while having the less experienced troops advance from another direction.

Strategically, as wee see often in modern warfare, using civilian areas as human shields helped the Chechens enormously, such that without the tactic it is likely that the Chechens would not have staved off the Russian occupation. In addition to making use of civilian areas, Chechen fighters would also move tanks that they seized from Russian soldiers and plant them inside basements, firing them from there so that Russia would strike the house or residential area and kill civilians, allowing Chechen fighters to show to the media how insidious Russian tactics are. Chechen urban tactics were textbook tactics now used by insurgencies in the middle east. Interestingly, the Ukraine war has raised some questions as to whether or not defensive armies should be allowed to used civilian areas for strategic purposes.

Another aspect that helped the Chechen factions initially stave off the Russian advance during the first Chechen War was their ability to seize Russian radios and intercept Russian communications. This was extremely vital and allowed Chechen fighters to know in advance where Russian forces were moving, allowing the Chechens to conduct successful ambush attacks. Russia, however, later figured out how to better encrypt their communications; they also figured out ways to lure Chechen fighters suspecting Russian unawareness and then wipe out the Chechen fighters upon their approach after falling for the bait. One would think that Russia would have developed a strategy for Kyiv after February 24, 2022 that would have provided troops with some knowledge of how to respond to urban combat. Maybe this is why Russian sent many Chechen fighters to Kyiv since it is possible some of their command may have fought the Russians in urban combat during the first Chechen war and thus would have some knowledge on how to deal with the Ukrainian fighters employing urban warfare tactics in Kyiv in early 2022.

After the Russian gained control over Grozny, the Chechen factions had spit. One part was made up op secularist, while the other part was comprised of Islamic fundamentalists led by Shamil Basayev, who in mid-1995 while Grozny was under Russian control, would lead 200 of his fighters into Russian territory in the town of Budennovsk. This campaign sowed the seeds for Russia's eventual withdrawal of troops from Chechnya. On June of 1995, Basayev launched an attack on Budenovsk, first by attempting to seize the police station. (seizing police stations seems to be the first point of attack during a takeover. This was how separatists in eastern Ukraine took control of Donetsk.) But in Basayev's case, his unit failed to gain

control of the police station, but ended up capturing a bank building and the city administrative building, followed by the local hospital where they planted boobytraps and took hostages. This gave the Chechen Islamist fighters leverage to make demands for Russian withdrawal from Chechnya in exchange for the release of hostages. They also asserted that if the Russians tried to use force to release the hostages, they would execute them. The Russian government were forced to negotiate with Basayev, but at the same time, the military would still try to capture the hospital from Basayev's forces. They managed to gain control of the first floor and free some of the hostages, while eliminating some of Basayev's men who were standing guard with sniper rifles and machine guns. The Russian military did this twice, and ultimately stifled negotiations which ended shortly, allowing Basasev to return back to Chechnya after having killed 150 civilians during his terrorist operation in Budennovsk. While his actions there didn't yield him his demand for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya, the event caused a rift between the Russian government negotiators and the Russian military forces who acted to recapture the hospital under their own accord. The Russian government would tell Basayev that the Russian military were operating independently of the government.

Basayev's men launched two more attacks in Grozny, both orchestrated and conduced after months of calm. The relative quiet made the Russian soldiers complacent in both instances, causing large casualties during Basayev's attacks. The first attack in Grozny after a period of calm occurred in March of 1996 when Basayev's men captured a train before disembarking and attacking Russian MVD forces stationed in the north, west and southern parts of Grozny. The attack lasted five days and resulted in 200 casualties. Once again the Russians were initially flustered by the surprise attack and took some time to neutralize the enemy. Basayev managed to escape with multiple hostages. This attack was followed by calm for a few more months, before Basayev launched another surprise attack in August of 1996, this time with more men and a battle strategy that cut off the Russian forces from its supply lines, resulting in close to 1000 Russian casualties, which forced Russia to negotiate and end to the war and withdraw its troops from Chechnya. The heinous actions of hostage taking and conducting attacks after periods of calm wore out the Russian resolve to retain control of the Chechnya. Chechnya is not the first time that attacks on civilians won a nation its independence. Algeria was able to become independent of France when Algerian separatists called the FLN launched sporadic terrorist attacks on the civilian population, both on french people living in Algeria and also on french people living in Paris, leading to France and its population

eventually becoming worn out from endless fighting and civilian death. The disproportionate response from the French military and other French nationalist groups, leading to death of scores of Algerian civilians led to international condemnation which further worked in favor of a likely Algerian independence. Another example is the Gaza Strip. The militants there were able to get Israel to withdraw its troops from there in 2005 by launching horrific attacks on the civilian population as well surprise ambushes on Israeli troops. In Afghanistan after the US occupied the country in 2002 after overthrowing the Taliban government, continued Taliban presence via terrorist attacks on civilian population as well as surprise ambush attacks on US-backed Afghan security forces led to the US eventually having to negotiate a settlement with the Taliban, which ultimately paved the way for the Taliban to reclaim its territory from US and Afghan security forces. Ukraine, however, faces a different situation. In the case of Ukraine, Russia is occupying parts of the country that is mostly ethnic Russian and more than likely to become satisfied with the status quo of being governed or influenced by Russian officials. So, essentially, in that case, it is less likely that Russian soldiers will face ambush attacks and also less likely that ethnic Russians living there will have to deal with pro-Ukrainian factions carrying out terror attacks. At the moment, most of the attacks on those areas are the result of shelling from Ukrainian territories. With Russia's troops occupying a mostly Russian area, it is highly unlikely that Russia would face the same sequence of events that led to its withdrawal from Chechnya after the first Chechen war. Occupation is a very tenuous ordeal when a military is trying to occupy a population outside of its own national identity, but the case of Ukraine is such that Ukraine will not be able to incur the advantage of this for its lost territories in eastern Ukraine because much of eastern Ukraine is Russian speaking and many of those ethnic Russians identify as Russian and because of that, they will be less inclined to resist the status quo and all attempts to guilt-trip them into resisting it won't have much of a platform to operate. This is a different dynamic from the aforementioned cases of Algeria, Gaza, Chechnya in 1996, and Afghanistan, where its easier to convince a population to resist the occupation of a foreign force. This is not the case in eastern Ukraine. However, there is the possibility that some tensions could arise in the DPR and LPR concerning remaining autonomous or joining the Russian federation. Many officials in the DPR like their autonomy and being able to set their own legislative agenda, but one can expect that there is an element brewing in eastern Ukraine that could insist on becoming a part of Russia. And this could create problems for Russia if tensions over such a matter reaches a point where clashes began to

break out in the DPR or LPR between factions that support autonomy and factions that want to become part of the Russian federation. This is a very likely scenario, and will put the DPR and LPR officials back under Ukraine's sphere of influence since Ukraine would prefer that the breakaway regions remain autonomous, and even more so, hostile to Russia but friendly to Ukraine. The reason I say this is likely is because of what happened in Afghanistan after the country forced Russia to withdraw its forces from the country in the late 70s. The Afghan freedom fighters did not have a plan on moving forward with its independence and this led to a split amongst the fighters that had fought together against the Soviet occupation, leading to more violence and instability in Afghanistan. These freedom fighters became split—on one side was the Northern Alliance and on the other was the Taliban. This also happened in Chechnya after the Russian forces withdrew from the country in 1996—Chechen forces became split between Islamic jihadists and Chechen secularists and such division gave Russia all the advantage it needed to later capture the entire country and make it a part of Russia. In this situation of eastern Ukraine, Ukraine will have that same advantage Russia had when it came to making Chechnya part of the Russian federation, should there be a rift between those in eastern Ukraine who want to remain autonomous and those who would rather become a part of Russia. This is why it would be advantageous for Ukraine to recognize the DPR and LPR as autonomous, but also willing to provide military support to ensure this autonomy, meaning that Ukraine will militarily back the DPR and LPR officials against opposition forces that want to make those regions part of the Russian federation. This deal automatically places the DPR and LPR under Ukraine's sphere of influence and sets the DPR and LPR officials somewhat politically against the Russian state. If clashes break out, Russia will likely move in quickly and occupy the DPR and LPR, as well as overthrow their autonomy. But now those DPR and LPR insurgents will have to lean on Ukraine and go to guerrilla warfare tactics in order to resist Russian occupation. Now Ukraine can persuade DPR and LPR insurgent fighters to re-identify as Ukrainian-but-Russian-speaking in exchange for support. If Ukraine is wise, they would not only just recognize the autonomy of the DPR and LPR and pledge to militarily back them against opposition groups that want to make the DPR and LPR a part of the Russian federation, Ukraine would also help the DPR and LPR set up a secret underground arms and aid smuggling tunnel that would ensure DPR and LPR resistance against a future Russian occupation. DPR and LPR already have their own legislation and its highly unlikely that they will want to throw away control over it. But now, in this scenario,

one has to consider the reality of what will happen. DPR and LPR insurgents will have no choice but to use the same guerrilla tactics that the Chechen fighters employed during the first Chechen war, i.e. using civilian infrastructure, launching attacks on Russian territories by way of hostage taking, taking over train stations, surrounding Russian forces in eastern Ukraine and conducting surprise attacks that will wear out the Russian occupation. Like the Chechen fighters during the first Chechen war, DPR and LPR separatists may be able to receive troop support from volunteers in the Russian federation who would could sneak into eastern Ukraine. These aspects will further push Russia to the negotiating table and compel them to withdraw their forces if they cannot muster public support for the war. The media factor was critical for the success of the Chechens during the first Chechen War. And it wasn't so much the Chechens allowing the media to operate unrestricted in Grozny that was attributable to that success, but Russia's unwillingness to allocate resources towards controlling how information about the war was disseminated. Such negligence on their part kept the Russian public from mustering up support for continued Russian efforts to seize Chechnya. Meanwhile, Russian casualties continued to mount and mothers became concerned about the whereabouts of their sons drafted into the Russian military. During the Ukraine war, both Ukraine and Russia maintained a tight grip on how information was allocated, with neither country allowing any room for doubt concerning how the war was to be understood. During the second Chechen War was when Russia began using a strategy of not referring to a military effort as a war and this was to keep the public from becoming concerned since the public will more likely tolerate something considered to be a military operation. During the second Chechen war, Russia didn't refer to the conflict as a war, but as a "counter-terrorist operation", and this did wonders for how the public perceived the conflict--an operation sounds much less perturbing than an actual war. Russia also improved their use of media to control the narratives about the war, which is something they did not do during the first Chechen war. Another factor that helped the Russians during the second Chechen war was that after the first Chechen war, Chechnya had become inundated with rogue militia groups and renegade fighters. Basayev, the leader of the Islamists fighters, had acquired large funding from Islamic nations such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. They also received help from Osama Bin Laden--eventual mastermind of the 9/11 terror attacks in New York City, who would send thousands of mercenaries from Afghanistan and Yemen to help the Islamic fighters in Chechnya. The catch-22 here is that the funding emboldened Basayev to launch incursions into the Russian territory of Daghestan. Basayev

had won a strategic victory for Chechnya when he led his men into Russian territory of Budennovsk and captured a hospital, taking numerous people hostage. This ultimately led to Russia negotiating and withdrawing its troops from Chechnya without officially guaranteeing the status of Chechnya. But at the outset of second Chechen war, Basayev tried to repeat this strategic maneuver of attempting to assert their geopolitical agenda by way of incursion into Russian territory, launching an invasion of Dagestan. Russia had been training in the North Caucasus for a possible second war against Chechnya, and was able to drive the Islamist forces out of Daghestan in short order. The mistake that would eventually Chechnya its independence was when the Islamists started bombing civilians in Russian territory. After the Russians had driven out the Islamists from Daghestan, an apartment was bombed in Daghestan in August of 1999, and then shortly thereafter in September, more apartment bombings took place in other Russian cities, even in the capital Moscow. The bombings were carried out by Islamic Arab militants fighting for Chechen forces. Some speculated that the bombings were false flags carried out by the FSB since three FSB agents were arrested after being seen carrying suspicious items into one of the apartment buildings in Moscow. Later, they stated that it was only an anti-terror drill. Nevertheless, the timing of it, drew considerable suspicion. Ultimately, however, the incursion into Russian territory by Islamist forces made it very easy to implicate them in the subsequent apartment bombings. Such an event made it much easier for Russia to convince the public of the necessity of launching another invasion of Chechnya in the name of national security. Hence, Russia would garner more public support for their military operations in Chechnya, making sure to call it a "counter terrorist operation" and not a war. If we fast forward to February 24, 2022, we notice that Russia applies this same tactic which worked during the second Chechen War, calling the invasion of Ukraine a "special military operation" This was done to curb possible concerns from the Russian public of the implications of a full-scale war and the potential casualties that the Russian public would have to stomach.

After the first Chechen war, after having incurred numerous casualties from fighting in an urban warfare scenario, Russia, during the second Chechen war, had tried to apply a strategy in which they would operate in Grozny on the basis of avoiding engagement in urban combat. For this purpose, they incorporated more air power and air strikes on Chechen positions in urban areas. However, secret underground tunnels and passageways used by the Chechen fighters forced Russia to abandon their strategy of avoiding urban combat. To avoid a repeat of the casualties of the first Chechen war, Russia

employed more experienced fighters at the outset of their advance into Grozny. They also dispatched ground troops to move alongside of armored vehicles. This greatly repelled ambush assaults from Chechen fighters. Russia also improved communications, oftentimes purposely communicating to each other their next movement in order to lure Chechen fighters to an area where they would be ambushed by Russian forces. Chechen fighters were intercepting radio transmissions, but when Russia got wind of this, they would simply communicate their positions for the purpose of reeling in Chechen fighters. Following Russia's initial assault on Grozny in response to the apartment bombings in Daghestan and Moscow, the Islamists Chechen mlitants launched more terrorist attacks in Russian territory, attacks that included hostage taking and bombings. Staring in May of 2002, Basayev led his militants in a terrorist campaign that included the bombings of trains in Stavropol and Moscow, as well as the bombing of a Russian aircraft in 2004. Hostage taking operations took place at a Moscow theater and Beslan school, where Basayev's militants would kill hundreds of civilians as the Russian FSB attempted to breach the buildings. The Islamist forces were using this tactic to wear out the Russian resolve, much like those tactics did during the first Chechen war. However, in 2002, Russia was already reporting an end to the war, which is another form of information strategy, quelling public concern about rising troop casualties. The militants in Chechnya denied this and continued to conduct guerrilla warfare and terror tactics inside Russian territory as well as extensive presence in the North Caucasus with over 1000 separatist fighters. Basayev was killed in 2006 from an accidental mine blast, and the separatist Chechen president, Aslan Maskhadov, was killed a year earlier in 2005 during a raid in which Russian forces attempted to arrest him. Early on during the second Chechen war, Mashkhadov, largely condemned Basayev's terrorist operations in Russia, but later began to encourage them. Russia had gathered evidence of Mashakadov calling for increased terror activities on Russian territories and went after him. In retrospect, during the first Chechen war, it is arguable that terrorist tactics played a role in wearing out the Russian occupation of Chechnya between 1994 and 1996, combined with the fact that Russia did not use propaganda to persuade the Russian public that intervention in Chechnya was necessary. The success of Russia during the second Chechen war was not only rooted in the preparation, but also in using information to quell public concern about Russia's military operations there. Russia would refer to the second Chechen war as a "counter terrorist operation." This, for one, automatically had a psychological effect on the Russian population, where they would be

more approving of Russia's military carrying out an operation as opposed to embarking upon a full-scale invasion or starting a full-scale war. This essentially gave Russia time to carry out its military engagement before public sentiment would began to oppose Russian foreign policy, much like it did during the Japan/Russian war in 1905, where Russian incurred significant loses, which led to a revolution in the country and calls for reforms to the Russian constitution. The same happened during World War I, where Russia was taking severe losses, leading to the Russian people becoming fed up to the point of overthrowing the Russian empire in what was called the Bolshevik Revolution. We see even as of August 24th, some domestic dissidence inside Russia has already manifested with the assassination of the daughter of Alexandr Dugin. An anti-Putin group called the National Republican Army that operates underground in Russia took credit for the act, and they are probably responsible for sabotage operations that took place in Crimea, one being an attack at a Russian airbase and another at an ammunition depot. This event is a key indicator that Russia is running out of time as far as keeping its own troops operating in the eastern Ukraine. Hence why Russia has been lobbying to find mercenaries who will volunteer to fight on their behalf because Russia knows that negative public perception of their goals abroad will stifle Russia's chances of achieving them. This is largely why Russia was compelled to withdraw from Chechnya in 1996. Russia, however, managed to keep public sentiment of their goals in Chechnya in the early 2000s from breaking out into all out opposition to the Russian government in three ways. First, as mentioned, they called the military effort a "counter terrorist operation". Second, was that the operation was precipitated by a terrorist attack in Russia, which underscored the necessity of Russia invading Chechnya to be a matter of Russian national security. Third, was that Russia declared the war to be over after 2 years, which also puts the public's mind at ease. This allowed Russia to continue operating in Chechnya without being in danger of evoking public concern.

This is a key element to understand about the Ukraine war because it may be an indicator that Ukraine might be able to win this first round. We can also predict that Russia will declare the war over in 2 years. They clearly give themselves a two year deadline. Russia also did not enter this war on the heels of a major terrorist attack. This was also the case in the first Chechen war, which led to Russia being unable to sustain public support and thus having to withdraw in 1996. So we can predict that the dynamic that are playing out in Ukraine will ultimately lead to Russia's complete withdrawal by 2024. They do not have the backdrop to sustain public approval of their war

for longer than that. This seems to be a historical pattern. At the very least, Ukraine can expect forces of the Russian federation to withdraw of the Donbass in 2024.

So in looking back at the Chechen wars, Ukraine has to be careful not to repeat the same mistake that the Islamists did back in 1999 by doing something along the lines of conducting a series of apartment bombings on Russia soil. In doing such, the Islamist ultimately gave Russia the means to present to the Russian public, a justification to invade Chechnya in the name of internal national security. This gave Russia all the time it needed to conduct and pursue their military goals there. Russia did not have this backdrop of justification in the first Chechen war, which ultimately worked in favor of the Chechens in resisting the Russian occupation. Likewise, in 2022, when it comes to Ukraine, Russia does not have that factor—Ukraine carrying out a terror attack on Russian soil or being a threat to Russia's internal national security. So we can expect that Ukraine could possibly come out victorious this first time around, if they play their cards right. However, there is another factor to consider. Much of eastern Ukraine identifies as Russian, so in order to delve into this factor, we have to look at the dynamics of what happened after the first Chechen war and thus possibly forecast that those dynamics could play out inside the DPR and LPR breakaway regions.

Chapter 7: Exploiting the Power Vacuum in Eastern Ukraine

After the first Chechen war, the country had become inundated with various rogue militias and renegade radical Islamic groups and there had always been some tension between Chechen secularist and Islamic radicals. Ukraine, on the other hand, was smart to integrate Azov into the Ukrainian military, keeping them from becoming a renegade militia. We can expect that even before the eventual Russian pull out of the Donbass region in 2024, political tensions will arise within the DPR and LPR concerning both autonomy and integration into the Russian federation. There will be officials in the DPR/LPR that insist on autonomy, and there will be officials in the DPR/LPR opposed to autonomy but in favor of become part of the Russian federation. This will work in Ukraine's favor if they play their cards right. If they can somehow intervene, encourage tension between pro-autonomy factions in the DPR and pro-integration factions in the DPR, instigate the rift and pull one side(the side supporting autonomy) into Ukraine's sphere of influence, then it could set up a possible pathway into those regions being reintegrated back into Ukraine because the Russian federation will ultimately side with the faction of the DPR or LPR that wants to become annexed into the Russian federation, leaving the faction that wants to remain autonomous on the side of Ukraine. On social media, there is some evidence that many in those breakaway regions do not support becoming part of the Russian federation and depending on how strong this sentiment is, there could be some militancy backing it up, which would, by default, place those in favor of DPR and LPR autonomy back to the side of Ukraine. In this scenario, Ukraine can offer to respect their autonomy, perhaps reasserting Minsk II and then offer to uphold the autonomy laid out in Minsk II if those DPR and LPR pro-autonomy factions allow the Ukrainian army to enter the eastern Ukraine for the sake of helping them resist those trying to get the DPR and LPR annexed into the Russian federation. There is a lot that would have to be addressed in such a negotiation, things like allowing the Russian language and also providing amnesty for those DPR and LPR fighters. The question is can Ukraine or the intelligence services of its allies foment a political schism between those in the DPR and LPR that support autonomy and those in the DPR and LPR whom insist on becoming part of the Russian federation. The level of hostility that arises between those two camps will correlate to the likelihood of Ukraine keeping the eastern breakaway areas under its control. This rift would have to be fomented and facilitated somewhere near the end of the 2 year deadline that Russia gives its military to operate during a conflict, which would thus keep Russia

from being able to convince its own public of a longer stay in eastern Ukraine. To reiterate, Ukraine in the ensuing years after the Russian eventual pullout in 2024 must not give Russia the means pursue a full-scale second war by way of convincing its own public that Russian operations in Ukraine is a matter of internal Russian security. Attacks on Russian soil during the current hostilities, however, will wear out the Russian occupation if they are carried out closer to the end of the 2 year deadline. But when Russia pulls out, and then subsequently encounters an attack from a foreign adversary on its own soil, such could be used as the impetus to launch another invasion of Ukraine. Basically, the rule garnered from the first Chechen war is that attacks on the enemy's soil can wear out their occupation efforts in another country. But if that country has already militarily pulled out of the country, then attacks on their soil will do the opposite. It will motivate them to launch a full-scale invasion and eventually conquer the nations responsible, all while getting public support to do so. Right now as Russia has not declared an end to the Ukraine/Russian war as well as not having had convinced the public of the justification since there was no terror attack carried out by Ukrainians on Russian soil prior to, attacks on their soil during this ongoing war will wear out the Russian military's resolve in eastern Ukraine. This was the case during the first Chechen war. But if Russia pulls their troops out of eastern Ukraine, any subsequent attacks on Russian soil will compel the Russian public to support another Russian military incursion into Ukraine. This was the case for the second Chechen war which was largely supported by the Russian public and ultimately led to Russia's victory.

The Ukraine/Russia war has raised questions about the viability of the Geneva convention. The Geneva Convention and International Humanitarian Law does not take sides during an ongoing conflict and does not factor into it the reasons for the conflict. Essentially, when a nation is attacked by an aggressor, the invaded nation is not permitted to use any means at its disposal to resist the aggression, and has to take care to avoid civilian casualties in a situation where the aggressor nation, if compelled to do such, can simply retreat back to its own country, whereas the invaded nation is in many cases trapped in their own land, which leaves little opportunity to take refuge in areas other than populated or urban ones. The use of residential areas to evade strikes from enemy forces is a war crime according to international humanitarian law because the law is meant to protect the civilian population from military operations, whether they be offensive or defensive. This has posed a problem for not only Ukraine but those who support the Ukrainian army to take back lands seized by the Russian military. When looking back at history, one can

presume that only way to resist and defeat an occupation is by using civilian areas to conduct urban warfare tactics, which is proven to work against invasion and occupation, hence why there is no way to support a defending military without supporting their use of civilian and urban infrastructure to conduct surprise attacks on the aggressor nation's military. Oftentimes, this leads to civilian casualties, which ironically further vilifies the invading nation and helps muster up support for the defending army and also increases the chances that the defending nation win the conflict. Without this aspect, the Chechens would not have been able to repel Russian forces during the first Chechen war. This is why there needs to be an amendment to the Geneva Convention where the defending nation, both combatants and non-combatants would retain civilian status throughout the conflict. This is because the civilian population by and large support any actions deemed to be self-defense and therefore may not need protection—as laid out in the Geneva Convention, at least when it comes to being extracted from the military framework of their own country's military. Hypothetically, under a new convention, they can simply be regarded as "civilian" only in relation to the aggressor state. Ukrainian citizens overwhelmingly support Ukraine's military defending the country by all means necessary, and because it is defense, they should still be garnered "civilian status" relative to the aggressor nation, but not relative to their own defensive army. Meaning, civilians in the defensive nation should be subject to how their own military labels them and if the military endangers their own civilians, then it should not be considered a war crime, but a violation of the nations own domestic policy if their legislation made it a matter of law that the military not endanger its civilians. The way this new legal proposal would apply to Ukraine is that all civilians within its internationally recognized borders would be recognized by the international law as "defending party", but only in relation to its own military. They would be recognized as "civilians" by the international community in relation to the aggressor nation or separatist entity. When the aggressor nation or separatist entity would violate laws of warfare by firing into or from civilian areas in Ukraine, it would be internationally recognized as a war crime against civilians. However, if the defending state(Ukraine) fires upon its own citizens or endangers their own citizens within their internationally recognized borders, then it would be considered by the international community as friendly fire and accountability could only be applied from the framework of the domestic laws of the country. Also, under this new hypothetical convention, the invading country(Russia) would be considered to be endangering the civilians of its own country by attacking civilian areas of another country. Which means if the

invaded country retaliates and launches attacks into the nation of the invading country and kills civilians in the process, both the invading country and the invaded country would be considered to be in violation of the laws of warfare in that instance. The attacks against the nation of the invading country would be considered to have been invited by the invading nation's advance into the invaded country, which thus systemically placed civilians in the nation of the invading country at risk. An example, under this new hypothetical convention, would be Russia's invasion of Ukraine being cited by the international community as Russia placing its own civilians inside Russia in danger, with any retaliation in Russian territory by Ukrainian forces being considered to still be a war crime, but having been invited by the Russian forces invasion of Ukraine. This new parameter would solve the problem of the defending nation having to concede all advantage of maintaining its status-quo and existence just to adhere to the Geneva Convention and the International Laws of Warfare, which on paper favors the aggressor nation and handicaps the defensive nation. This new proposal should be introduced in a new convention, perhaps "The Kyiv Convention" since the Ukraine war has resurfaced questions concerning how the laws of war should be applied.

In terms of reclaiming the breakaway region, a good example to cite is how ISIS was able to reclaim parts of Iraq from the Shitte government. In 2013, feeling ostracized by the new US-backed Shitte government, many Sunnis took to the streets in protest to oppressive policies. This unrest allowed ISIS to recruit and join forces with local Sunni militias, growing their numbers, and eventually taking control of various parts of Iraq, i.e. Mosul, Fallujah, and Ramadi. In Ukraine's situation, Ukrainians don't have any cultural of religious connection to much of the inhabitants of the eastern Ukraine, and this would make it harder for Ukraine to take advantage of the power vacuum that would be created if hostilities began to take place between pro-autonomy DPR/LPR officials and DPR/LPR officials that want to join the Russian federation. In the case of protests on this matter by citizens of the DPR/LPR, Ukraine would not have any means of kinship to take advantage and thus offer its solidarity with those protesters. In the case of Iraq, ISIS are made up of Sunnis, and were therefore able to express solidarity with the local Sunni population and militias protesting the new Shiite government. In order for this dynamic to favor Ukraine in their attempt to recapture lost territory with the help of the locals, Ukraine will have to find a means to identify with the Russian speakers in the DPR/LPR who want autonomy but do not want to become part of the Russian federation. This will require Ukraine facilitating the organization of

its own Russian-speaking but Ukrainian-identifying militia. In essence, Ukraine would develop and back a fighting force that identifies as Ukrainian but chooses to speak Russian. This would be done in order to show some measure of solidarity with those in the DPR/LPR who choose autonomy as opposed to annexation into Russia. Many of the Azov members in a sense identify as Ukrainian even as native Russian speakers, but are implicated in some eggregious acts carried out in Mariupol, which would make it hard for components of that group to garner some semblance of kinship with Russian speakers in the DPR/LPR. However, here is Zelenskyy, who was a native Russian speaker that ultimately identified as Ukrainian and he entered office on a platform that sought to erase difference between the Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers. This aspect that I mention is why Ukraine must remain prudent in not completely alienating the Russian culture because a major strategy in Ukraine reclaiming the Donetsk and Luhansk will be Ukraine's ability to work with Russian-speakers in those areas who do not want to become part of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, this would also require Ukraine to scale back its artillery bombardments of those areas. In addition to that, Ukraine also scaling back its anti-Russian rhetoric will prevent Russia from using that as evidence to implicate Ukraine in any attacks that may occur on Russian soil, should Russia try to orchestrate a false flag operation in order to get more public support for another Russian offensive into Ukraine.

There is without question that there will be people in Donetsk and Luhansk that will be militantly opposed to joining the Russian Federation. Which is why Ukraine must shift its policy in such a way that will make any decision by LPR/DPR citizens even harder to decide to join the Russian Federation. The question is can Ukraine denominate a Russian-speaker that still identifies as Ukrainian into a tangible terminology? What would be a good word for it? Can Ukrainians refer to them as Rus-people, much like the Rus people of the old Kievan Rus? If Zelenskyy can address those who want to remain autonomous without joining the Russian federation, it could be possible to evoke kinship without alienating the staunch Ukrainian nationalists that insist on the Ukrainian language mandate. In Ukraine, there is the existence of a Ukrainian nationalist movement called the Ukrainian National Assembly and the linked Ukrainian Self-Defense Organization(UNA-UNSO), which agrees on the unity of East Slavic peoples. However this group believes that Ukraine, not Russia is entitled to being the dominant state of the Rus' peoples since the original center of the Kievan Rus' empire was Kiev. If Ukraine can channel this movement into one that facilitates a doctrine that could help rekindle some sense of identity that would link a Russian-

speaking east Slav to Kiev, it is possible that Ukraine may be able to carve out a possible path to bring eastern Ukraine back into Kiev's sphere of influence. Keep in mind that resisting an occupation is much different that reclaiming territory. The latter is more difficult and requires having an element in that territory that will invite one's intervention. For example, for the US to invade Afghanistan in 2001, they had to aid the Northern Alliance whom had been at war with the Taliban throughout the 1990s. Same with Russia. Russia invaded Ukraine because the separatists in eastern Ukraine who were in conflict with Kyiv essentially invited Russia to invade Ukraine and helped facilitate the occupation. This was what occurred in Chechnya as well—pro-Russian Chechens had to invite and help facilitate Russia's advance into Grozny. Likewise, if Ukraine wants to take back the east of its country, then they will need a similar dynamic at work in which a contentious entity in eastern Ukraine would be at odds with certain political policies in the DPR/LPR and would thus invite and facilitate the Ukrainian military's return to those regions. However, this has to coincide with Russia preparing to withdraw its forces from the east of Ukraine. One has to keep in mind that Russia can only remain in a military conflict as long as its own population will allow it. Hence why Russia gives itself a max of two years to complete its goals before either withdrawing or declaring the war to be over. Otherwise, they are playing with fire and a possible repeat of history when revolutions in Russia triggered regime change. Russia is aware of this, and they will not be able to stay in eastern Ukraine for longer then two years. They will withdraw and then prepare for a second offensive, but this time with a pretext that involves a major terror attack in Russia since such events will evoke public support for another military intervention. This is exactly how Russia was able to win the second Chechen war—it was essentially precipitated by a series of terrorist attacks in Russia which triggered public support for another Russian invasion of Grozny. What aided that process was the act of rogue militias in Chechnya attempting to take Dagestan. This is why Ukraine has to be careful not to make this same mistake that the Islamist did which triggered their defeat in the second Chechen war, allowing Russia to convey to the Russian public the necessity of pursing a military course of action against the entirety of Chechnya. Russia failed to do this for the first invasion of Ukraine—basically convince the Russian public of the necessity to do so, but will nonetheless try to do so for a second offensive on Kyiv. If Zelenskyy can avoid indulging harsh anti-Russian rhetoric after the Russians pull out of eastern Ukraine in 2024, it will be a strategic victory for Ukraine because Russia will not have a pretext that will evoke public support for a second offensive against Kyiv. If we look back, in

regards to the first Chechen war, the reason attacks on Russian soil helped trigger a Russian withdrawal was because they occurred as the war had been ongoing and as Russian troops and the Russian public were already becoming weary. Not to mention, attacks on Russian troops in Grozny after long periods of calm had a very strong demoralizing effect. Now the reason the attacks on Russian soil actually worked against the Chechens in second Chechen war was because they occurred years after the Russian forces had already withdrawn from Chechnya, which allowed Russia to persuade the Russian public of Chechnya's aggression and the need for the Russian military to finish the job of taking over the country, hence why it was easier for Russia to gather public support. It was a completely different dynamic at work. During the first Chechen war, the attacks on Russian soil wore out the Russian resolve because they occurred as the war had already been raging for over a year—they also set the Russian government and military at odds with each other(remember the hostage crisis in Buddenovsk?). During the second Chechen war, the attacks on Russian soil actually triggered Russian resolve and initiated the conflict, and that was the mistake for Chechnya because Russia's military offensives are almost totally contingent on the Kremlin's ability to garner public support, which they did get the second time around against Chechnya. Ukraine, however, would not need to apply such insidious tactics like terrorism and may be able to reclaim the DPR/LPR by way of invitation by the pro-autonomy DPR/LPR officials and with little to no resistance from their opposition.

The Ukrainian nationalist movement called the Ukrainian National Assembly and the linked Ukrainian Self-Defense Organization(UNA–UNSO) formed in Ukraine in the early 90s after the fall of the Soviet Union and based its platform on the idea of an independent Ukraine that espoused loyalty to the Ukrainian statehood regardless of cultural allegiance, whether Ukrainian-speaking or Russian-speaking. This group was instrumental in helping eastern European countries resist Russian imperialism during the 90s. They participated in the conflict in Transnistria, protecting the ethnic Ukrainians there from the Moldovan government. The UNA-UNSO fought in the Georgian war in 1992 against the pro-Russian separatists in Abkhazia, and also helped Chechnya fight against the Russian invasion during the first Chechen war from 1994 - 1996, which led to Chechnya's de facto independence. The UNA-UNSO also fought in the Donbass War in 2014 and the subsequent Ukraine/Russian war in 2022. While the platform of the UNA-UNSO espoused a civic nationalism, many of its components have maintained extreme right leanings. The group later unified into

the Right Sector party which has been the main target of Russia's rhetoric that identifies the group as staunch neo-Nazis and terrorists. Much of Russia's concern about the Right Sector had to do with the component of the Right Sector comprised of members from the UNA-UNSO, which had been a problem for Russia's geopolitical ambitions since after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia also considered the UNA-UNSO's fighters in Chechnya to be the most dangerous due to their Slavic appearance and fluency in the Russian language. The UNA-UNSO has also developed contacts with pro-Ukrainian far right Russian groups inside Russia and this will be the most important key element that could bring eastern Ukraine back into the control of Kiev. Strategically, the first thing Ukraine would have to do in order to alter a trajectory that is heading in the direction of the DPR/LPR becoming part of the Russian Federation is to foment political tension inside the DPR/LPR. Such would work in favor of Ukraine. If Ukraine goes down this path using the tactic that the CIA has used throughout its existence to weaken other nations politically, then Ukraine would have to allow way for the UNA-UNSO to touch base with its pro-Ukrainian Russian contacts in Russia so that the UNA-UNSO could orchestrate for them to go into Donetsk and Luhansk and begin a strategy of pushing for the DPR and LPR to become part of the Russian federation—they would also recruit on this platform so that a counter movement that strongly insists on DPR/LPR autonomy will arise in reaction. After this is achieved and some friction begins to come about politically, those who facilitated the schism could simply return to Russia and send more pro-Ukrainian Russians to the DPR/LPR regions to help facilitate more political friction there. Once the tensions escalate and pro-autonomy DPR/LPR officials begin to use rhetoric that alienates any opposition their platform, the pro-Ukrainian Russians there operating incognito would—as part of the plan—begin to appeal to the Russian Federation on behalf of the anti-autonomy faction of the DPR/LPR. This will, in turn, force the pro-autonomy DPR and LPR factions to appeal to Kiev for help in resisting becoming a part of the Russian Federation. In this regard, Kyiv would subsequently have the upper hand on negotiating with their former enemies-now-turned-allies in the fight against Russian hegemony. Once this is achieved, the pro-Ukrainian Russians that sided with the anti-autonomy DPR/LPR factions and facilitated the friction could simply return to Russia without notice or suspicion. Meanwhile, Ukraine could begin pushing the UNA-UNSO's original platform of civic nationalism all throughout the country, advocating for both the rights and Ukrainianism/ambiguity of Russian speakers. This will open the door for Ukraine to be able to recruit more Russian speakers inside the DPR/LPR regions against the anti-autonomy pro-Russian

Federation components of the DPR/LPR. At this point, the pro autonomy DPR/LPR officials would likely begin letting Ukrainian forces back into the region. If this happens just after Russia pulls its troops out of eastern Ukraine in 2024, Russia will not be able to convince its public of the necessity to return there and deploy more troops to eastern Ukraine to risk their lives for another country. Hence, why in the year 2023, Russia may lobby for the DPR/LPR to hurry and join the Russian Federation, which would end any chance of Ukraine reclaiming that territory since Russian troops could remain there indefinitely and relegate all attacks from Ukrainian forces as attacks against the internal security of the Russian state. Thus, the importance of Ukraine fomenting internal strife within the DPR/LPR regarding the status of those regions so that Russia will not be able to annex those territories into the Russian Federation, at least not without resistance from those components of the DPR/LPR that insist on autonomy. And because Ukraine would ideally have been promoting civic nationalism, it would be hard for anyone in Russia to believe that Ukraine has any intention of harming Russians in Ukraine, should any false flags be conducted to garner support for another Russian offensive against Kyiv. The end result of DPR/LPR pro-autonomy factions leaning towards Kyiv should be a Russian withdrawal in 2024, a quick Ukrainian show of force in DPR/LPR territory against those seeking to have those territories enjoined to Russia, followed by a quick surrender of all those entities to Ukrainian forces. Ideally, the pro-autonomy DPR/LPR officials and Ukraine would reassert the Minsk II, allowing the DPR/LPR to be slowing re-integrated back into Ukraine following a negotiated period of time. Zelenskyy would then pass legislation giving some protection to the Russian language.

From this point Ukrainian identity will be an ideology based identity that is defined in loyalty to Ukrainian statehood irrespective of language, which would distinguish its East Slav component from that of Belarusian and Russian which places emphasis on language. Essentially, East Slavs that don't emphasize language over Ukrainian statehood will automatically make one Ukrainian, and such will put forth a trajectory that may one day unite all Rus people and make Kiev once again the center of that unification.

All Ukraine would have to do to implement this plan would be to have Kiev, during the year 2023, make appeals to the Russian population, ensuring them that they have no intention of attacking inside of Russia. In the mean time, the UNA-UNSO would try to establish contacts with its far right connections in Russia throughout the year 2023, setting up a plan in which those pro-Ukrainian Russians inside Russia would travel to the DPR/LPR to sow political

tension between those who want to remain autonomous and those who want to become part of Russia. In order for that to work, Ukraine would have to allow the DPR/LPR militants to become comfortable in their control of the region, at least for a time so that the political aspect of whether or not to remain autonomous or become a part of Russia can start to emerge as a contentious theme in DPR/LPR politics. In late 2023, after continued resistance from Ukrainian forces, the Russian military will begin to become very war weary and reports of more Russian casualties will ultimately concern the Russian public, forcing the Russian military to pull their troops out of the region of eastern Ukraine shortly thereafter. Subsequently, the Russian military will start preparing for a second offensive on Kyiv and at the same time look for justification to do so. With Ukraine already having allied itself with pro-autonomy DPR/LPR forces, the re-occupation of the areas there by Ukrainian forces should be very quick and without any resistance, resembling the Taliban's quick takeover of Afghanistan in 2021 after the US troops pulled out of the country.

Chapter 8: Counterfeiting the Ruble

Some political circles believe that Ukraine will not be able to win the war against Russia since the United States is insistent on remaining restrained when it comes to providing Ukraine with weapons that could turn the tide in the war. For example, fighter jet. Reason being is the fear that the war could escalate. Thus, the likely trajectory as it stands on August 28, 2022 is a negotiated settlement that will leave Russia in control of just a little over 20% of Ukraine's internationally recognized territory, much of which is their agricultural and industrial areas. Such would leave Ukraine totally dependent on other nations in order to sustain itself. Not to mention, the current international support and aid for Ukraine will likely abate over time due to the fact that multiple nations around the world are already growing weary of the impact sanctions against Russia is having on their economy. Peace for Ukraine would come at a cost and leave it all the more likely that many elements in Ukraine could be become even more radicalized, perhaps seeking other ways to release their indignation. Ukraine has stated on numerous occasions the equipment they need to win the war, but much of that has fallen on deaf ears. While western aid is helping Ukraine strategically in some areas, it ultimately won't be enough and all fighting ends up becoming symbolic, backed by a principle and not by a solid strategy. This will ultimately speed up the forecasted end result. But still and all, the aid that Ukraine has received from western nations in terms of financial and security has allowed Ukraine to inflict the Russian army with significant loses both on the ground and in the air. But the lack of airpower and long-range missiles will keep Ukraine from being able to carry out a major counter-offensive, which is the only way Ukraine can recover lost territories occupied by Russian forces and comprised largely of people who identify as Russian. If those occupied areas were comprised of Ukrainians, then the lack of air power and long range artillery would not prevent Ukraine from recapturing those areas because Ukraine could simply recruit more volunteers from within the occupied areas in order to fight against the occupation forces. This is much harder to do in areas that share the same ethnic backdrop as the occupiers. A scenario where occupied areas of Ukraine would be made up of Ukrainians would allow Ukraine to do what ISIS did not recapture territories from US-backed forces in Iraq—recruit from within the occupied areas on the basis of kinship and attempt to reclaim the territories. ISIS was able to do this in the Anbar province, Mosul and Fallujah because of protest against the government, protest which were comprised of Sunnis—the same sect of Islam practiced by ISIS. If the occupied territories in Ukraine

were made up of Ukrainians, insurgent elements there could, like ISIS, recruit from among their own demographic and more easily reclaim the lost territory. Since Ukraine does not have this factor working in their favor, the current supply of weapons will not be enough to drive the Russians out of the eastern Ukraine. The trepidation among western powers in doing everything to keep Russia from targeting them with nuclear weapons is another factor that does not work in Ukraine's favor. And most experts and academics see this to be case which is why many of the prominent scholars are advocating for Ukraine to cut its losses—not because they support Russia, but because they see a trajectory that is obviously not conducive to a Ukrainian victory. On the other hand, some military experts believe that it would be better to take an assertive approach of getting involved while Russia is depleted military and while morale is low among Russian soldiers. Not to mention, Ukraine is capable of putting together a very large fighting force consisting of Ukrainian soldiers and foreign fighters. Russia is leery of committing too many troops to the conflict.

Ukraine has been supplied with a significant amount of firearms, body armor, drones, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft missile technology, as well as intel and an efficient rail system for moving supplies. Ukrainian artillery does not have good protection from enemy fire and can be easily targeted and destroyed during combat scenarios. Russia also has longer range missiles in their artillery systems. The US has high-powered weapons like fighter jets that Ukraine could use to win the war against Russia, but the US has been hesitant to supply them to Ukraine. They have, however, supplied Ukraine with HIMARS rockets, which is giving Ukraine the impetus it needs to launch a counter-offensive in the south. Much of the US's hesitancy in going all out in backing Ukraine is due to Russia's threat to use nuclear weapons against any country aiding Ukraine militarily during the war. Moreover, nations normally acquire nuclear weapons not just for exerting geopolitical strength, but also for ensuring mutually assured destruction, meaning if a nation is an existential threat, then that nation must also risk its own existential destruction by way of a nuclear strike. Most nuclear weapons today are vastly more powerful than the ones used on Japan during World War II. But some political elements in the US believe that Russia is bluffing on its threats to use nuclear weapons, and because of that, the US should step up aid to Ukraine by supplying fighter jets and longer range missile systems. Important to note that aside from Russia's threats, the US is battling another threat when it comes to aiding Ukraine. The US is facing the total loss of trust by its allies abroad which would have a devastating impact on its national currency. Essentially, if the US withdraws

support for Ukraine in such a way that it justifies Ukraine accusing the US of betrayal, many of the US's main allies will take note of it and likely make plans to withdraw their alliances and agreements with the United States. For example the petrodollar agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia in which Saudi Arabia agreed to sell oil for US dollars in exchange for military backing. Ukraine knows this aspect to be the case and is wisely using this factor to help them secure aid and weaponry from the US in the hopes of not only getting the weapons it needs, but also—should they finally receive the fighter jets and other supplies, drive the Russian forces out of Ukraine internationally recognized territories. One can thus say that the value of the US dollar is built on foreign military intervention and the trust of US allies.

One strategy used by Ukraine to deter Russian aggression was calling for nations to cripple the Russian economy through sanctions. However, this largely failed due to the fact that Russia sits on a vast amount of raw materials that much of the western world relies upon, making it impossible for anyone to believe that such restriction on Russia's export markets would be tenable in the long term since western nations would become weary of the penalties they have to impose upon themselves just to stile Russian economically. Thus, one has to presume that western nations would be able to hold out on buying from Russia in the long term. This factor, along with the fact that because Russia has all these raw materials, they always have the option of restricting the purchase of those materials to strictly Russian rubles. This threat alone props the value of the ruble. In fact, Russia simply saying publicly that they may sell start selling their oil only for rubles is enough for the ruble to rise in value throughout the time that sanctions are being levied upon them. Many economists are perplexed that the ruble, in response to western sanctions had become stronger then ever. What's surprising is that its largely ignored how much of an impact statements or threats by Russia to sell their raw materials for rubles only has on propping up its own economy. If economist were aware of this factor, the solution to countering it would be to simply threaten to mass-counterfeit rubles at the international level and limit how much confidence the ruble can garner. So now when Russia threatens that they would only sell their oil for rubles, those listening would remember the counterfeiting threats and presume that its possible that the rubles attained abroad might be fake and also put them at risk of being investigated for counterfeiting. The impact of the threat alone could also cause consumers inside Russia to lose some confidence in the ruble. Of course, actual counterfeiting is feasible internationally, and such a threat in tandem with sanctions, would offset Russia being able to both prop up the ruble and subvert the impact of sanctions by

threatening to sell their oil for rubles. Ukraine can apply deterrence to Russian aggression by threatening to upscale their international ruble counterfeiting operations, and depending on Russia's insistence on continued attacks on Ukrainian civilians, Ukraine can go further and threaten to use its contacts inside Russia to inject fake undetectable counterfeit rubles into the Russian economy via eastern Ukraine, thereby crippling the economic market and potentially contributing to the Russian public becoming more unsatisfied with the Kremlin about the impact the war in Ukraine is having on the economy. Just the mere threat of counterfeiting alone will cause people to lose confidence in the ruble. And actual cases of ruble counterfeiting being uncovered will further cause the value of the ruble to drop because all that does is create more alarm, thus making it to where Russia bringing light to such operations publicly actually works even more against their own currency. This ends up becoming a massive conundrum. Russia would also have to spend considerable resources to crack down on counterfeiting, which means re-allocating law enforcement personnel, shifting them from other assignments and spending money on equipment that could detect counterfeit currency. Of course, Russia can apply a workaround that involves legalizing bitcoin for international transactions only. In September of 2022, this is exactly what they did, allowing bitcoin to be used for cross border transactions. This will have a way of propping up the ruble by creating an artificial demand. Russia, for example, after selling oil for bitcoin, can simply then sell the bitcoin for rubles. In retrospect, bitcoin played a role in keeping the ruble afloat after initial sanctions were applied on Russia by the west. Reason being, is because family members of Russian people were only able to use bitcoin to send money home to family members living in Russia. As a consequence, those bitcoins were then liquidated for rubles, as rubles, since the invasion, is the only currency Russian citizens are permitted to use. Russia by making Bitcoin legal for international transactions not only helps them evade sanctions but also helps them apply a mechanism for increasing the value of the ruble. And this is actually why many countries are hesitant to ban bitcoin altogether. The west has tried to counter this by attempting to persuade bitcoin exchanges to ban Russians from using the platform. This was to no avail as pretty much all the exchanges refused to do so. As far countering a counterfeiting operation aimed at destroying the ruble, it would take a very significant amount of bitcoin to achieve the task. Furthermore, counterfeiting may also likely be weaponized by the US in order to keep nations from evading sanctions with the use of cryptocurrency.

Some studies show that counterfeiting has a minimal effect on inflation, especially when the cost of counterfeiting is high, presuming that the one carrying out the counterfeiting task is being paid in the currency he is counterfeiting. But if the counterfeiting is occurring abroad and the cost of it is either low or being paid in some other means of value, this offsetting factor would not apply to the nation where all the counterfeit currency is being injected. Economists, however, would insist that Russia could counter this by encouraging people to use electronic means for purchases, however, people in fear of having counterfeit rubles would also be afraid of depositing them into banks. Russia and China have offered to sell some of their commodities in Bitcoin as a way to evade sanctions. And Russia has been flirting with the idea of putting the Ruble on the gold standard in order to mitigate the dangers of high inflation. However, excess fake Rubles circulating the financial system abroad could lead to the same dynamic that caused the US to leave the gold standard back in 1971—not having enough gold to exchange for all the foreign held currency, should much of the fake rubles remain undetected.

So once again, this is why Zelenskyy remaining in power in Ukraine is imperative for Ukraine because of his ability to garner the support of the international community. If Ukraine does orchestrate a ruble counterfeiting operation abroad, the cost of production could be denominated in Ukraine's currency, which would prop up the Ukrainian economy at the same time. Now with this in effect, the ruble's value becomes couched to the mercy of any statement coming out of Kyiv about attempts to counterfeit. Kyiv can use such a factor in negotiations and decide to scale back threats of counterfeiting activities in exchange for whatever demands Ukraine deems appropriate to make upon Russia. The power of this method could reduce Ukraine having to use military means to deter the Russian occupation. In this, they reduce the casualties caused by their own forces in trying to reclaim territory, and are also able to conduct a defensive activity that is not considered a war crime. The Nazis tried this counterfeiting method in World War II against England, printing counterfeit British notes and planning to air drop them into England in the hopes of crippling the British economy. The Nazis assumed that while honest British citizens would take the counterfeit money off the ground and report it to the authorities, other unscrupulous types like criminals would be more likely to take advantage of the commercial opportunity that the counterfeit money could provide if it could be exchanged without evoking suspicion. Such, if enough people in England decided to use the fake notes for commerce, would have devastated England's economy and left them unable to pay for and sustain their military apparatus in World War II. However, the Nazis

never got around to implementing this plan, but did print a large amount of British notes and later decided to use the notes to bank roll the war machine by purchasing materials with the counterfeits. The advantage the Nazis had in printing the fake notes came from their ability to use the free labor of skilled workers detained in concentration camps. With Ukraine, the situation is more advantageous than it was for the Nazis due to the fact that Ukraine could solicit foreign help in making the counterfeiting of the ruble an international operation. But this would only be possible with Zelenskyy at the helm, since he is able to garner an appeal at the international level. This operation combined with sanctions would cripple the Russian economy and keep them from funding the war effort against Ukraine. It would also put the value of the ruble at the mercy of statements coming from Kyiv. As stated before, just the threat of counterfeiting alone can rattle an economy. Another power play that Zelenskyy can take advantage of is Ukraine's role in maintaining the power of the US dollar. The value of the US dollar goes back to the petrodollar agreement established between Saudi Arabia and the United States, which is an agreement in which the US would agree to defend Saudi Arabia militarily if Saudi Arabia and OPEC nations sell their oil for US Dollars. This agreement has held steady since 1973 and was demonstrated in real time when the United States military was deployed to Iraq in the early 1990s to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraq aggression. However, the United States in the subsequent years, have demonstrated an ability to make commitments to nations militarily and then back out of them when pressures at home became to heavy to bear. This was the case in Afghanistan when in 2021, after a 20 years occupation, the US decided to pull out of the country, leaving the Afghan Security forces at the mercy of the re-surging Taliban army. This also happened in Libya and Syria when NATO forces instigated unrest in both countries, made overtures to the separatist forces, before ultimately leaving them to their fate. Libya has yet to recover and is now marred by continuous fighting between various militia groups vying for control of the region. In Syria, the US backed the Kurdish forces against ISIS, whom had been gaining territory in Syria since 2014. However, in 2017, the US suddenly pulled their troops out of Syria and left the Kurdish militants defenseless against Turkish powers seeking to eliminate them from the Syrian-Turkish border. The examples of Afghanistan, Syria and Libya represent abandonment of allies in rapid succession. Ukraine had nearly met this same fate of being abandoned by the United States when the Russian forces invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Just prior to the war, the United States made very strong overtures to Ukraine, telling them

that they would respond swiftly and decisively if Russian invaded Ukraine. But just 24 hours into the war Zelenskyy would state that the west had abandoned them. But thanks to Zelenskyy persistence, the west and the United States finally came around to getting weapons into Ukraine. While they never supplied the fighter jets that Ukraine had been requesting, they did provide billions of dollars in lethal aid that would give Ukraine more ability to resist the Russian military advances throughout the country. Because the US has been committed to Ukraine winning the war and has promised to do whatever it takes to help Ukraine achieve victory, they thus have kept at bay the implication of what would have occurred had they abandoned Ukraine to its own devices after goading them to join NATO and then promising to act swiftly and decisively against Russia if Russia invaded. If the US did decide to abandon Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the US dollar would have been in serious jeopardy because the US's main allies would have been on high alert regarding the merit of the US's commitment to its allies abroad. We saw that shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine along with the trepidation applied by the US towards providing aid to Ukraine, Saudi Arabia did something unprecedented. They actually considered selling their oil to China for Chinese Yuan instead of US dollars. This alarmed many US economists and there were numerous reports about the severe economic implications of the Saudi Arabia ditching the US dollar. One can say that the US's engagement with Ukraine is a form of penance for having abandoned many of its previous allies, such that if this engagement with Ukraine leads to a Ukrainian victory, the rest of the United State's most critical allies may be able to reassert trust in US military commitment, which would then keep the dollar afloat since its value is based on US commitment to foreign military intervention. But if the US at any point tries to put on the brakes and withdraw aid from Ukraine without leading Ukraine to reclaiming the Russian-occupied territories, then Ukraine could threaten to announce US withdrawal of critical aid as a betrayal and abandonment of Ukraine by the US military industrial complex. This scenario would place US alliances in jeopardy and could threaten the stability and power of the US dollar, should Saudi Arabia no longer trust the US military as a pertinent ally. Zelenskyy knows this. With this leverage combined with the aforementioned leverage concerning counterfeiting the ruble, Vlodymyr Zelenskyy could wield a level of power that the world has not seen for quite some time, having the economic stability of both superpowers at the mercy of his command.

Chapter 9: Using Critical Race Theory to Reclaim the DPR/LPR

Russia's use of media, which was improved considerably during the Second Chechen war, worked out in their favor again during their invasion of Ukraine. Russia managed to bring in western journalists to cover their side of the story at a time when the general public in the west, particularly in the United States, had begun, for some time, to lose faith in the mainstream media, causing many Americans to mistrust was being said about the war in mainstream outlets. This brings to light another factor that one has to watch for during a conflict—if national media outlets of another country is willing to back the official narrative presented by one of the involved parties in the conflict, does the general public in that other country have an overall good assessment or perception of what is being reported by their mainstream media. While the US got fully behind what Ukraine wanted to control as far as information, the political climate in the US was such that information presented by the mainstream media there would predictably be met with suspicion by a significant sector of the American public due to the domestic political leanings attached to every topic in the news. This then causes many in the public to seek alternative sources of information to see if there is or isn't a connection to what the mainstream media is pushing as far as the narrative is concerned. In the case of Ukraine and Russia, many Americans were able to find alternative sources of information from fellow westerners actually covering what is happening on the Russian and Russian-backed side of the conflict. And at times, some of this information didn't align with some components of the mainstream narrative. Obviously this dynamic worked in favor of Russia because it created enough skepticism in the west that many who ventured away from the mainstream narrative applied by the west were ultimately sucked into following the official mainstream narratives of the Russian side, i.e. that the Bucha massacre was staged and that Ukraine was comprised entirely of Nazis. Ultimately when most people shift to the middle, they often end up going to the other extreme without realizing it. In order to circumvent a total shift in western perception against Ukraine, Ukraine will have to avoid rhetoric that could later be used against them in the event of a major attack. Apparently the CIA/NATO is hosting an enemies of Ukraine list at a website called myrotvorets.center. This site doxxes people it has concluded to be enemies of Ukraine. It even has American citizens on it who are advocating for a negotiated settlement. Oliver Stone and Noam Chomsky are on it for their comments about Ukraine. Recently added was Roger Waters of Pink Floyd. They are being accused of being accomplices of the Russian invasion. However, none of them

encouraged Russia to invade Ukraine. But because of this list, they become strategic targets. Not only for Ukrainian extremist if they want to silence someone, but also for Russia because if something happens to westerners on the list, many in the west will first point the finger at the website and could withdraw support for Ukraine irrespective of who or what is responsible for their deaths, should something tragic happen. Even more ominously, westerners may start outright supporting Russia's invasion of the country, which would be very bad for Ukraine geopolitically. Some of the people on that list have already been killed. Darya Dugina, the daughter of Alexandr Dugin—a Russian philosopher, had been on the list for her journalism and after she was killed in a car bombing, her picture on the website was covered with the word "liquidated" written across her face. It must be said that a major strategy for Ukraine to win will be in their ability to keep the enemy from implicating them in anything that could be used to justify a second military offensive against Kyiv. Russia will fight militarily for as long as their public allows them to and if they can convince the public and the west that Ukraine is a threat to their own national security, then Russia will have all it needs to carry out a full scale second offensive against Kyiv that could leave all of Ukraine under Russian occupation. This dynamic is exactly how Russia was able to win the second Chechen war. Zelenskyy's early strategy of appealing to Russian speakers was very effective in presenting to the public that Ukraine has no intentions inside of Russia. Continuing down this path could help Ukraine stave off a second Russian offensive, even before it starts.

And here is the power vacuum that is currently in place in Donetsk and Luhansk. While the leaders of the DPR and LPR have announced for a future referendum to take place, allowing the people in those cities to vote on whether or not to have the DPR or LPR join the Russian Federation, Zelenskyy must still nonetheless remain prudent in not allowing Ukraine to recognize the Russian speakers in those eastern areas as "Russian," since it is the case that doing so will only make it easier for them to discount themselves as being ethnically Ukrainian. Because of this aspect, Ukraine must take advantage of the opportunity denominate exactly what a Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizen should be. Or at the very least, allow the Russian-speakers to decide for themselves what they want to identify as. If it becomes evident that many in the DPR and LPR decide not to identify as either, then that demographic will end up falling outside of the bounds of what Russia considers to be inside their jurisdiction. Russia is under the understanding that the Russian speakers in Ukraine identify as Russian, which is why Russia has provided passports and military aid to the Russian-speaking regions. So if any

demographic arises in the DPR and LPR that chooses not to identify as either Ukrainian or Russian, then they will be outside of the framework of Russia's backing, which would leave that new neutral demographic without any backing whatsoever. Thus there is a void there that Ukraine can fill, offering to recognize these racially ambiguous members of the eastern Russian occupied areas as ethnically neutral. If anyone from that mode of thinking is embedded within the DPR or LPR leadership, then Ukraine may have a pathway of bringing the east back into its sphere of influence and away from Russia by splitting the DPR and LPR government into two factions. Clearly, the racially ambiguous Russian speakers will insist on the DPR and LPR remaining autonomous, while the rest will insist on joining the Russian Federation. Ukraine can foment this potential schism by having the UNA-UNSO get in contact with its Russian counterparts inside Russia and have them travel to the DPR and LPR for the purposes of intensifying the disagreement to the point where officials in the DPR and LPR consider reaching out to Kyiv. Those Russians that would travel to eastern Ukraine would operate on behalf of the side of the argument that wants to join the Russian Federation, perhaps helping to apply rhetoric that further alienates the racially ambiguous citizens of the DPR and LPR from ever considering joining the Russian Federation. This is done as to not evoke suspicion of working for Kyiv. The intensity of disagreement between racially ambiguous Russian-speakers supporting autonomy and Russian-identifying Russian speakers supporting joining the Russian Federation will correlate with the chances of Ukraine being invited to intervene on behalf of the racially ambiguous Russian speakers. If Russia attempts to keep things calm in eastern Ukraine, Ukraine could nonetheless still get involved by surreptitiously supporting the racially ambiguous Russian speakers during DPR and LPR elections without giving off the impression of recognizing the legitimacy of the DPR/LPR autonomy. This keeps the administration in Kyiv from evoking contempt from the staunch Ukrainian nationalists, and at the same time, keeps them involved and influential as to what is going on within their internationally recognized territories. This demographic of racially ambiguous Russian-speakers, if political tensions escalate, will only be able to seek refuge from radical Russophilia by leaning to the west towards Kyiv. If things continue to escalate between them and Russian-identifying Russian speakers, perhaps leading to Russian troops becoming aggressive towards racially ambiguous Russian speakers, Kyiv could be called in to protect the racially ambiguous Russian speakers from Russian aggression. This is something that Russian does not want, and at the same time if Russia starts attacking racially

ambiguous Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine, it could create a rift inside Russia since it is likely that many Russian liberals inside of Russia might also identify as racially ambiguous. So all in all, if Zelenskyy can help with rhetoric that affirms the identity of racially ambiguous Russian speakers in the eastern Ukraine, such will lower the chances of parts of eastern Ukraine becoming part of the Russian Federation. If hostilities start to unfold between racially ambiguous Russian speakers and Russian-identifying Russian speakers, then such would increase the chances of Ukraine being able to re-access the occupied territories. Russia does not want this. Furthermore, when it comes to being able to re-align Russian speakers with Kyiv, Zelenskky can make this a reality by holding polls in western Ukraine about their willingness to accommodate racially ambiguous Russian-speakers. If those racially ambiguous types feel that Ukraine is more willing to protect their ambiguity, then many in the DPR/LPR will slowly start to side moreso with Kyiv than with Moscow. The key here is Zelenskyy seeing the identity crisis in the eastern Ukraine and then finding a way remedy the situation by giving them a name and a face. Zelenskyy may also have to give some concessions to the Russian language in the west, and if this is done for the sake of unifying Ukrainian land, then he should have no problem in convincing his political opposition of the necessity to do so. The bottom line is that in order for Ukraine to recapture its internationally recognized borders, they have to be able to develop some semblance of fundamental kinship with the inhabitants there. At the moment, this is only possible by taking advantage of a power vacuum left by the potential of non-Russian identifying Russian speakers becoming alienated from both those Russian speakers that identify as Russian and also from Moscow. What is interesting is that Zelenskyy himself would fall under this new category of being racially ambiguous and would therefore have an easier time of connecting with this new ethnotype in eastern Ukraine. Now Ukraine can point to the history of Ukraine since 1991 and point out that the racially ambiguous peoples of eastern Ukraine were always a part of Ukraine, and Zelenskyy can point to himself as an example of how Ukraine had always been willing to accommodate the racially ambiguous Russian speakers. Obviously, there should be a line drawn. Ukraine should protect the Ukrainian language in some levels of society. Now trying to reintegrate the Russian speakers of the east and south back into the west of Ukraine would take some time, considering the fact that a war has just taken place, one of which the Russian military was basically called in by pro-Russian separatists of eastern Ukraine to invade all of Ukraine and kill as many Ukrainians as possible. Consequently, Ukrainians will not forget this for years to come. At this time, just

hearing the Russian language could be traumatizing for Ukrainians, and for this reason it will be hard to reintegrate Russian speakers back into the whole of Ukraine in the short term. Still and all, in order for Ukraine to turn the Russian speakers against the Russian occupiers, Ukraine would have to find a way to show that there is more of a link between the Russian speakers of the east Ukraine and Ukrainians, than that of Russian speakers of the east and Russians. The best median to tread would be acknowledging the eastern Ukrainians who speak Russia as being ethnically ambiguous and culturally distinct from both Russia and Ukraine, but at the same time better off remaining politically leaned in the direction of Ukraine. However, even this is a hard task since much of eastern Ukraine has been dealing with shelling from the Ukrainian side since 2014, which gave the separatist all the leg room they needed to convince the Russian speakers that Kyiv was in fact their enemy, irregardless of the fact that the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine are more responsible for the overall carnage of the war than NATO, since it was them who tried to impose secession in the eastern part of Ukraine even when it was clear that the Russian speaking citizens did not want that outcome. These are pressing issues that get in the way of Ukraine being able to re-occupy their own internationally recognized territories, but it is possible. The events concurrently taking place in Iraq could be a prelude to what transpires in the breakaway regions in the DPR and LPR. In Iraq since the US invasion in 2003, the country has encountered significant political instability, led by a Sadr, who was once considered enemy number 1 by US forces following their invasion of Iraq. Al Sadr's rise originates from his role during the Iraq insurgency in 2004 as the leader of the Shiite Mahdi army. Following the US invasion, the Iraqi insurgency actually comprised of both Sunni fighters loyal to Saddam Hussein whom had just been overthrown by the invasion, and also of Shia fighters largely embedded within al Sadr's Mahdi Army. Those Shia fighters were supported and later provided refuge by Iran after having fought with the Mahdi Army that resisted the US occupation. Al Sadr was largely against the presence of foreign troops on Iraqi soil, and as a Shiite, Iran was able to express solidarity with Al Sadr's goals at that time. While, on the other hand, the Sunni fighters were largely embedded with Al Qaeda. While both Sunnis and Shias resisted US occupation, there was no collaboration between the two groups during the insurgency. In fact, only a few years after the insurgency began, the Mahdi Army and Al Sadr had become instrumental in disenfranchising the Sunni minorities in Iraq. Once the new western backed Shia government began to take hold of Iraq after the US scaled back its military operations, the Sunni minorities began to protest

throughout the country against what they considered to be sectarian policies that were aimed against the Sunni demographic. The US had already warned the new Iraqi government to avoid the temptation of implementing policies that would alienate the Sunni minority and create a power vacuum that would allow an insurgency to re-surge. As predicted, ISIS was able to take advantage of the unrest and recruit from within the local Sunni organizations and protester movements, before carrying out a militant course of action that would lead to ISIS reclaiming various territories inside of Iraq. If we try to apply how this would work analogously with Ukraine, we get stuck on how the factor which gave ISIS the advantage to reclaim territory is not readily apparent in the situation concerning Ukraine. This, due to the fact, that most ethnic Ukrainian have likely been eradicated from the pro-Russian separatist regions, and perhaps purposely for that very reason of preventing internal unrest that would create a power vacuum and potential resurgence of Ukrainian resistance inside the eastern territories. Earlier, it was mentioned that a workaround for Ukraine in this regard would be recruiting operatives from inside Russia to travel to eastern Ukraine for the purpose of sowing division between those who want to remain autonomous and those who want to join the Russian Federation, creating enough of a rift that would lead to the side that wants to remain autonomous leaning politically in the direction of Kyiv. Meanwhile, Russia would be at a standstill, not knowing how to approach a situation where they may have to side against Russian speakers. For this reason, as to not upset domestic balance within their own country, Russia would remain apprehensive about getting involved. Even the Russian troops left inside the eastern breakaway regions would have to show restraint. Now if we look back at the situation in Iraq with the resurgence of ISIS in 2014, we notice that correspondingly, Iran was able to take advantage of the power vacuum and become more involved in Iraqi politics by backing organizations that aimed to fight against ISIS. At this time al Sadr was instrumental organizing unites for the purpose of protecting Shiite cultural sites from ISIS. What was once the Mahdi Army had become the Peace Brigades. Because of the threat of ISIS, Iran and most Iraqi Shiites were in solidarity. But after the threat of ISIS had been neutralized by 2019, it was clear that al Sadr's movement against foreign influence was not restricted simply to the United States or Sunni extremism. It was also aimed at Iran, and the last recent years of unrest in Iraq involves internal strife and violence within the Shiite sect. Al Sadr's movement against Iran is comprised of secularists, Sunnis, and Shiites, all of whom are against the foothold that Iran has gained in Iraqi politics. Iran essentially took advantage of the power vacuum created by the rise of ISIS which kept the Shiite sects

dependent on Iranian support in fending off the extremist Sunni militant group. An Iran funded political organization had even managed to gain the majority of seats in Iraq's parliament, a state of affairs that was opposed by al Sadr and his movement. Later in 2021, al Sadr's movement had managed to counter Iranian influence in Iraqi politics by gaining the majority of seats in Iraq's parliament but after being unable to form a government, al Sadr withdrew his bloc from the Iraqi parliament, allowing the Iran backed political party to reclaim the majority of seats. So all in all, one can say right now as of 2022, another power vacuum has been established in Iraq. There are secularist, Sunni and Shiite members making up al Sadr's group, while the rest of the Shiite sects in Iraq are backed by Iran. The question in this case is, could ISIS take advantage here and latch onto al Sadr's movement against Iran since both now share a common political enemy. The reason this is possible is because while ISIS upholds an extremist form of Sunni Islam that considers Shia Islam a form of heresy, much of the reason for their ability too recruit often goes beyond the religious factor. Much of it has to do with the political backdrop. ISIS had more of a connection with the Sunnis in Iraq then the Sunnis in Syria. In Iraq, there was a commonality between Sunnis and ISIS regarding the impact of being disenfranchised by the Shiite governing apparatus there, hence ISIS could express solidarity and thus recruit Sunnis to their cause of liberation. In Syria, this dynamic was not present, hence why so many Sunnis were largely repulsed by the militant group. Another factor that allows ISIS to recruit is due to the economic circumstances, where people are willing to join in exchange for resources and money that is not available to them in their current situation. For Ukraine to be able to infiltrate back into its internationally recognized territories, they would have find a way to express some measure of solidarity with Russian speakers in the east who want to remain autonomous. We can look back the example of the UNA-UNSO fighting in Tranistria back in the 1990s on behalf of protecting the Ethnic Ukrainians against the Moldovan government. It has been noted that at the same time, the UNA-UNSO had unwittingly fought alongside the pro-Russian separatists there who were also fighting against the Moldovan government, and there may have been some collaboration. So when it comes to factors that divide people, in many cases these factors can be overridden by having a common enemy, as we see in the case of Ukrainian nationalists fighting alongside the pro-Russian separatists in Moldova. A real-time example in Ukraine of how this strategy would work can be seen in the Kherson. Ukraine launched a counteroffensive aimed at recapturing Kherson from the Russian forces. President Zelenskyy of Ukraine made it his goal to reclaim Kherson before the winter. Just

prior to the offensive, Ukraine was able to acquire HIMARS rocket systems from the United States, which allowed Ukraine to attack the bridges that connected Kherson to the east of Ukraine and to Crimea. Destroying these bridges leaves Russian military personnel stranded west of the Dnipro river and cut off from its supply routes, and at the same time vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery strikes. One of the key strategies of Ukraine's counteroffensive into Kherson in late August of 2022 was to get Russian forces further away from their supply lines. In theory after destroying the bridges over the Dnieper river, Ukraine would trap Russian forces west of Dnieper and leave them vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery with nowhere to retreat. The bridges that separate Ukraine along the Dnieper river are a logistical nightmare for the Russian occupation and keeps them hesitant to consolidate further west. Furthermore, Kherson is important because of the access it provides to other parts of eastern Ukraine. The Russians being able to capture Kherson at the start of the war, allowed them to seize more territories such as Mariupol, Zaporizhia, Dnipro and Mykolaiv. If they repel the Ukrainian counter-offensive, Russia will have the ability to launch attacks on other eastern Ukrainian cities such as Odessa, which would allow them to capture Ukraine's major ports and pave the way for Russian forces to develop a land bridge to Tranistria, which would then place the Moldovan government under Russia's sphere of influence. One factor that may have impeded the strategic prowess of Ukraine's plan to retake Kherson was the fact that someone inside the Ukrainian SBU may have handed over a map of the minefields to the Russian forces, which thus permitted Russia to claim Kherson very quickly at the outset of the war. Kherson is very close to Crimea where Russia has had a strong military presence since 2014 when they annexed it from Ukraine after a referendum. Since then, the Russian military had remained a threat to the region. And thus before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, Ukraine had vigorously prepared Kherson to be strongly defended from a Russian advance. Zelenskyy himself personally visited Kherson on February 12, 2022 to oversee the military drills taking place there. In retrospect, had Ukraine been able to successfully defend Kherson, it would have had a ripple effect of Ukraine being able to stave off Russian aggression in other parts of eastern Ukraine. However, when a traitor within Ukrainian ranks revealed a map of mine fields to the Russian army, Russia was able to capture Kherson in a matter of hours. Obviously, dealing with collaborators will be the main key in Ukraine being able to recapture its internationally recognized territories from the Russians. However, after Russia captured Kherson early on in the war, there is a still a pro-Ukrainian element there despite the abuse and harassment of

pro-Ukrainian activists, journalists and war veterans, all of whose information was stored on hard drives seized by the Russian military after police fled the city on February 24th 2022. Just prior to the invasion, pro-Russian elements inside Kherson were pushing pro-Russian propaganda and setting the stage for Russian forces to be welcomed into the city, and this is a perfect example of Russia taking advantage of a power vacuum left by the cultural rift. While Ukraine has its suspicions on who may have surrendered the city, it remains unclear as to who actually was responsible. Ukraine has been able to take back a few small villages in Kherson, but reports have indicated that Ukraine has incurred heavy losses. Kherson is of strategic importance to the Russian military because it allows clean water to flow into Crimea, a major flash-point during the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014. Russia had also accused Ukraine's blocking of the flow of water into Crimea to be a form genocide. The Kremlin has deployed a significant number of men to defend Kherson, many being young conscripts with no military training whatsoever. If Ukraine is able to reclaim Kherson, they will be in better position to reclaim Crimea and attack the Russian fleet in Sevastopol.

Meanwhile inside Kherson, under Russian occupation, Russia continues to employ non-military strategies that has had a large impact in Russia being able to remain in occupation of the city. Russia has successfully upheld the idea that Russian speakers were being disenfranchised and oppressed by the Ukrainian government in recent years. This aspect is key in getting the population to become satisfied with the new status-quo. In the occupied areas of the eastern Ukraine, the occupation forces is also allotted some freedom as to which methods they use to get the inhabitants to conform to the paradigm that is being implemented. Anyone that evokes suspicion in those areas are often jailed, tortured, abducted, killed or deported. Ethnic cleansing is often the end game of these occupations because it reduces the chances of the type of dissent that could lead to insurgency. Hence why the Russian language and Russian culture is being imposed upon the territories of eastern Ukraine. In the Russian occupied areas, troops are forcing the inhabitants to use rubles for all their commercial activities and salaries, making it mandatory to the point that not doing so could cost someone their entire livelihood. Much of the anti-Ukrainian indoctrination is upheld by a narrative that blames Ukrainians for the suffering of the people of eastern Ukraine. This attempt at unifying the population as one with the occupiers will predict the success of Russia being able to get the citizens of eastern Ukraine to conform to the everyday life that Russia wants them to live. Amid all these factors inside Kherson, there are still partisans there who remain hopeful that the Ukrainian army will

liberate the city. These pro-Ukrainians often try to remind the inhabitants of the cities that the Ukrainian army sees their actions and that any actions deemed to be collaboration with the enemy will be punished. While some of the remnant pro-Ukrainians are active in Kherson and are non-violent, there also exists a shadow army that uses violent methods to wear out the occupation, i.e. car bombings and other forms of terror. However, the quicker the Russian occupation forces bring some sense of normalcy to the lives of every day Russian speakers in the eastern Ukraine, the easier it will be for Russian to maintain control over those areas. The rift between Kyiv loyalists and Moscow loyalists is still of benefit to Ukraine. However, the difference between the presence of pro-Ukrainian elements in Kherson and the presence of Sunni militants in Iraq circa 2013 which made it easy for ISIS to go on the offensive and reclaim some parts of Iraq is based on the fact that in Iraq, much of the US forces had already pulled out of Iraq by 2011. Had this not been the case, it would have been harder for ISIS and Sunni militants to lay siege to Mosul, Ramadi or Fallujah. We can anticipate that Russia will likely cleanse all Ukrainian elements from the occupied territories before withdrawing. Once this happens, it becomes much harder for Ukraine to take advantage of a power vacuum amid any potential political strife that could occur within the eastern Ukrainian territories. If a referendum is applied and Kherson votes itself into the Russian Federation, Russia will be able to justify keeping troops in the region. Ultimately, it becomes very difficult to forsee any power vacuum of which a pro-Ukrainian element would serve the possibility of occupied eastern Ukrainian territories ending back into the hands of Kyiv. Thus, why its important to implore the possibility of cultivating a critical racial theory that allows those in Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine to identify as racially ambiguous, as opposed to either Ukrainian for Russian. It is hypothesized that those who do identify as racially ambiguous would ultimately become alienated from those who identify as Russian and thus is more solidarity with Ukraine than with Moscow. The key to the effectiveness of such a critical theory being fomented inside occupied territories is if it is also cultivated in the western parts of Ukraine. The only hurdle is the language factor which may draw suspicion from staunch Ukrainian nationalists who are now, as a result of Russian aggression, more likely to be more hostile than ever to Russian culture. Ukrainian nationalists are not necessarily pan East-Slavic nationalists in practice, but on paper they do advocate for the unification of Rus-people but with Kiev as the center, not Moscow. On account of that, a pan east-Slavic nationalism does align with Ukraine's historical backdrop with Kiev being the center of ancient Kievan Rus, the first

empire and unification of Rus people. So the development of a critical theory that falls along those points could alter the landscape to the point where there could be some political aspects in occupied territory that could lean in the direction of Kyiv. The aspect of the UNA-UNSO orchestrating for its pro-Ukrainian contacts inside of Russia to enter eastern Ukraine for the sake of fomenting political schism between the pro autonomy factions and the pro-Russia Federation factions should not be seen within the same context of how both Russia and the United States have fomented unrest in other countries for political advantages. Ukraine, in their case of influencing the politics in the breakaway region for geopolitical advantage is not the same as sowing discord politically because in Ukraine's case, the endgame is ultimately for the sake of uniting its internationally recognized country. There is no insidious quality here because essentially the attempt is to unite the country of Ukraine, not divide it. Of course in this regard, we presume that Ukraine nor the international community would recognize the legitimacy of the breakaway states in eastern and southern Ukraine. But if Ukraine does recognize the breakaway states, then there would be an insidious quality that would come with fomenting political unrest there. As long as this does not become the case, Ukraine should be confident in the operation. Another action against Russia that should not have an insidious quality attached to it is threatening to counterfeit rubles in order to deter Russian aggression. At the moment, Russia has illegally replaced the official Ukrainian currency, the hyrvnia, with the ruble on Ukraine's internationally recognized territory in eastern and southern Ukraine. Hence, actions taken by the Ukrainian government to restore its economic status-quo by taking measures to get its citizens in eastern Ukraine to lose confidence in the ruble will have a serious deterrence effect on Russian aggression because counterfeits injected into eastern Ukraine could flow into Russia and rattle the economy. This dynamic actually happened in the early 90s when Ukraine's soft monetary financial policies caused the ruble to lose value which had a ripple effect on Russia's economy when many of those excess rubles in Ukraine ended flowing into Russia. If Ukraine decides to start counterfeiting rubles en masse in western Ukraine and then somehow find a way to inject them into eastern Ukraine, the result of that could have a very negative impact on the ruble especially if some of those rubles flow into Russia. If Ukraine applies the Nazi Germany strategy, they could simply use an attack helicopter to drop billions of rubles into eastern Ukraine and presume that the more unscrupulous types of that region will not report them to the authorities but will use them for commercial activity and thus cause inflation to surge. The dangers of extreme inflation is that it can cause

serious economic inequalities, as well as a large wealth gap that could precipitate unrest. In serious cases of inflation, it is always for common for the financially astute members of the population to diversify their investment holdings of other stores of value. The common citizen however is oftentimes not well educated on economics and strategies of preparation in the event of an economic crisis. The wealthy however are often well prepared in the event, and this in many causes can lead to extreme wealth inequality, a dangerous prospect during a major economic catastrophe since the sense of lack especially in relation to others in society is much more acute in that setting. This dynamic has precipitated major revolutions throughout history. Moreover, threats to counterfeit rubles abroad could also make Russia think twice about its ability to remain militarily involved in Ukraine.

Chapter 10: Proven Tactics that Reduce Casualties

When it comes to actual military strategy at dealing with the flat lands that minimize the effectiveness of a Ukrainian counter-attack in Kherson, a work around could simply be Ukraine shelling the open fields relentlessly in order to transfigure it into a terrain that is more conducive to advancement, cover, and consolidation. With the use of drones, it would not be difficult for soldiers situated in the craters to be provided via communication the layout of the land and the locations of nearest craters. The reason this is mentioned is because if one reads testimonies of soldiers who fought on day, one can see how some of the soldiers credited shell craters to be what saved their lives on d-day. First Sergeant Leonard Lomell, United States Army Ranger of the 2nd Ranger Battalion recounted his experience of fighting on d-day:

When I went over the top, I tumbled into a shell crater. There was Captain Gilbert Baugh. He was E Company's commander. He had a .45 in his hand, and a bullet had gone through the back of his hand into the magazine in the grip of the .45. He was in shock and bleeding badly, and there was nothing we could do other than to give him some morphine and say, "Listen. We gotta move it. We're on our way, Captain. We'll send back a medic. You just stay here. You're gonna be all right." It was then that we left the crater where we had gathered together as we came over the cliff. We jumped into a bigger crater, and it held maybe a dozen of our guys. We couldn't get all 22 together in one crater for the move toward 4, 5 and 6 gun emplacements. We hadn't counted on craters being a protection to us. We would have lost more men, but the craters protected us.

This is something Ukraine should consider when it comes to launching counteroffensives in the future in areas comprised of open flat lands—simply shelling open field for the sake of making craters that could protect soldiers in route to occupied territories. However, the shelling would have to be followed by a quick advance and consolidation. This was one of the strategies applied by the Canadian and British forces against the German troops in the battle of Eloi during World War I in 1916. Both the British and German soldiers had been digging tunnels on the battlefield in order to reach the other's trench-lines and blow them up from underground. There were a number of these explosion carried out on the battlefield at the Belgium village of St. Eloi, and they left huge craters that the British army would try to use as cover in order to take over the ridge. The battle would become a battle of securing craters, which the Germans

had eventually won. Back then, there was no drone technology that could help ground troops know their location, and because of that there was much confusion during the battle of St. Eloi as to which craters the enemy forces were located. Soldiers in a battle similar to St. Eloi in modern times could certainly be aided by the use of drone technology that would help them navigate and understand the terrain. The presence of craters in the open fields of Kherson would help Ukrainian forces advance and also take cover. Another strategy that would also apply in this circumstance is how the presence of craters in Kherson would force the Russian forces to consider securing them before the Ukrainian troops would. The presence of craters that could serve as cover for the advancing Ukrainian army places the Russian military in a precarious position—if they advance and attempt to secure the craters, they would thus play into the hands of Ukraine's strategy of stretching Russia's forces further west and trapping them by cutting off access to the bridges over the Dnieper river. On the other hand, if Russia stays back and does not engage on the battlefield, they would be allowing the Ukrainian forces to advance by taking cover in the craters as they move froward. For the terrain to become conducive to a Ukrainian advance into Kherson, Ukraine may have to intensely shell the open fields for months, making it unrecognizable but advantageous for a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Another possibility is conducting serious underground mining operations near Kherson for the purpose of infiltrating further into separatist and Russian occupied areas.

Another strategy that could be applied to creating craters in open fields is the use of mylar space blankets. The Taliban forces in Afghanistan made efficient use of mylar space blankets, which are made up of thin material and are normally designed to treat hypothermia by trapping one's body heat. Many drone systems use thermal cameras to see targets at night via a process that essentially converts a person's body heat (infrared energy) into a visual image. However, because the mylar space blankets are designed to reflect one's body heat back towards the person, the mylar space blankets—if draped around a person—can ultimately prevent a thermal camera from detecting the person's body heat and thus the person. This methodology of evading thermal cameras is only effective at night and in cooler weather. On account of that, the Taliban forces in Afghanistan managed to crawl their way to a US base at the Afghan-Pakistan border and launch surprise attacks there, firing an RPG from the helicopter landing zone, before disappearing back into the night draping their mylar blankets over them and crawling back to safety. The Apache helicopters that patrolled the surrounding areas could not locate the Taliban fighters as they encroached the base.

Furthermore, this is certainly a tactic that Ukraine could use to get closer to Russian bases that are situated west of the Dnieper. Something else that could be of use is the pdf that Al-Qaeda commander Abdallah bin Muhammad published in 2011, containing 22 tips on how to evade or stop drones:

It is possible to know the intention and the mission of the drone by using the Russianmade "sky grabber" device to infiltrate the drone's waves and the frequencies. The device is available in the market for $2,595 and the one who operates it should be a computer know-how.

Using devices that broadcast frequencies or pack of frequencies to disconnect the contacts and confuse the frequencies used to control the drone. The Mujahideen have had successful experiments using the Russian-made "Racal."

Spreading the reflective pieces of glass on a car or on the roof of the building.

Placing a group of skilled snipers to hunt the drone, especially the reconnaissance ones because they fly low, about six kilometres or less.

Jamming of and confusing of electronic communication using the ordinary water-lifting dynamo fitted with a 30-metre copper pole.

Jamming of and confusing of electronic communication using old equipment and keeping them 24-hour running because of their strong frequencies and it is possible using simple ideas of deception of equipment to attract the electronic waves devices similar to that used by the Yugoslav army when they used the microwave (oven) in attracting and confusing the Nato missiles fitted with electromagnetic searching devices.

Using general confusion methods and not to use permanent headquarters.

Discovering the presence of a drone through well-placed reconnaissance networks and to warn all the formations to halt any movement in the area.

To hide from being directly or indirectly spotted, especially at night.

To hide under thick trees because they are the best cover against the planes.

To stay in places unlit by the sun such as the shadows of the buildings or the trees.

Maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts.

Disembark of vehicles and keep away from them especially when being chased or during combat.

To deceive the drone by entering places of multiple entrances and exits.

Using underground shelters because the missiles fired by these planes are usually of the fragmented anti-personnel and not anti-buildings type.

To avoid gathering in open areas and in urgent cases, use building of multiple doors or exits.

Forming anti-spies groups to look for spies and agents.

Formation of fake gatherings such as using dolls and statutes to be placed outside false ditches to mislead the enemy.

When discovering that a drone is after a car, leave the car immediately and everyone should go in different direction because the planes are unable to get after everyone.

Using natural barricades like forests and caves when there is an urgent need for training or gathering.

In frequently targeted areas, use smoke as cover by burning tires.

As for the leaders or those sought after, they should not use communications equipment because the enemy usually keeps a voice tag through which they can identify the speaking person and then locate him.

Applying other tactics to evade Russian aggression may become more imperative as NATO and US weapons development become unable to keep up with Ukrainian consumption. This was the opinion of US Brigadier General Mark T Kimmitt, who wrote a piece in the Wall

Street Journal on September 1st 2022 outlining how US and NATO weapons manufacturing will have a hard time keeping pace with the supply losses accrued on the battlefield. This creates a logistical problem for Ukraine. The article also mentioned that it is possible that Russia may have yet to tap into its own reserves of higher-powered weapons. A number of options were mentioned that could deal with these issues. One was that NATO member states could convince their respective populations that because Russia has been weakened as a result of using ts military resources for Ukraine, NATO member states should not have to worry about the implications of sending to Ukraine weapons from their own stockpiles originally meant to protect the member country. Another option that was explored in the article was the US sending F-16 fighter jets, as well as long range missiles, assuming that doing such would not expand the war further into western Europe. And then finally, it was proposed that Ukraine cut its losses and negotiate a peace deal. This final proposal is likely untenable because Ukraine still believes they have an opportunity to win the war, and because of this, such an option would seem overtly defeatist and such defeatism would be considered unwarranted. However, the fact that the article was even published in western media shows that Ukraine's suppliers are becoming concerned about how the war will affect their armaments stockpiles which are meant strictly for the defense of the NATO member states. Because of the overtures given to Ukraine by NATO and the US just prior to the war, promising that they would protect Ukraine in the event of a Russian invasion makes it to where any withdrawal of US or NATO support could be defined as betrayal. Such would have massive implication, especially for the United States, whose currency's value is based on the trust of foreign nations that the US would intervene militarily on their behalf. Another reason for the timing of the article could be what is brewing between China and the United States over Taiwan. A US conflict with China would prevent the US from being able to sustain the level of weapons supply to Ukraine. When it comes to the potential withdrawal of US aid to Ukraine, Zelenskyy could use the whole US dollar aspect that comes with US commitment abroad and simply threaten to call any withdrawal of US support as a direct betrayal and negative reflection on US moral standing. This would threaten US alliances with critical allies like Saudi Arabia, an alliance which keeps the US dollar afloat, preventing America from collapsing into an economic depression despite the high inflation. Zelenskyy using that angle would deter the US from withdrawing aid at any time in the near future. If Saudi Arabia also views the Ukraine Russia war from that same angle of withdrawal as betrayal, and openly expresses to reassess the petrodollar agreement if such a scenario does arise, it

would further deter the US from withdrawing aid to Ukraine. In addition to this as mentioned earlier, if Zelensky runs this threat concurrent with threats to counterfeit the Russian ruble, he could kill two birds with one stone. Basically, prevent the US from withdrawing aid and also deter Russian aggression by threatening to dump billions of fake counterfeit rubles into eastern Ukraine, which could trickle into Russia and damage the economy and potentially cause unrest. In this regard, Zelenskyy places Ukraine back in control over the situation within its internationally recognized territories without having to use military aggression. It is certainly possible that both tactics could lead to continued US funding and a slow Russian withdrawal from eastern and southern Ukraine, depending on the level of impact the counterfeit rubles has on the Russian economy. Of course that is the economic tactic of deterrence. The political tactic would be as mentioned before—having the UNA-UNSO have its contacts from Russia travel to eastern and southern Ukraine to foment a schism between pro-autonomists and those who want to join the Russian Federation. The Russian operatives would join those who want to join the Russian Federation, using rhetoric that would alienate the pro-autonomists from those who wish to become part of Russia, and in doing so causing the pro-autonomists to naturally become more pro-Kyiv. Meanwhile, in western Ukraine, doctrines would be drawn up that would define the Russian-speaker who doesn't identify as Russian to be a racially ambiguous ethnotype but leaned closer to Ukraine. This sows the seeds that Russian-speakers may become more confident of acceptance in the western parts of Ukraine, and at the same time more openly pro-Kyiv in the eastern parts. This tactic would have to coincide with a large scale Russian withdrawal from Ukraine so that Kyiv forces would be given an opportunity by the pro-autonomists to march back into eastern Ukraine and occupy lost territory in a show of force, not requiring any major acts of hostility very much akin to the Taliban reclaiming Afghanistan right as the US pulled its troops out the country. Ukrainian troop presence there would be to uphold the autonomy of the Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine. This basically puts Kyiv back in control over the geography. The idea is to have Ukrainian troops there to back the pro-autonomist militias. Following this arrangement, a deal can be orchestrated in which Ukrainian troops could indefinitely uphold their autonomy or plan to have them reintegrated into Ukraine after a period of time, depending on how the west accommodates Russian speakers.

Militarily, for Ukraine to make advances against Russian aggression, they would have to employ underground operations aimed at altering the landscape of the open fields that are keeping

them from encroaching Russian occupied territories. This would require purposely bombing the open fields strictly for the purpose of have craters to take cover in upon advance. The craters should be far enough apart to where Ukrainian soldiers can crawl to and secure each craters at night with mylar blankets draped over them so that they can avoid being seen by the thermal cameras of the surveillance drones and helicopters. The presence of craters themselves being used Ukraine makes it to where Russia would have to stretch its forces in order to secure the craters and keep Ukraine from reaching them. But this also works in favor of Ukraine because it places Russian forces further away from their supply lines and potentially leaves them trapped and vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery. Thus the open fields become the field of Mars where continued resistance by Ukraine will eventually force Russia to withdraw its forces from there. In fact, we can expect that continued resistance by Ukraine against Russian forces west of the Dnieper river will lead to Russia withdrawing its troops from those areas. With HIMARS added to the picture the aforementioned economic, political, and military gameplan is enough to keep morale high enough in Ukraine and also prevent political in-fighting between the far right and Zelenskyy's political party.

However, when it comes to reclaiming territory east of the Dnieper, Ukraine will have a much harder time achieving this militarily without the numbers and amount of artillery that would have to be deployed nearby. This had already been an issue during the battle of Sievierodonetsk in Luhansk region where Ukrainian forces took considerable losses amid being severely outnumbered by Russian troops and equipment. Once again, we have a case of close proximity to supply lines working in favor of Russia, while distant proximity to supply lines working against Ukraine. In mid-June, the critical battle waged on in Sievierodonetsk in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine. While Sievierodonetsk is located in the Luhansk Oblast, one of the breakaway regions, the city of Sievierodonetsk remained part of Ukraine. However in June, the Russian forces began to surround the city. Both Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk hosted many serious clashes between Ukrainian forces and separatist forces during the war in Donbass back in 2014. Shortly after Russian forces invaded Ukraine in February of 2022, Russian troops immediately began shelling Sievierodonetsk and clashes between Russian and Ukrainian forces erupted all over the city. Ukrainian troops initially repelled the Russian forces from entering Sievierodonetsk, but that would eventually change as Russia would began to overwhelm them with more troops and artillery. As the battle continued, Russian forces managed to gain control over much of the surrounding region

in Luhansk, capturing Rubizhne and Popasna, two cities very close to Sievierodonetsk. The Russian troops continued to shell Sievierodonetsk as the Ukrainian continued to resist the Russian advance. Meanwhile, many civilians in the city began to flee, and in April, Russian troops began moving into vacant areas of the Donbass region. Its important to not that for Ukraine to have any success in recapturing territories in the Donbass region, they would have to find a way to cut off the supply lines coming in from the Russian Federation. Look back at history, one example of this being carried out was during the Soviet Invasion of Finland just before World War II. The Red Army greatly outnumbered Finland in manpower and military equipment, but the Finns were able to achieve success early on by dispersing their forces to the border areas, which allowed them to cut off Red Army supplies from Russia and thus win early battles. At one point, it looked as though Finland would defeat the Soviet Union, but as should have been expected, the Red Army just simply applied more troops and military artillery to the point of overwhelming the Finns.

In Sievierodonetsk, Ukrainian forces began suffering massive casualties as a result of intense fighting, losing around 100 troops a day and imploring western nations to provide more heavy weapons. In early May, both the Russian troops and LPR fighters began securing areas just outside of Sievierodonetsk in an attempt to surround and overpower the Ukrainian forces. The strategy was to take control over all the nearby villages and effectively surround the city and cut off its access to the outside. The Ukrainian holdout, nonetheless, refused to surrender, despite ultimatums from LPR and Russian fighters. Russian forces continued to attack villages surrounding Sievierodonetsk—Rubizhne, Voevodivka, Popasna and Bilohorivka encountered significant Russian fighting, and before long, Russian forces encircled the city. They were then in position to bombard it relentlessly after the LPR defeated the Ukrainian forces in the battle of Rubizhne. Russia subsequently halted the ground advance and strictly resorted to artillery strikes on both Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk. While the Russian forces were largely staved off in the north, they were able to make gains south of the city. In late May, Russian forces began a ground assault and tried to make their way further into Sievierodontsk and break off into multiple pockets within the city. In the west, the supply lines were being destroyed by Russian artillery. The Russian troops made minor advances on May 28th, but by this time both sides of the conflict were suffering heavy casualties. Russia did not want to overextend its commitment to add reinforcements to the region, and at this time reinforcing LPR fighters was proving to be very difficult. The next

day, fighting erupted in the middle of Sievierodonetsk as some Russian troops were able to breach Ukrainian resistance at the outskirts. Shortly thereafter, Russia gained control over 80% of the city, causing many Ukrainian troops to retreat and prepare for a counteroffensive. At the start of June, Russian artillery struck a nitric acid tank at the Azot chemical plant, where roughly 800 civilians had been hiding in bomb shelters underneath. Despite the Russian advance into the city centre, Ukrainian troops managed to kill 200 Russian soldiers and regain some of the lost territory in Sievierodonetsk after launching a counter offensive on June 3rd. Many of Ukraine's foreign fighters were also active in the city. Despite the newfound momentum, Russia had cut off supply lines, blowing up bridges that lead into the city, making it difficult for Ukrainian troops to access deliveries of food and medicine into Sievierodonetsk. Russia has this advantage, being consolidated east—they can cut the flow of aid coming from the west. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense accused Russia of putting its non-Russian military personnel in danger for the sake of minimizing casualties within the Russian army. The governor of Luhansk, Serhiy Haidai, was confounded by the sheer size of the Russian military arsenal in terms of troops and equipment. President Zelenskyy repeated the same sentiments, despite vowing that Ukrainian troops will continue resisting. Yet no one was certain as to who was controlling what, in and around the city, but Ukrainian officials continued to remain steadfast, ensuring everyone that Ukrainian forces would continue to hold out. This was amid Russian reports that Ukrainian forces were depleted of critical supplies and troops. A short while later, the Luhansk governor would admit that Ukrainian forces had been pushed back as a result of Russian shelling, leaving 800 civilians trapped in the Azot chemical factory. By June 9th, the Russian forces would have control over 90% of the city. Ukrainian forces attempted to lure Russian forces into an urban combat scenario, which is Russia's weakness. But the lack of influx of weapons and other equipment left Ukrainian forces stagnant. The urban fighting continued and casualties continued to mount on both sides, but Ukrainian officials were admitting that they were taking heavy losses and that Russia was in control over much of Sievierodonetsk. Ukrainian officials also continued to reiterate that the Russians had a significant advantage of manpower and artillery and pleaded with the west to send more heavy weapons. The LPR officials later accused Ukraine of launching strikes from the Azot plant, potentially using the civilians there as human shields. On June 13th, the last remaining bridges attaching Sievierodonetsk to other parts of Luhansk had been destroyed by Russian forces and left Ukrainian forces indefinitely stranded inside the city with no supply

lines or escape routes. It was clear that Ukrainian forces being so far away from its supply lines in western Ukraine left them unable to resist the Russian onslaught in Sievierodonetsk. Up to this point, the carnage and death in Sievierodonetsk had become so significant that Ukrainian officials stopped counting casualties. But much like other parts of Ukraine, there were reports of Russian shelling of soft targets like schools and churches, as well as humanitarian centers. The mayor as of late May said that roughly 1500 civilians were killed in Sievierodonetsk since the beginning of the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022. On June 25, 2022, the Russian forces took full control of Sievierodonetsk, forcing Ukrainian forces to retreat and seek higher ground in Lysychansk in a move which allows Ukraine to prepare for a future counter-assault. This was the largest setback for Ukrainian forces. However, Ukrainian officials insist that the withdrawal was strictly tactical, and that the newly arrived HIMARS rocket systems will allow Ukraine to strike targets in Russian-occupied areas of the country, making it possible for Ukrainian forces to recapture lost territories. But unfortunately within a few days, Lysychansk would fall to the Russians. However, the arrival of the HIMARS weapons will allow Ukraine to apply their own strategy of destroying bridges and cutting off Russian supply lines that bring in weapons from east of the Dnieper. If Ukraine attempts to return to the east of Ukraine, they would have to use the HIMARS to attack the Izvaryne border crossing which allows supplies to flow into eastern Ukraine from Russia.

One strategy that Ukraine has to remain vigilant about has to do with the timing of Russia's withdrawal of troops from eastern Ukraine. This aspect was vital to ISIS reclaiming parts of Iraq in 2014 and also for the Taliban resurgence which took place after 2014. In fact, the Taliban's strategy was very deliberate. Between 2011 and 2014, US and NATO announced the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and attempted to transfer control and the security situation over to the Afghan security forces. Meanwhile, during this time, the Taliban decided to give off the impression that their capabilities were largely weakened and therefore no threat to the new US-backed Afghan governance. The reason the Taliban applied this approach was to help facilitate the withdrawal since US NATO withdrawal was predicated on the idea that the Taliban would no longer be a threat. Likewise, in Ukraine if other tactics fail to persuade Russia to withdraw, Russia will eventually announce a withdrawal of most of its forces within 2 years, likely leaving some Russian forces in the region but also transferring control over to local separatist forces. The period of time between Russia's announced withdrawal and their actual withdrawal would have to coincide with

Ukraine fomenting political infighting in the separatist-held territories over the status of the region, and setting the stage for the pro-autonomy factions in the separatist-held territories to help facilitate a quick Ukrainian surge into the area just following the Russian withdrawal of most of its forces. The idea is that a critical race theory that cements the identity of Russian-speakers in Ukraine as racially ambiguous will weaken their will to continue fighting for a cause that they do not resonate with, and for that reason they will be open to negotiating with Kyiv. Also, just like in Afghanistan, the separatist regions will not have the same access to air support that they had throughout the war. This was another factor that helped facilitate the Taliban resurgence and reclaiming of power in Afghanistan—many who served in the Afghan Security service who were low in morale also knew that they would be helpless against the Taliban without NATO/US air support. The same could be said for the separatists. They will likely lose faith in their ability to fend off the Ukrainian forces without the full backing of Russian air support. Now its likely that Russia will keep forces in the separatist regions indefinitely due to their own constitutional factors that justify doing so in territories they designate as independent and sovereign and of whom they are also allies with. But as Ukraine facilitates political issues within the separatist regions along with doctrines that show that Russian speakers in eastern and southern Ukraine are racially ambiguous, the morale to fight will plummet among separatist fighters, now dealing with an environment that will make them more inclined to defect to the Ukrainian side and help them return to power in the eastern and southern territories. Another overlooked aspect that enabled the Taliban to solicit the help of Afghan Security forces in reclaiming the country was the fact that the average Afghan had more in common with the Taliban than the US or NATO. Many in Afganistan felt that western identity was being forced upon them. This dynamic is why Ukraine will be able to take advantage of the fact that Russian identity being forced upon Russian speakers in separatist held territories will only cause resentment and hurt morale there. As a result, many Russian speakers will feel more aligned with Ukraine since Ukraine would not be forcing an identity upon them, but simply respecting the ambiguity of Russian speakers in the Donbass and southern Ukraine insist upon. Whereas before, Russian speakers felt more in common with the average Russian, now the Russian speaker in Ukraine will feel more aligned with Kyiv since Kyiv would respect their wishes to remain autonomous.

Another aspect that can pacify enemy fighters is the prospect of better treatment if captured. Russia has taken advantage of this on multiple occasion showing video and testimony of captured soldiers

explaining how well their captors have treated them. In Afghanistan, the Taliban would film defectors meeting, shaking hands, and hugging Taliban fighters after being provided safe passage and money to relocate and start anew. There was a strategic element to this. It works to discourage enemy fighter from continuing the fight and it also evokes the temptation to flee into the enemy's hands if the outcome would be more advantageous. Russia has applied this strategy with great efficiency, showing Ukrainian fighters giving a testimony of refusing to be swapped back to the Ukrainian side during prisoner swaps. Things like this have a pacifying effect on enemy soldiers and could tempt them to willfully fall into the enemy's hands. Because corruption has been noted in Ukraine for many years, there is a very high probability that Ukrainian soldiers could fall privvy to such temptations. Ukraine must quickly move to apply the same strategy, showing films of Russian soldiers giving testimony to how well their Ukrainian captors are treating them. If Ukraine manages to inflate the ruble in eastern territories, they may be able to pay Russian defectors large sums of US dollars to leave the separatist armies. The Taliban strategy was basically surrender for money, and Ukraine could take advantage of this in a scenario where the economy in the separatist regions could foster the temptation to accept payouts from the other side. The impact of economics/bribery in recapturing territory cannot be understated and Afghanistan is a shining example of how that methodology can be used to its maximum extent.

These potential power vacuum scenarios are also taking place in Georgia, another country that faced a full-scale Russian invasion. During the Russia war in Ukraine in 2022, South Ossetia contributed troops to help with alongside the Russian army. However, former separatist leader of South Ossetia, Eduard Kokoity, accused Russia of using them as cannon fodder. This statement was made right around the time that South Ossetia under Anatoly Bibilov was preparing to initiate a referendum, voting on whether or not to join the Russian Federation. What is interesting was that after a new leader Alan Gagloyev was elected in May of 2022, the referendum was quickly postponed. One can wonder if a political schism is brewing in Georgia over autonomy or joining the Russian Federation and if this disagreement is based on how Russian managed South Ossetia troops helping Russia in Ukraine. The intensity of this quarrel could create a power vacuum that the Georgian government could take advantage of. The conundrum, however, is that any engagement by the Georgian government could be construed as recognition. Here, new terminology has to be denominated which would define engagement without construing it as recognition.

The war between Russian and Ukraine has become a gritty battle of attrition after six months. But since Russia could only slowly adapt to warfare against a resistant Ukrainian forces, the influx of western weapons into Ukraine give confidence to the prospect of an eventual Russian withdrawal. Based on past wars in recent years, one can presume that Russia will be seeking to withdraw its forces from Ukraine in 2024. In the meantime, however, Ukraine will have to remain vigilant of Russia's ability to deplete Ukraine's stockpile of western weapons, as well as their reserve fighters, even with it being the case that defending nations would in most cases have the ability to retain a higher battlefield morale. In this regard, Ukraine has the edge. Along with this, there is also international support which has been predicated on such support being enough for Ukraine to defend itself without it leading to an expanded war. Another factor regarding weapons supplied by the international community pertains to how quickly Ukrainian troops can be trained to use the equipment. This factor has largely played a role in western reluctance to provide f-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, since in the scenario of which the west would approve deployment, there is still the question of Ukrainian troops having the time to learn how to fly the f-16s. Under normal conditions, it would take roughly six months for Ukrainian pilots to learn how to operate the fighter jets, and Ukraine has proposed for the training of pilots to take place immediately, so that when it is approved for fighter jets to be supplied to Ukraine, Ukrainian pilots could immediately be deployed into combat missions with the new jets. The US has been apprehensive about supplying f-16s, fearing it could escalate and expand the war beyond eastern Europe. Instead, the US has considered offering Ukraine its surplus of A-10 jets, which would be effective in attacking large columns of Russian tanks. The A-10s, however, are much slower than other fighter jets and make them very vulnerable to Russian air defense systems. They are still, however, more powerful than Ukraine's current arsenal of fighter jets which include Soviet Era MIGs and Su-25s, but not as fast, agile or elusive as f16s of f35 fighter jets. The goal of the west in supplying weapons to Ukraine is for the purpose of depleting Russia's military arsenal of weapons. A stalemate would only compel western nations to become concerned about the implication that supplying Ukraine has on their own reserves, which would lead to western countries urging Ukraine to seek out a negotiated settlement with Russia.

Despite the apprehension of western leaders to send weapons that would more significantly change the tide of the war, there are still other aspects that would have to be incorporated into Ukraine's strategy, and these methods include the non-military aspects that have been explained in this book. The use critical race theories,

clandestine operations, Ukrainian sympathizers in Russia, power vacuums from political friction, and counterfeiting operations could have a significant impact on raising the prospect of Ukraine reclaiming breakaway areas in the east and south of Ukraine.

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